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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, cities across the United States have 
invested considerable amounts of public funds to finance the 
construction of stadium facilities. Supporters of these 
projects have utilized, through the use of multiplier 
effects, positive direct and indirect economic outcomes, as 
well as community building and cultural identification 
factors to argue in favor of these public expenditures. As 
sports become part of a culture industry, questions remain 
as to whether these sports construction projects are viable 
urban development tools. 
This study examines the relationship between three 
urban communities in the city of Chicago (South Armour 
Square, Lake View and Near West Side) and the stadiums which 
rest within their boundaries. Qualitative and quantitative 
data was employed to conduct this research and investigate 
the relationship among stadium development, business 
interests and community issues. 
This study concludes that (1) there is a strong 
relationship between the interests of stadium developers and 
the actions of public officials, who work to support private 
enterprise, (2) Race matters since minority communities 
prove to be more directly affected by these projects, (3) 
v 
the media plays an important role as it works to support the 
interest of the developers, (4) social inequality proves to 
be the outcome of these projects within the urban 
environment, and (5) the stadium as an urban development 
tool is capable of not only reorganizing the physical space 
but also of transforming local culture. Thus, stadium 
development can effect urban change. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Goal of this Project 
Urban development and its implications toward the 
quality of life for those residing within the urban 
environment has been shaped by multiple factors. The 
primary emphasis on ecological, political and economic 
factors, as ways to understand urban processes, has often 
excluded the investigation and impact of various cultural 
influences. 
Cultural aspects affect the character of the 
metropolis. More specifically, cultural differences, as 
represented by the effects of social factors such as income, 
education, race, etc., inform the organization of the urban 
environment. Symbolic values, such as dress code and 
reliance on the automobile can help differentiate between 
experiencing life in New York and experiencing life in Los 
Angeles. These symbolic values have emerged from both 
historical and demographic variations (Gottdiener, 1994) and 
can assist in the creation of positively identified images 
of place (Hummon, 1986). 
One of the cultural factors which has shaped and 
continues to shape the urban environment has been that of 
1 
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professional sports. Professional sports and the stadiums 
which host their teams have utilized cities across America 
as places of operation. These sports enterprises are unique 
when compared to other businesses that affect the character 
of a metropolitan area. Though they retain the profit 
oriented mode which typifies other businesses, they are 
often perceived as a collective representation of a 
metropolis while depicting the qualities of its residents. 
As a result, professional sports can construct the 
metropolitan character. The presence of a team becomes a 
cultural symbol of the city. These symbolic images of 
sports become powerful tools of city identification, capable 
of leaving a mark on the urban terrain and its communities. 
This project examines the relationship between 
three urban communities in the city of Chicago (South Armour 
Square, Near West Side and Lake View) and the stadiums which 
rest within their boundaries (New Comiskey Park, United 
Center and Wrigley Field). Specifically, the purpose of 
this research is threefold. The first is to investigate the 
development of these sports facilities and their 
relationship to the community. The issues to be addressed 
here are: What role did the local and/or state government 
play in the construction of these stadiums? What 
rationale(s) were utilized to support these developments and 
what was the site selection process? How did the local 
communities respond to these development plans? What were 
the consequences of these developments on these urban 
communities? Who won and who lost? 
3 
The second purpose is to compare how these three 
communities experienced the stadium development plans. 
Issues to be addressed here include: What is the ongoing 
relationship between these urban developments and the local 
communities? Are there any similarities and/or differences 
in the way the sports developers managed to achieve their 
goals? Are there any similarities and/or differences in the 
way the three urban communities responded to the development 
plans? If so, what might account for the similarities 
and/or differences? 
Finally, the third purpose is to draw on the general 
patterns of recent stadium development as representations of 
the changing nature of capitalism. The issues to be 
addressed here are: What might be driving the recent 
construction of stadium facilities across the United States? 
What is the general relationship between this gentrification 
of stadiums and the role of government? How does this 
collaboration between sport enterprise and government 
support, as exemplified by stadium development, differ from 
other cases where government engages in activity aimed at 
advancing the interests of free enterprise? Does the study 
of stadium development, help us better understand the 
evolving relationship between social institutions and 
capitalism within the urban environment? What role does 
4 
urban communities play in these processes? 
This research will build on the work of sociologists 
who have been concerned with urban development and the 
various roles of determining the political and economic 
directions of the city, including the social implications on 
urban life. Also, political scientists who have been 
interested in the government's role in supporting urban 
development projects such as stadium construction. Finally, 
sport sociologists who have been concerned with the social 
significance of sport and its infiltration and impact on 
various social institutions, specifically urban communities. 
Cities across the United States invest considerable 
amounts of public funds to finance the construction of 
stadium facilities. To rationalize their "need", supporters 
of these projects have utilized positive, direct and 
indirect economic outcomes and cultural identification 
factors. They have also upheld the status, which these 
types of cities are perceived to gain by becoming accepted 
into the unique "major league club", as a key element in 
making public investment in these projects worthwhile. 
Thus, drawing from these general developments, the purpose 
of this study is to investigate the relationship among (1) 
stadium development, (2) business interests and (3) 
community issues in Chicago. 
5 
Selection of Communities and Stadiums for Case Studies 
The presence of five major league professional 
franchises in Chicago (White Sox, Bears, Cubs, Blackhawks 
and Bulls) provided four different opportunities to 
investigate the relationship between the local communities 
and the sport enterprise as expressed through the 
construction of stadium facilities (both the Blackhawks and 
Bulls play at the United Center) . The unique opportunity to 
have two of these stadiums, the New Comiskey Park in South 
Armour Square and the United Center on the Near West Side, 
complete their construction and open within the last few 
years, made those stadiums two strong candidates for 
inclusion. In addition, the nature of the local communities 
as areas experiencing economic and social distress - a fact 
which was utilized as a rationale for building these 
facilities at these locations - made for interesting 
circumstances to study. 
The construction of the United Center on the Near West 
Side and of the New Comiskey Park in South Armour Square, 
are two recent developments exemplifying the relationship 
between the urban environment and professional teams. In 
looking at these two communities, one can note a number of 
similarities. However, the dynamics which brought about the 
construction of these sports facilities are quite different. 
Both the United Center and the New Comiskey Park have 
affected these communities and will continue to shape the 
6 
landscape of their urban environment in the future. 
The location of Soldiers Field (current home of the 
Bears), at the lakefront, does not make it an attractive 
option to be included as a case study. This stadium is 
isolated from a residential community and fits well within 
the museum/landmark campus which exists on that general area 
of Lakeshore Drive. Yet, the professional franchise of the 
Bears and its impact on the urban environment, as part of 
this intense stadium development, can be examined on the 
Near West Side. It was there when, in the mid to late SO's, 
a strong effort took place to build a 75,000 spectator, 
open-air stadium for the Bears. This expansion effort will 
be considered when examining the relationship between the 
Near West Side and the United Center. 
Finally Wrigley Field, on the north side of the city, 
is a ballpark of special status. It continues to attract 
fans even though the Cubs have poor seasons on the field. 
It is also one of the only three ballparks left which 
represent the "old" era of stadiums in America (the other 
two being Tiger Stadium and Fenway Park) . The community in 
which Wrigley Field is located has in recent years attracted 
a younger crowd. This case study also offers an insight on 
the issue of stadium development. Specifically, the 
introduction of lights at Wrigley Field made this ballpark 
become the last stadium in the major leagues to have night 
games. 
It is because of these reasons that these three 
communities and their stadiums fit well within the scope of 
this project and have been chosen as case studies. At the 
same time, these three stadiums will provide an additional 
opportunity to compare a stadium of 'historic status', such 
as that of Wrigley Field, to the other two stadiums, which 
are patterned after a "new shopping mall" form of 
development. Simultaneously, having three very different 
communities will also allow for unique comparisons to 
emerge. 
Methodology 
The case study approach is an appropriate way to study 
the development of sport stadiums and their 
relationship/effect to local communities. First, the case 
study approach provides an opportunity to integrate a 
historical perspective to the analysis and investigate the 
political, economic and social influences which brought 
about the construction of these facilities. Second, case 
studies will allow for variations and similarities to 
emerge. For example, the demographic composition of the 
7 
communities involved in these stadium development processes, 
their organizational strategies, the role of the local 
political leadership, their physical location within the 
city, the degree of city and state intervention, the role of 
the media, etc., allow for interesting comparisons. Yet, 
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examined comprehensively, these cases studies will provide 
an opportunity to move from the micro to a macro level of 
analysis and draw conclusions about the relationship between 
stadium development and urban communities in general. 
The case studies of these three urban, stadium 
communities will be based on: (1) a review of newspaper 
accounts of events related to these stadium developments, 
(2) interviews, (3) inclusion of census data from 1980 and 
1990 for these communities, and (4) review of local 
documents/publications. Specifically: 
Review of newspaper accounts: The events which led to the 
stadium development examined in these three case studies 
received considerable coverage by local and national media. 
Much of the coverage concentrated on issues related to site 
selection, finance, role of the local and state government, 
community response to the development plans, etc. A history 
of the social, political and economic occurrences which led 
to the construction of the new Comiskey Park and United 
Center, and the installation of lights at Wrigley Field will 
prove useful in understanding these stadium development 
issues. 
Interviews: Another source of data employed was the 
interviews which were conducted with community leaders and 
others involved in the stadium issues. Using a snowball 
effect, I identified individuals engaged in the community 
response to the stadium development plans. These 
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individuals included local activists, stadium preservation 
advocates and even an architect. For example, in the case 
of the new Comiskey Park, the response of the South Armour 
Square residents was discussed with community leaders. A 
stadium architect, critical of contemporary "urban ballpark 
design" who had proposed an alternative stadium development 
plan in that same area was interviewed. Finally, other 
organization leaders like those of the "Save Our Sox" group 
which argued that it was the increased profit on the part of 
the ownership and not the disintegrating old Comiskey which 
drove the demands for a new ballpark were also interviewed. 
In the process of these interviews, the tactics of setting 
one city against another for the public finance of a new 
stadium for the White Sox were revealed. 
Similar interviews were conducted for the other case 
studies. In the case of Wrigley Field, the effect of the 
lights on the local community was discussed with the owners 
of local businesses. These interactions provided additional 
insights to this analysis. It is important to note here, 
that, due to the large number of individuals involved with 
these issues, these interviews were utilized as means to 
access information which complemented the other methods of 
data collection employed in this project. 
Census data: The use of census data was also utilized in 
these case studies at two different levels: (1) at the 
community level, and (2) at the census track level. Even 
10 
though the New Comiskey Park and the United Center were 
built after the 1990 census was completed, they were both 
constructed next to the previous facilities. As a result, 
the use of census data provided insights on the social and 
economic characteristics of the surrounding community. In 
addition to community characteristics, census track data 
from around the ballpark in the Wrigley Field/Lake View case 
study was employed. Specifically, 1980 and 1990 census 
tract data was utilized to convey population changes and 
compare socioeconomic trends in the area surrounding the 
ballpark. 
Local documents/publications: The last source of data for 
these case studies was the review of local 
documents/publications. 'For example, community 
organizations involved with these stadium related issues, 
produced documents crucial to understanding these urban 
developments. Similarly, various documents published by the 
City of Chicago and/or the franchises themselves were 
incorporated in the analysis. Such publications included, 
neighborhood assessments, neighborhood improvement and 
protection plans, surveys by the sports franchises on 
community impact, reports on the teams' value for Chicago, 
committee minutes, reports by the city, community 
redevelopment plans, etc. 
The general questions which will guide this research 
project include: 
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1. What is the business climate within which urban centers 
across America operate? 
2. Is growth an urban development strategy utilized by 
cities? 
3. What is the general relationship between the state and 
private investment within urban development? 
4. Are professional sports franchises and stadiums being 
viewed to be part of an urban development strategy? 
5. What types of rationales are employed by cities to 
support these projects? 
6. What are the social implications and community effects of 
these projects? 
7. What role does the political system, local or state, 
play in the stadium development plans of this study? 
8. In the case of neighborhood residents, how were they 
impacted by these changes? 
9. How did the community organize to respond to these 
development plans? 
10. Has the stadium development impacted 
positively/negatively on the local community? 
11. What role has the media played in this process? 
12. Does the case of the United Center on the West Side 
of Chicago, the New Comiskey Park in South Armour and the 
developments in Wrigley Field, with the addition of lights, 
represent the changing role and structure of stadiums within 
urban communities? 
13. Is there a relationship between the socioeconomic 
status of the community and the site selection process? 
14. Does such status impact upon the response of the 
community and upon the benefits/losses incurred after or 
during the construction? 
Organization of the Project 
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The general questions identified above will direct this 
analysis to better understand the relationship between 
professional sports and urban environments. This project is 
divided into four parts. The first part, which includes 
chapters 1 and 2, provides an introduction to the research, 
the methodology employed for conducting the three case 
studies, and the identification of two major factors (role 
of state intervention and cultural symbolism in urban 
development) which provide the theoretical framework for 
this project. 
The second part of this analysis includes chapters 3 
and 4. This part investigates the rationales utilized by 
cities across America to support the construction of 
stadiums. According to city officials, large public 
investments in stadium construction are necessary since 
without them professional franchises cannot be retained or 
attracted. 
Chapter 3 examines the use of the multiplier effect in 
input-output analysis. Public spending in projects like 
13 
stadiums has been rationalize through economic multipliers. 
The chapter investigates the multiplier use in various areas 
including the defense industry, manufacturing, tourism, the 
arts and sports. The chapter concludes with a critique of 
this methodology, outlining its limitations. 
Chapter 4 assesses the proposed social benefits 
reported to result from the presence of a professional 
sports franchise in cities across America. Drawing from the 
functionalist perspective in sports, arguments related to 
social cohesion, community building and perceived urban 
status are discussed. This chapter concludes with an 
assessment of these social based arguments. 
Part three consists of five chapters. Chapters 5, 6, 
7, 8, and 9, concentrate on the three case studies in 
Chicago. These case studies examine the three recent 
stadium developments and their effects on Chicago's local 
communities. 
Chapter 5 provides the political economy of the new 
Comiskey Park's construction. It analyzes the rationales 
behind the deteriorating condition of the old Comiskey Park 
and the demands for a new facility in South Armour Square, 
on the south side of the city. This chapter also discusses 
the strategy utilized by the ownership of the White Sox team 
to obtain a new stadium by setting suburban communities, the 
City of Chicago and the City of St. Petersburg in Florida 
against each other in return for the franchises' presence. 
This chapter concludes with a discussion of the more than 
generous financial package which the State of Illinois and 
the City of Chicago awarded to retain the White Sox. 
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Chapter 6 investigates the response of the local 
community to this project, community organizing, the role of 
the local political leadership, displacement, cultural 
implications and redevelopment efforts following the 
construction of this facility. The chapter concludes with 
the presentation of an alternative plan which, though it 
received no serious consideration, could have had a 
different influence on the local community. Specifically, 
according to its architectural designer, this plan could 
have produced limited displacement and possibly worked in 
such a way as to provide a "real" urban development 
opportunity for the area. 
Chapter 7 addresses the political economy of Wrigley 
Fields' stadium development plans on the north side of the 
city. Specifically, the interest on the part of baseball's 
Cubs to install lights on the last ballpark in the Major 
League to play only day games, was economically motivated. 
When the local community of Lake View responded to these 
plans with dissatisfaction and as legal efforts to approve 
the installation of lights proved fruitless, the Cubs 
threatened to leave for a suburban location and cease 
playing at historic Wrigley Field. This chapter also 
investigates the response of the Chicago City Council and 
the politics related to the final approval of the lights 
installation, regardless of continued expressions of 
community dissatisfaction. 
Chapter 8 examines the implications of the stadium 
development plans at Wrigley Field and its effect on the 
local community of Lake View. After a discussion of 
community efforts and various strategies utilized by 
resident organizations, the chapter addresses the response 
of the city to the demands of the community. It becomes 
clear that the advancement of a protection and improvement 
plan allowed these residents to have a say as to how the 
problems of traffic, congestion, and others would be 
addressed after the fact of lights installation. The 
chapter concludes with an investigation of how a permit 
parking program around the ballpark and the presence of 
night games assisted in transforming the surrounding 
community into an entertainment district. Possible long 
term implications of the lights for the community are also 
discussed. 
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Chapter 9 examines community response to development 
plans by the Chicago Bears in the mid to late 80's to 
construct a large, open-air football stadium, and of the 
Chicago Bulls and Blackhawks in the 1990's to build a large 
sporting indoor arena. Both of those stadium development 
efforts took place on the Near West Side of Chicago. The 
chapter outlines the urban development claims which could 
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flow into this economically disadvantaged community by the 
presence of these sports facilities. In addition, the 
defeat of the Bears' plans and the eventual construction of 
the United Center is discussed. The implications for this 
west side community from these stadium development plans, 
including displacement, the role of the local media, the 
role of the local and state governments, as well as 
reorganization of the west side of the city are also 
addressed in this chapter. 
The fourth part of this project consists of two 
chapters. Chapter 10, compares the three case studies and 
chapter 11 provides conclusions. 
Chapter 10 provides a comparative view of the three 
case studies conducted in this project. This chapter 
discusses the differences and similarities of the three 
urban communities, the differences and similarities in the 
government response to the needs/demands of the residents 
and stadium developers, issues related to displacement, race 
and class, the role of the media and the possible long term 
effects of these stadium development plans on these three 
urban communities. 
Finally, chapter 11 concludes with how cultural factors 
such as sporting events and the presence of professional 
franchises, through stadium development plans have direct 
implications and shape the urban environment. In that 
regard, professional sports becomes a case where through 
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their presence, economic interests are advanced. In the 
process, government support is easily generated making this 
another example where the political and economic systems 
become responsible for determining the nature and 
development of the urban environment. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE STATE AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT: STADIUMS AND URBAN GROWTH 
Introduction 
Urban centers across America are increasingly faced 
with multiple economic, social and political challenges, 
some of which have never before been encountered. Local 
political leadership often steps in and responds to these 
issues through the use of innovative approaches such as 
facilitating business licensing, establishing economic 
development corporations, creating industrial parks, 
floating industrial development revenue bonds, land-write 
downs, direct loans, employee training programs, etc ... 
(Wolman 1979; Bessire, 1981; Huddleston, 1984; Seymour, 
1985; Malizia, 1985; Rubin and Rubin, 1987). 
In addition, the recent construction of sports 
facilities to attract professional sports franchises has 
been viewed as another effective urban development strategy. 
These partnerships between public and private sectors, 
provide examples where public investment in private 
development become critical to urban change. 
The literature on stadium construction as an urban 
development strategy, which includes the effect of these 
projects on urban communities, franchise relocation and city 
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competition, the political economy of sports, its 
implications on the urban environment, etc., lacks a solid 
theoretical foundation. The coverage of these and related 
issues is primarily conducted by journalists whose reports 
appear in local and national newspapers, as well as other 
related forms of mass media. Social scientists have not 
engaged in concentrated efforts to investigate the dynamics 
of stadium development, leaving the literature in this field 
sparse. 
Though the relationship of sports to the urban 
environment is generally under-researched, political 
scientists have recently conducted most of the research in 
assessing the relationship between government and sports as 
expressed through franchise relocation and stadium 
investment issues (Johnson, 1979; 1983; 1986; 1993; Johnson 
and Frey, 1985; Euchner, 1993). Similarly, economists have 
addressed the business relationship between sports and 
stadiums, including the operational aspects of professional 
franchises (Scully, 1989; Quirk and Fort, 1992; Baim, 1994; 
Gorman and Calhoun, 1994). Although sociologists have 
engaged in work in the general area of sport and society 
(Boyle, 1963; Edwards, 1973; Nixon, 1976; Figler, 1981; 
Snyder and Spreitzer, 1989; Coakley, 1990; Leonard, 1993), 
very little attention has been placed on investigating the 
role of stadiums and their relationship to local urban 
communities within the framework of capitalist operations. 
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Due to the limited analysis conducted in this area, 
this chapter identifies two major points which provide an 
insight into understanding the relationship between stadiums 
and urban development. The first point addresses the 
relationship between state intervention and urban 
development as framed within a Marxist model of political 
economy driven by the growth machine/growth ideology. State 
investment in private projects such as stadiums has been 
viewed as resulting in community-wide economic benefits. 
Advocates of these projects claim extraordinary economic 
benefits through the use of multiplier effects and economic 
impact studies. Similarly, driven by these same rationales, 
cities compete with eachother as they attempt to attract or 
retain professional franchises at considerable public 
expense. Professional sports teams and stadium construction 
then becomes a part of an urban growth strategy. 
The second point concentrates on the role of cultural 
elements. In this regard theorists have searched for 
answers regarding urban development through an analytical 
incorporation of the ways cultural aspects influence and 
shape urban centers. Specifically, stadium construction as 
a form of urban development is unique, since, in addition to 
the economic arguments of revitalization and redevelopment, 
professional sports franchises have also been viewed by 
cities as cultural communicators, sources of prestige, 
capable of constructing the identity of its citizenry and 
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producing sentiments and experiences which result in 
community building. Sports then, like the arts, urban 
tourism, landmark sites, theme parks, etc., can be viewed as 
part of a culture industry. 
This chapter frames the theoretical issues on which the 
following chapters, on the use of multipliers and social 
rationales for the support of professional franchises and 
stadium construction, rely. Similarly, these theoretical 
perspectives will assist in reflecting on the case studies 
of this project. Thus, it is elements of the growth 
ideology and the "new" urban sociology, which provide a 
comprehensive theoretical framework in understanding urban 
development as it relates to stadium construction and 
ensuing community impact. 
Growth Machine and Growth Ideology 
In response to urban ecology, the growth machine and 
growth ideology has emerged as a perspective of 
understanding and doing urban science. Urban ecology 
theories and analysis, influenced by the biological 
sciences, searched to investigate the development of the 
"natural areas" in the urban environment (Park 1969; Park, 
Burgess and McKenzie, 1925; Hoyt, 1933; Harris and Ullman, 
1945; Hawley 1950; 1956; Wingo, 1961; Losch, 1964; Berry and 
Kasandra, 1977) . This approach to studying urban society is 
generally incomplete since it fails to include the effect of 
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cultural factors in addition to business and government 
interests. Human ecology also fails in its consideration of 
the economy since it has a limited view of the competitive 
nature and multiple representations of capitalism. Its 
monolithic view, regarding the primacy of the core when 
addressing urban development patterns, does not integrate 
the ideology of growth. 
Molotch (1976), and later Logan and Molotch (1987), 
described the city as a "growth machine." According to this 
approach, growth can provide an explanation of the dynamics 
of urban development. The growth machine/growth ideology is 
a response to the functionalist perspective which was 
utilized to explain the nature and interrelationship of 
political powers amongst various urban communities. 1 
Cities engage in activities which are directed towards 
growth. Molotch (1976: 309-310) writes on this approach of 
1 This functionalist approach emphasizes the 
departure from a centralized model of urban power and 
political control. Operating through competing interest 
groups, citizens have an opportunity to influence 
government, thus, making the political system responsive to 
organized groups. Power then rests in multiple centers 
rather than single interests (Dahl, 1967; 1989). Based on 
these assumptions, it is noted that as cities expand, the 
political power will be decentralized and a pluralist model 
will emerge. Thus, large heterogeneous urban structures and 
the varying political interests, which urban development 
produces, are accommodated by pluralist structures of power 
(Dahl, 1961; Clark, 1968, Polsby, 1980). Bachrach and 
Baratz (1962) have criticized this model and according to 
Schattschneider (1960:35): "The flaw in the pluralistic 
heaven is that heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-
class accent." The elite theory has also surfaced as an 
alternative perspective to both these majoritarian and 
pluralist models of democracy (Mills, 1956; Dye, 1990). 
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seeing the city as a growth machine: 
I speculate that the political and economic essence of 
virtually any given locality, in the present American 
context, is growth. I further argue that the desire 
for growth provides the key operative motivation 
toward consensus for members of politically mobilized 
local elites, however split they might be on other 
issues, and that a common interest in growth is the 
overriding communality among important people in a 
given locale-at least insofar as they have any 
important local goals at all. Further, this growth 
imperative is the most important constraint upon 
available options for local initiative in social and 
economic reform. It is thus that I argue that the very 
essence of a locality is its operation as a growth 
machine. . .. The city is, for those who count, a growth 
machine. 
As a result, the drive for growth provides both the 
rationale and the need for capital investment. These 
activities are most often advanced by elites who control the 
political, economic and cultural aspects of the city. 
Consequently, their priorities affect the overall nature of 
the urban environment, particularly land use patterns. 
It is through this growth driven ideology that 
capitalists will have an opportunity to generate conditions 
supportive of their goal which simply is to create profit. 
For example, as the city expands and grows there is an 
additional demand for services which the existing tax-base 
cannot support. This scenario, of cities in demand for 
additional income for services, is very common across urban 
centers. In addressing these concerns, local interests will 
come together to develop a plan and respond to these 
"emerging" needs. Government will then engage in a plan 
which of ten requires monetary subsidies to generate growth 
(See Illustration 1) . 
ILLUSTRATION 1 
THE LOGIC OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
.--~~~~~~--> Investment 
good business 
climate 
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Source: Judd, D. (1988). The politics of American cities. 
Glenview: Scott, Foresman, p. 376. 
As government contributes, through the use of tax 
monies to attract capital investment, and as investors 
search for places which can provide them with the greatest 
profit return in the shortest period of time, certain areas 
within the city benefit more than others. The ability of 
capital to easily relocate, especially with the emergence of 
the global economy can have an impact upon the life of urban 
residents (Sassen, 1991) and the emergence of the "dual 
city" could be viewed as a direct outcome of these changes 
(Castells and Mollenkopf, 1991). 
Capitalists, after assessing and weighing the pros and 
cons of an area, will determine its profitability. The 
perceived financial outcomes will form the extent to which 
investment occurs. Capitals' decision, when considering 
investing in a socioeconomically devastated area, will have 
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serious implications as to the future condition and 
direction of that particular urban community. 
Non-investment in an economically devastated area 
allows negative existing conditions within those areas to be 
reproduced. On the other hand, a low-priced area that .can 
be gentrified and redeveloped will be likely to receive 
special attention by business interests. Such decisions 
could have adverse outcomes for the current community since 
displacement of its members will be likely to follow. The 
nature of capital investment can then have a direct impact 
on the quality of life within the urban environment. 2 
Often, urban centers become preoccupied with an 
emphasis on growth and expansion as a means of addressing 
the social ills and problems they face. As a study of 
Chicago points out (Squires, Bennett, Mccourt and Nyden, 
1987:11-12), it is important to examine the real 
implications of this approach to urban development: 
That Chicago's industrial mix is shifting from heavy 
manufacturing to service and high technology industries 
is noted, along with the conviction that the city 
2 Scott (1980), in his theory of "urban land nexus" 
outlines that land development patterns are the result of a 
contradictory relationship between the private and public 
sphere. Both capitalist interests and the state work 
against each other. The former, though empowered to make 
decisions, cannot carry out its plans without the latter and 
the latter, for the sake of general interest, attempts to 
direct (through urban planning) the former. What results, 
according to Scott, is uneven urban development. Though 
uneven development is the outcome of the growth 
machine/growth ideology, as put forth by Logan and Molotch 
(1988), for Scott (1988), uneven development results from 
within the process of capitalist production. 
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should encourage such developments to take advantage of 
emerging growth industries. Yet more fundamental 
structural and particularly exploitative dimensions 
inherent in the process of uneven development are 
either ignored or viewed as issues that can only be 
addressed after higher-priority concerns-generating 
economic growth-have been resolved. If it is widely 
understood that the city's economic and social problems 
will not be resolved simply by the next upturn in 
the business cycle, with perhaps a few exceptions 
nobody is demanding fundamental changes in the city's 
and nation's basic institutional structure either. 
The emphasis on solving the problems of Chicago by creating 
greater economic growth by providing incentives for private 
capital investment has generated a strategic approach which 
has not fully responded to the social needs of the city and 
its residents. Because of these urban development 
strategies and the effects of uneven development, the 
distinction and segregation of groups based upon their 
racial, ethnic and class identities has been intensified. 3 
The different roles in determining political and 
economic directions of the city is the major strength of the 
growth ideology. Regarding the organization of the growth 
machine, Logan and Molotch (1987) point to the importance of 
government operations as they relate to advancing corporate 
interests. 
3 Sawers (1984), for example, claims that an 
investigation of class needs to be further incorporated in 
order to better understand the formation of urban 
development, while Gordon (1984) provides a class/labor 
based analysis in explaining urban development. Finally, 
biracial tensions which emerged in many urban centers after 
the great black migration to the North (Drake and Cayton, 
1945; Pettigrew, 1980; Yetman, 1985) have contributed to the 
development of a racial/ethnic based identity within the 
urban environment (Massey and Denton, 1988a; 1989; 1992). 
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The Political Environment: 
Private Interests and Public Needs 
The relationship between the private enterprise and the 
government's impact on local urban policy has provided 
interesting views amongst urban theoreticians. According to 
Logan and Molotch (1987:153-154), the private interests are 
integrated with local government and become represented 
through the growth machine. Logan and Molotch point out 
that the political leadership often becomes one with 
business interests, making for a combination of a political 
and economic class whose actions are responsible for 
explaining the dynamics of urban development. 4 They write: 
Intervention in land use in the United States has never 
been meant to replace the operation of the property 
marketplace, only to smooth out its functioning. Even 
though individual enterprenours may balk at specific 
decisions or even denounce the entire planning process 
when they lose a particular contest, enterprenours 
throughout the twentieth century have come to 
appreciate that selective intervention can yield, in 
the end, benefits for the growth process... In this 
sense, the necessity for the "relative autonomy of the 
State" percolates down to the local level: In order to 
keep the property market rising, government must act on 
behalf of the market. 
Similarly for Gottdiener (1987) , the local government 
eventually works to promote the interests of the private 
enterprise. Yet for him, the relationship between 
4 Harvey (1976; 1983; 1990) and Mandrel (1975) 
advocate that the state has played an important role to 
ensure capitalist survival. For Harvey, it is the political 
economy of capitalism which determines the power of the 
state, making the state a tool of capital accumulation. 
Capital interests evolve to establish the state-capital 
articulation and promote capitalist control. In this 
regard, politics and economics become one with eachother. 
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government and private interests is different. Gottdiener 
(1994:140), in the sociospatial perspective, views the role 
of government as separate and distinct from various economic 
interests. Gottdiener writes: 
... the SSP [sociospatial perspective] considers 
government intervention and the interests of 
politicians in growth as a principle factor in 
metropolitan change. Traditional urban ecology and the 
newer approaches of urban political economy either 
ignore completely the role of government in channelling 
growth or treat the state as simply derivative of 
economic interests. The SSP considers the state as 
relative autonomous, that is, with officials having 
interests of their own, and more specifically considers 
politics as highly linked to the concerns of property 
development (emphasis mine) . 5 
Whether local government and business interests fall 
within two separate classes, each with distinct interests 
and agendas, or whether local government is itself 
integrated into a business elite, the outcome of their 
operation is similar. Private interests are advanced 
through the presence of a growth machine guided by political 
leadership. Its goal is to promote its "style of economic 
growth." 6 Capitalism then has two centers of authority. 
The first is represented by the decisions of the economic 
5 Gottdiener (1977), addresses the issue of 
political control and urban planning. According to 
Gottdiener, the interests of business partners find a way 
into the process of zoning/rezoning and are supported by the 
political system. 
6 The need for social control of the inhabitants of 
areas which were rapidly deteriorating (mostly in central 
city areas), thus signaling possibilities of reoccurring 
ghetto riots, has also been cited as a reason behind the 
states' finance of these projects (Mollenkopf, 1975). 
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system and the second, by the decisions of the political 
system (Wilson, 1994). Both work in accordance with each 
other to support the private interests. Though on the 
surface this economic growth is legitimized and rationalized 
as a strategy aimed at providing stability and financial 
prosperity to distressed urban centers, it often results in 
the creation of additional urban stress. 
Economic growth in cities has had direct cumulative 
affects. When economic growth is cited as a result of some 
strategy put forth by the local government the question of 
"Who benefits from this arrangement?" must be addressed. 
The usual outcome of this interaction between the public and 
private enterprise is that the 'investors', assisted by the 
state, emerge as the beneficiaries from these economic 
opportunities present within the urban environment 
(Carruthers, 1969; Boyer, 1973; Leinsdorf and Etra, 1973; 
Lamarche, 1977; Scott, 1980; Harvey, 1973; 1982; Mollenkopf, 
1983; Hartman and Kessler, 1984). 
But what becomes the role of the local government in 
this process? The local government is caught in a dilemma. 
On the one hand, it supports private enterprise since it 
perceives such action as the only way to address the 
multiple social issues facing the city. On the other hand, 
city government must support the interests of the public. 
Advocating and supporting, through various policies, the 
public interests and needs, comes into sharp conflict with 
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the political machine's choice to support individual 
business interests. As a result, the political system is 
caught in a cycle; in order to deal with public needs it 
must promote private interests which, in turn, create 
unequal opportunity structures thus, expanding public needs. 
Castells (1978:18-19), discusses the much needed 
infrastructure for capital production: 7 
. . . the intervention of the state becomes necessary in 
order to take charge of sectors and services which are 
less profitable but necessary for the functioning of 
economic activity. . .. This intervention of the state 
is functional and necessary to the monopolies, even 
though it done in opposition to some capitalist 
interests. In effect, it assures the necessary 
reproduction of the labour power at a minimum level, it 
lessens the cost of direct salaries, while at the same 
time easing demands. Besides public investment, as we 
know, is an essential form of 'devaluation of social 
capital', a major resource for counteracting the 
tendency toward the lowering of the profit margin . 
. . . the intervention of the state, covers the functional 
or economic 'holes', thus making it possible for 
private capital to take over (thus the public highway 
infrastructure which makes use of the automobile 
possible, or urban renewal operations which permit the 
actions of private promoters, etc) . 
7 Castells' other related work (1977) applies the 
Althusserian structuralistic view to the examination of the 
urban. Social structure for Castells is composed of the 
economic system, the political system and the ideological 
system. Such investigation of the social structure will 
allow for the formulation of a theory of the "urban system." 
In this regard, Castells (1977: 460) introduces another form 
of consumption which he refers to as "collective 
consumption." He defines collective consumption as 
" ... being consumption whose economic and social treatment, 
while remaining capitalist, takes place not through the 
market, but through the state apparatus." So, for example, 
the privatization of natural resources before they become 
profitable, require the intervention of the state. In this 
regard, a conflict emerges since the two responsibilities 
are ideologically and diametrically opposed. O'Connor 
(1973) has also discussed this "crisis of the state." 
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The state then is charged with a dual responsibility; the 
creation of opportunities for capital expansion, and the 
maintenance of the quality of life. 8 
Growth and expansion has heavily impacted upon the 
demands for services in the city. As the city grows and is 
called to provide for its members, it necessitates 
additional resources to meet those needs. 9 Thus, the city 
is faced with multiple challenges. Providing public 
services for a poor neighborhood, whose residents contribute 
very little to the city's tax base, is financially a loss. 
As a result, cities look elsewhere for generating the 
appropriate income to perform these services. Promoting 
economic growth by supporting business interest has been a 
strategy toward urban growth. 
Similarly, sports and stadium development has been 
8 The removal of old commercial areas and 
residential communities for the construction of modernized 
administrative facilities are not uncommon to emerge since 
various forms of state subsidies are meant to cover land 
costs (Fellmuth, 1973; Goodman 1971; Marcuse 1981; 
Gottdiener, 1985). Corporate presence then extends beyond 
economic competition into the ownership of land and power 
over the production of space. In this regard, the state has 
the ability to reproduce social relations. 
9 For example, as minority and immigrant population, 
which has served as cheap labor force for various business 
interests in the city increases, additional funding to meet 
the expanded needs of these populations is required. 
Health, education and other social services becomes the 
responsibility of the government. As public investment in 
transportation routes strive to meet the needs of a growing 
economy, additional expenditures to maintain these 
structures are required. Finally, as housing decays and the 
trapped city population cannot afford to maintain new 
structures, public housing is required. 
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viewed by cities across the United States as a pro-growth 
strategy. Reports of multi-million dollar economic benefits 
resulting from sport related activities generate a climate 
of intense competition among cities. This competition 
requires considerable capital investment which often takes 
the form of public expenditures. 
Capital Investment and Competition: Stadiums, Professional 
Franchises and Urban Growth 
Cities also engage in activities to attract 
professional teams as an urban development strategy aimed at 
ensuring or expanding local and regional economic growth. 
Capital investment by the government aimed at growth has led 
to the construction of sports stadiums. In 1970 about 70 
percent of sports facilities were publicly financed and 
owned (Okner, 1974). In 1988 (Riess, 1989) and in 1991 
(Quirk and Fort, 1992), over 80 percent of the facilities 
utilized by professional teams across the country were 
publicly owned. Even small municipalities, where minor 
league baseball is played, know that if they do not pay for 
the expensive upgrades of stadium facilities, other cities 
will accommodate such requests (Mahtesian, 1994; S.A.F.E., 
1995a; S.A.F.E., 1995b; Austin Sports Development Authority, 
1995). As a result, cities across the country have engaged 
in extensive public investments and intense competitiveness 
to retain or attract a professional sports franchise 
(Whelan, 1987; Berss, 1992; Hammonds, 1993; Norton, 1993; 
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Purdy, 1994; Anderson, 1995; Kramer, 1995a; Neusner, 1995; 
Osterland, 1995; Schrotenboer, 1995; Witt, 1995). 
The rationale behind the subsidies which professional 
teams receive from local and state governments is based on 
the perception that such action is a form of capital 
investment, similar to other urban redevelopment 
projects. 10 Euchner (1993), while investigating the 
competition between cities in North America for a 
professional team concludes that sports are viewed as part 
of a development strategy. Cities will "make a good 
business environment" by extending financial support to 
professional franchises hoping to attract one of them to 
their town. This drive towards attracting franchises is 
consistent with, and a part of, the notion of the growth 
ideology; generating opportunities towards expansion as a 
strategy for revitalization and the creation of economic and 
10 Squires, et.al, (1987:163-165) in a study of 
Chicago provide three modes of redevelopment utilized by the 
local government after WWII: (1) infrastructural 
development, (2) cooperative ventures with private groups 
and (3) essentially private investment. All three modes, 
directly or indirectly found the local government supporting 
and advancing private interests. These projects were 
viewed to attract outside investment, resulting into job 
opportunities, increased income and additional taxes. This 
income will increase spending and consumption by city 
residents providing the city with additional money for 
public services. 
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1 b . 11 social wel - e1ng. 
This emphasis on urban revitalization and redevelopment 
has introduced a spirit of competitiveness amongst cities. 
Research has shown that poorer cities are more likely than 
economically stable cities to engage in activities which are 
aimed at generating economic development. Rubin and Rubin 
(1987:55) conducted a study analyzing census data in 
Illinois comparing the public investments of various types 
of cities. They concluded that: 
. . . cities that are poorest - that have the poorest 
citizens and the highest unemployment rates - are the 
ones that are spending the most money on expensive and 
possibly ineffective economic development incentives. 
In their attempt to generate economic growth, cities will 
find themselves in contested arrangements. 
In the area of professional sports, cities compete with 
each other to attract an existing franchise or become chosen 
by a league to host an expansion team. 12 Regarding stadium 
11 Johnson (1993) shows that the economics of minor 
league baseball makes the stadium the core of the 
relationship between the team and the local community. 
Johnson concludes that teams influence local governments to 
perceive minor league stadiums as redevelopment 
opportunities and strategies toward urban growth. 
12 In recent years, cities like Baltimore (football), 
St. Louis (football), Jacksonville (football), Charlotte 
(basketball), Nashville (football), Oakland (football), 
Tampa (baseball), Phoenix (hockey), Denver (baseball), 
Dallas (hockey), Orlando (hockey) and others, have been 
involved in efforts to attract professional sports teams. 
On the other hand, cities across America like Cleveland 
(football), Houston (football), Los Angeles (football), 
Seattle (football), Tampa (football), Pittsburgh (baseball), 
Minneapolis (basketball), Chicago (football) and others have 
been involved in efforts to retain professional franchises 
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construction Snyder and Spreitzer (1989:278), noted that the 
purpose for this type of public funds use is questionable: 
The taxpayers subsidize professional sports through 
construction bonds, stadia rent below the market value, 
taxes foregone on the land, and appropriation of public 
services to sports facilities in the form of water and 
sewage facilities, mass transit, law enforcement, and 
improvement of access roads. This use of public funds 
in support of private enterprise raises the critical 
question of "cui bono", who benefits? 
Similarly, according to Wilson (1994:261): 
The real issue with sport franchises is how local 
elites are able to get public sanction and subsidy for 
the private accumulation of wealth. Local capitalists 
stand to gain much from a city's successful pursuit of 
a sport franchise. 
As a result, cities will find themselves considering the 
extent to which they are, stadium wise, capable of 
supporting and competing with other cities. 
Thus, at one level, the construction of stadiums is 
viewed as an urban development strategy, a part of a growth 
ideology, yet, at another level, in order for their 
construction to occur, the state has to contribute by (1) 
allocating public resources and (2) convincing the public 
that the proposed civic expenditures are wisely disbursed. 
For the latter to occur, both the state and the private 
interests have to join together and become one, since they 
share similar objectives. 
which threaten to leave. 
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Sports Driven Economic Rejuvenation 
Cities in the United States have attempted to 
rejuvenate downtown economically depressed areas through the 
utilization of sports. 13 In recent years, stadium 
developments such as those of Coors Field (1995) in Denver, 
Colorado, New Comisk~y Park (1991) and United Center (1994) 
both in Chicago, Illinois, Jacobs Field (1994) in Cleveland, 
Ohio and Camden Yards (1992) in Baltimore, Maryland have all 
been located in the downtown or near downtown areas. 
This approach of "pumping money" into a downtown, 
economically depressed area is the driving force behind 
these stadium location decisions. According to Baim 
(1994:220): 
For a depressed inner city, the unemployment and 
incidence of crime is already high. The increase in 
employment related to a stadium and sports team will be 
more valuable and the increased crime less 
objectionable in the downtown area. Thus, the rational 
place to locate the stadium in a city with a depressed 
center district would be downtown. The residents of 
the suburbs are willing to commute the extra distance 
to keep the stadium "out of their neighborhood," and 
the residents of the inner city are aided by the 
increased economic growth. 
Similar to urban tourism and the advancement of the arts in 
urban centers, sports stadiums are viewed as part of an 
13 State intervention in the renewal of downtowns has 
been viewed as a means of capital accumulation in response 
to diminishing profits in those areas (O'Connor, 1973; 
Mandel, 1975; Harvey, 1982; Hirsch, 1982). It has also been 
noted that the restructuring of the downtown areas, assisted 
by the state, has served various business interests through 
real estate actions, providing no direct opportunities to 
the urban poor (Anderson, 1964; Friedland, 1980; Mollenkopf, 
1983; Hartman and Kessler, 1984; Gottdiener, 1985). 
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ideology toward urban growth. 
Through the use of multipliers, cities employ economic 
impact studies on sports to report impressive local and 
regional benefits. These findings are then utilized to 
justify the public dollars invested in the construction of 
stadium facilities. However, the long term economic 
implications of these projects in cities across America 
remain questionable. 
The stadium as an urban revitalization tool has been 
identified by cities across America. In Cleveland, Ohio, 
the recent partnership (private-public) between the city and 
the Gateway Economic Development Corporation, known as the 
Gateway Project, to which has been attributed the economic 
rebounding of Cleveland by the local government (Barrett and 
Green, 1993). 
The goal of this project is to attract people to the 
downtown area, making it vibrant once again (Kosowatz, 
1993) . 14 The city has attempted to generate redevelopment 
from this stadium project. Even though Cleveland Indians' 
representatives asked for 10,000 on-site parking spaces, the 
14 The owners of the Cleveland Indians (Major League 
Baseball) convinced the city to build a new stadium facility 
which would generate more jobs and prosperity. The city 
participated in the project by investing about $434 million. 
This project, on a 28 acre site on the southern edge of the 
downtown area, intends to capitalize on the presence and 
activities of a 42,000 seat Jacobs Field, built in 1994 for 
$161 (home of the Cleveland Indians) and the neighboring 
$118 million, 21,000 seat indoor arena for the Cleveland 
Cavaliers of the NBA (Bartimole, 1994). 
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city approved only a third. City officials felt that having 
spectators park a distance and walk to the ballpark, will 
expose them to the area, and thus, possibly (1) lift 
negative beliefs associated with the downtown location and 
(2) help revitalize local business. As a result the 
ballpark becomes viewed as a magnet for downtown activity 
(Kamin, 1994). 
In Baltimore, the 1992 construction of Camden Yards, is 
expected to generate economic growth and give rebirth to its 
surrounding areas. It is claimed that this project has 
helped revitalize part of the urban core in the city of 
Baltimore and serves as a the standard of urban design. 15 
According to a survey conducted by Baltimore's Mayor Kurt 
Schmoke, $52.8 million of spending by the fans outside the 
park make the project a ''financial grand slam" 
(Schrotenboer, 1995). 
For the Chicago Bears of the National Football League, 
Camden Yards is a model stadium. Assuming that they receive 
the requested financial support from the City of Chicago and 
the State of Illinois ($200 million) the Bears claim that a 
similar type of stadium design would aid the community/site 
and be a catalyst for economic development. In a recent 
radio program, Michael Mccaskey, President of the franchise 
15 This 48,000-seat baseball facility cost $206 
million to complete. In 1994, Camden Yards was 
distinguished by the Urban Land Institute as the best public 
project in the country (Chicago Tribune, November 26, 1994). 
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noted: 
Camden Yards made a valuable contribution to the city 
of Baltimore. What makes that ballpark special is not 
the design by itself ... it is the way that it's 
integrated into the inner-harbor area. There is that 
long warehouse and that has served as a venue for 
retailing operations, for food courts, and for other 
things that draw people to it on non-game days. And we 
would like to do the same thing with the football 
stadium. Just don't focus on the box that's the 
football stadium, but let's look at the entire 
surrounding area, and let's look at the way to use that 
stadium as a stimulus for economic development for a 
much wider neighborhood around it. In the same way that 
Camden Yards has done it (WBBM RADI0-780AM, 1995) . 
In response to McCaskey's requests, the City of Chicago has 
offered to renovate Soldier Field at a public expense of 
$156 million. Yet, the Bears continue to promote the 
concept of a new, open-air stadium as an urban redevelopment 
tool. 
In Denver, two years prior to the opening of Coors 
Field for the expansion Colorado Rockies of the MLB in 
Denver, the stadium was credited with benefiting the hotel 
industry. It was noted that the presence of the sports 
facility would have a positive economic outcome and improve 
upon the currently thriving business growth of hotels in 
that city (Jesitus, 1993). 
Since its construction, Coors Field has been described 
as a representation of "a thoughtful and successful effort 
at urban revitalization" (Muschamp, 1995) . Its presence in 
Denver's Lower Downtown district complements the gentrified 
neighborhoods, galleries, small shops, and the "SoHo" like 
atmosphere. Coors Field becomes an outstanding addition to 
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a newly emerging downtown area, one which replaces the 
deteriorated, industrially based, central business center 
with a central district geared toward a culture of the arts 
and popular entertainment (Judd, 1995; Muschamp, 1995; 
Schrotenboer, 1995). 
Similar assessments of economic growth, resulting from 
the construction of sports stadiums, have been made in San 
Francisco (Margolis, 1989), Detroit (White, 1994), 
Washington, DC (Pyatt, 1993), Alexandria, Virginia (Howe, 
1993), Atlanta (Faw, 1993), and Salt Lake City (Wright and 
Jorgensen, 1993) and the Meadowlands, New Jersey (Ibata, 
1985), amongst other cities. 
The Use of Cultural Factors in Urban Development 
In addition to addressing the political economy of 
space, an understanding of sports and stadiums within the 
urban environment requires the investigation of related 
cultural factors. Numerous culturally based factors have 
been utilized to support the construction of sports 
facilities. For example, social cohesion, community 
building and other related arguments have been widely 
reported when governments and team representatives attempt 
to convince the public that expenditures on these projects 
are necessary. At the same time, images of the cultural 
relationship between the team and the city are continuously 
communicated, thus producing a strong link between the team 
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and the urban environment. 
The "new" urban sociology has integrated cultural 
factors in its investigation regarding patterns and social 
implications of urban development. Though at the core, this 
perspective remains Marxist and shares many, if not most of 
the characteristics which define other Marxist perspectives, 
the addition of these culturally based elements provides for 
an understanding of the dynamics of the urban development. 
Gottdiener (1994:17), influenced by Gramsci (1971) and 
Lefebvres' (1991) notion of "the production of space", 
provides the dimensions of what he refers to as the 
"sociospatial perspective." These dimensions include: (1) 
utilizing a regional perspective of studying the factors 
which shape both the urban and suburban space by looking at 
the two as interrelated and interconnected, capable of 
impacting the fate of each other, (2) considering both the 
implications emerging from the global nature of capitalism, 
as well as the national, regional and local settings, which 
shape urban development and affect urban life, (3) 
integrating government policies and real estate actions 
("supply-side forces" which have a direct impact on 
development processes), and (4) analyzing the importance of 
cultural factors such as gender, class, social status, age 
and race and their impact on the built environment, 
specifically as to how these factors shape that environment 
and then are shaped by it. Increasingly, cultural symbols 
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are associated with objects, describing urban communities or 
elements within these communities. 16 
Gottdiener (1994:16) explains the dual relationship 
between people and space: 
In the past, urbanists have regarded the space of 
habitation as only a container of social activities. 
But this view is limited. Space not only contains 
actions but also acts as a meaningful object to which 
we orient our actions. The factor of space constitutes 
a part of social relations and is intimately involved 
in our daily lives. It affects the way we feel about 
what we do. In turn, people alter space and construct 
new environments to fit their needs better. Hence, 
there is a dual relationship between people and space. 
On the one hand, human beings act according to social 
factors such as gender, class, race, age, and status 
within and in reaction to a given space. On the other 
hand, people also create and alter spaces for 
themselves that express their own needs and desires. 
16 David Harvey (1990) utilizes a postmodernist 
perspective to analyze architecture and urban design. In 
opposition to modernists, who manipulate space to be shaped 
for social purposes, postmodernists view space as something 
independent, driven by the aesthetic principles. 
Architecture then, as a form of symbolic representation, 
becomes a form of communication, a language, which sets the 
stage for a dialogue (Barthes, 1975). As Harvey notes 
(1990:74), the presence of Trump Tower and of Philip 
Johnson's AT&T buildings in New York City, represent two 
different eras. The modernism of the former battles the 
postmodernism of the latter for control over the city's 
skyline. Cultural representations then become integrated in 
urban form. Others, including Jencks (1984), see postmodern 
architecture as the outcome of technological shifts. Soja 
(1989), argues for a historical and geographical 
materialism, while Bourdieu (1984; 1986) remarks that 
consumption can be related to product differentiation in the 
urban environment. 'Symbolic capital' for Bourdieu are 
goods which serve as representations capable of defining the 
owner's taste and distinction. Finally, for Lyotard 
(1984:73), the emergence of a culture of choice is a part of 
cultural development: "Eclectism is the degree zero of 
contemporary general culture: one listens to reggae, watches 
a western, eats McDonald's food for lunch and local cuisine 
for dinner, wears Paris perfume in Tokyo and 'retro' clothes 
in Hong Kong." 
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Gottdiener (1994:15) also notes: 
A variety of images has been used, such as signs of 
industry ("the twin cities"), signs of vision ("city of 
tomorrow"), and signs of good quality ("the city of 
leisure"). Slogans such as these are often linked to 
images or objects, such as the skyline or graphic logo 
of some kind. In this way a symbolic identity is 
created for a place, which gives the impression that it 
is special. 
Historically, in the area of sports, there has been a 
symbolic connection between a community and a team: "to 
watch a club compete was to watch a community perform" 
(Wilson, 1994: 234). Similarly, sports teams became signs 
of modernity, postmodernity and progress for the city, while 
at the same time have been utilized to advertise the 
strength of the local business climate (Goldstein, 1989; 
Riess, 1989; Wilson, 1994). 
This approach of integrating cultural factors to better 
understand the dynamics of urban development, provides a 
perspective which analytically can be responsive to the 
changing nature of contemporary urban life. Thus, the arts 
and sports can be viewed as aspects of culture which have 
been integrated into urban development planning. 
The Arts as Part of Urban Growth 
Cities have identified the arts to be part of a pro-
growth, urban strategy. Support for the arts is seen to 
have numerous positive outcomes. Specifically, (1) 
investment in physical facilities and "good" arts allows 
cities to compete with those communities which have 
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primarily relied on their natural amenities (i.e., good 
weather) to attract potential growth activities; (2) the 
presence of arts activities can bring more visitors to the 
downtown area; (3) those likely to attend performing arts 
activities have higher disposable incomes, making them "good 
customers" for downtown businesses; (4) the enticement of 
performing arts groups means that many of these companies 
will renovate existing structures, thus physically 
revitalizing the downtown area; (5) businesses will be 
attracted to the immediate area; and (6) the emergence of a 
vital performing arts in a downtown district will have 
positive ''spill-over effects" for surrounding business and 
residential communities (Whitt, 1987). 
Building on earlier studies (Whitt and Mizruchi, 1986; 
Whitt, 1987; 1988), Whitt and Lammers (1991) conducted a 
study of the relationship between arts and development 
organizations. After investigating the ties of board 
members to a group of arts organizations in Louisville, 
Kentucky, Whitt and Lammers concluded that the development 
of the arts in urban centers is a pro-growth strategy which 
includes the involvement of multiple business-elites. The 
implications of these findings are more extensive since they 
inform us that culturally perceived activities (theater, 
ballet, opera, orchestra, museum) are directly and 
indirectly part of larger business interests. 
Taking into consideration the previous studies on arts 
45 
and urban development, Whitt and Lammers (1991:388) 
concluded that: 
... (1) ... growth is central to urban politics; 
(2) ... there is a local inner-circle of businessmen who 
provides structural bridges among large corporations, 
arts organizations, and the leading groups devoted to 
urban growth policies; (3) the arts are, at least in 
some cities, governed at the top levels by powerful 
people (primarily men) who appear to be active 
participants in the local growth machine; (4) the major 
arts and cultural organizations of downtowns may have 
become essential components of urban growth machines, 
implying an increasing mutual dependency between 
corporations and cultural institutions. 
Besides being economic contributors, the arts have also been 
perceived to serve as an advertisement for urban centers, 
capable of generating prestige and a positive city image 
(Whitt, 1988). 
Sports as a Culture Industry 
The relationship between government and free enterprise 
can also be investigated within a broader cultural 
framework. Sports are an example of symbolic expressions of 
culture and stadiums are the locales where these cultural 
symbols emerge as products to be bought and sold. 
Sports have evolved in American society becoming much 
more than just a game, and yet, remaining a central aspect 
of American culture. 17 The sense of civic identity, pride 
17 The ownership of professional sports, for example 
has changed. The corporatization of sports is well outlined 
by Quirk and Fort (1992:39) who notes that 22 owners of 
professional sports franchises made a list which outlined 
the 400 richest individuals in the country. The list also 
included several others who were previous owners of a 
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and representation makes cities identify sports stars as 
"their" ambassadors. Sports then have a symbolic value, as 
cultural communicators and, from this rising association, a 
culture industry develops. According to Zukin (1995:12): 
"Because culture is a system for producing symbols, every 
attempt to get people to buy a product becomes a culture 
industry." Thus, sports, like museums, the arts and theme 
parks become part of the culture industry. The demand for 
sports creates the stadium, both a social space and a space 
of economies and consumption. Public gatherings at the 
stadium promote cultural collectiveness. As a result, the 
production of capital and commodities emerges, and, within 
this framework, a culture industry develops. 
This emergence of sports as a culture industry is also 
consistent with larger economic shifts from an industrial to 
a post-industrial economy. Lash and Urry (1994) explore the 
emergence of new economies, the 'economies of signs.' These 
economies are organized around symbols, images and desires. 
As a result, culture industries develop. According to Lash 
and Urry (1994:17): 
The old Fordist, organized capitalist core was 
characterized by a set of producer networks clustered 
around a heavy-industrialized hub of the motor, 
chemicals, electrical and steel industries ... This old 
professional franchise. Ted Arinson, owner of the Miami 
Heat of the NBA, was listed with an estimated wealth of $2.1 
billion, as was Laurence Tisch, owner of the New York Giants 
of the NFL with $1.5 billion. Media revenue and stadium 
related revenues have contributed into making professional 
sports 'wise' business investments. 
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order has been significantly undermined by two 
processes. The first is the disintegration of the old 
core with finance, distribution, property, service, and 
knowledge and R&D functions each taking their own 
autonomy. The second is the formation of a new core, 
one in which 'the post-industrial tail is of the old 
order begins effectively to wag the Fordist and 
industrial dog' . The new core is clustered around 
information, communications and the advanced producer 
services, as well as other services, such as 
telecommunications, airlines and important parts of 
tourism and leisure. 
Sports and stadium development can then be viewed to be part 
of this emerging capitalist framework. 
Lash and Urry (1994), examine the relationship between 
cultural objects such as music, movies and paperbacks, and 
their process of development into the culture industries of 
recording labels, television and publishing. Regarding 
music, Lash and Urry (1994:134) write: 
Thus, as the EMI executive said, for the industry to be 
really big business the music had to 'become a part of 
teenage lifestyle' ... But these objects [music, movies, 
paperbacks] are not yet ready for market. First, they 
must become intellectual property. That is firms can 
only exploit or make money from cultural objects, when 
they have been juridically converted into intellectual 
property. Only when firms are able to exclude other 
entrepreneurs and consumers from rights to the use of 
cultural objects can the culture industries survive. 
In the area of sports, the firm is the professional 
franchise. There are two reasons these franchises have been 
able to control the 'cultural product' and become its select 
distributor. First, the ownership structure of the 
professional leagues has excluded others from control over 
their "product." Second, through exclusive agreements with 
media sources, sportswear manufacturers, vendors, etc, 
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franchise owners have ensured that, even if new competing 
leagues develop, the visibility of their product becomes 
quickly limited. In this regard, sports as a cultural 
product can evolve into an industry which includes the 
stadium as its place of operation and yet, because of 
advanced means of communication and league arrangements can 
become non-localized. 
This notion of sports as a culture industry provides an 
understanding of the dynamics regarding the relationship 
between the consumer, the commodity and the firm with 
capitalist relations. It is within this framework that the 
city becomes connected to the sports culture industry. 
According to Zukin (1995:12): 
Culture is intertwined with capital and identity in the 
city's production systems. From that point of view, 
cultural institutions establish a competitive advantage 
over other cities for attracting new businesses and 
corporate elites. But in American and European cities 
during the 1970s, culture became more of an instrument 
in the entrepreneurial strategies of local governments 
and business alliances. In the shift to a post-war 
economy, who could build the biggest modern art museum 
suggested the vitality of the financial sector. Who 
could turn the waterfront from docklands ruble to parks 
and marinas suggested the possibilities for expansion 
of the managerial and professional corps. 
These culture industries then, which includes sports are 
viewed to be stimulates for the urban economy. 
The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Stadium Development 
Race and ethnicity are also additional factors which 
must be integrated in an analysis of urban development and 
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urban life as it relates to stadium development. The strong 
association between ethnicity and race with patterns of 
residential segregation (Lieberson, 1980; Massey and Denton, 
1987; 1988a; 1992) has resulted in distinct socioeconomic 
differences amongst the various groups, leaving these groups 
without political and economic power capable of effectively 
responding to urban renewal projects (Guest and Zuiches, 
1971; Molotch, 1972; Harvey, 1976; Schneider and Logan, 
1982; Schuman, Steeh and Bobo, 1985; Yinger, 1986; Massey 
and Denton, 1988b; Galster, 1990; Massey and Eggers, 1990; 
Massey and Fong, 1990; Massey, 1990; Massey and Denton, 
1993) . 
Regarding stadium construction, urban development and 
community impact, issues of race and ethnicity have also 
surfaced to play an important role. For example, the 
construction of the new Comiskey Park (1991) in Chicago 
displaced a predominantly African-American community. In 
that same city, the construction of the United Center (1994) 
was viewed as a catalyst of redevelopment for the 
surrounding African-American community in the Near West 
Side. In Miami, the privately constructed Joe Robbie 
Stadium (1982) has been positioned in the vicinity of an 
African-American community, leaving the residents of this 
nearby subdivision to suffer the long lines of traffic and 
pollution through their residential streets. 
In addition, the position of stadiums in predominantly 
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minority, urban communities has been a primary reason for 
the owners of the New York Yankees, the Chicago White Sox, 
the Washington Redskins and others to search for replacement 
facilities in suburban, non-minority communities (Kifner, 
1994). Yet, many of these efforts remain unsuccessful since 
suburban, residential communities tend to reject the 
presence of these large projects (i.e, Addison, IL rejected 
the White Sox from moving to their town), viewing them as 
sources of activities, which would negatively affect the 
quality of living. 
Yet, these concerns don't surface when considering the 
construction of sports stadiums in urban communities. Like 
many other publicly supported projects (i.e., highways, 
universities, etc), race/ethnicity, in addition to class, 
plays a critical role. Do sports facility development 
authorities (the state) and private interests find it much 
easier to displace minority residents and make use of the 
land for the construction of stadiums? Also, how do these 
authorities deal with the complaints of minority residents 
who have to contend with increased traffic, fan rowdiness, 
public consumption of alcohol, congestion, noise and air 
pollution, in addition to possible vandalism before and 
after the games? Answers to these questions will allow for 
an understanding of the extent to which race and ethnicity 
prove important factors in the investigation of stadium 
development and community impact. 
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Urban Social Movements 
When urban development and/or urban renewal projects 
are advanced through a private/public partnership, as in the 
case of stadium developments, communities are likely to be 
affected. Often, these arrangements result in the physical 
and cultural transformation of these areas and could even 
include community displacement. At that point, community 
organizing as a response to these plans frequently develops 
into community-based, resistance movements. 
Castells (1977; 1980; 1983) has been concerned with 
these urban responses or urban social movements including 
the role which they play in understanding urban change. He 
identifies urban social movements in relation to the 
capitalist mode of production. For Castells, urban social 
movements integrate the class struggle, production and the 
state. Interested in understanding the relationship between 
cities and social change through urban social movements, 
Castells (1983:291) writes: 
The city is a social product resulting from the 
conflicting interests and values. Because of the 
institutionalization of socially dominant interests, 
major innovations in the city's role, meaning, and 
structure tend to be the outcome of grassroots 
mobilization and demands. When these mobilizations 
result in the transformation of the urban structure, we 
call them urban social movements. Yet the process of 
urban social change cannot be reduced to the effects 
produced on the city of successful social movements. 
Thus a theory of urban change must account both for the 
spatial and social effects resulting from the action of 
dominant interests as well as from the grassroots' 
alternatives to this domination. 
As Castells notes, urban social change is not only the 
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outcome of "successful social movements'', but they also are 
due to the "action of dominant groups." In this regard, 
stadium development plans, become an expression of the 
dominant interests and could evolve into urban change. 
In addition, urban social movements emerge as the 
effect of contested meanings of space within the urban 
environment. This notion of meaning is addressed by 
Castells (1983: 304-305), who notes. Specifically: 
And, 
The dominant class in a given society, having the 
institutional power to restructure social forms (and 
thus cities) according to its interests and values, 
changes the existing meaning .... A social movement 
develops its own meaning over a given space in 
contradiction to the structurally dominant meaning. 
Society is a structured, conflictive reality in which 
social classes oppose eachother over the basic rules of 
social organization according to their own social 
interests. Therefore the definition of urban meaning 
will be a process of conflict, domination, and 
resistance to domination, directly linked to the 
dynamics of social struggle and not to the reproductive 
spatial expression of a unified culture. Furthermore, 
cities and space being fundamental to the organization 
of social life, the conflict over the assignment of 
certain goals to certain spatial forms will be one of 
the fundamental mechanisms of domination and counter-
domination in the social structure (Castells, 
1983: 302). 
This notion of contested meaning of urban development can be 
exemplified in the cases where the state and the stadium 
developers' view of urban growth comes into sharp conflict 
with that of the community's. Because of these conflicting 
perceptions of urban meaning, and through the "grassroots" 
struggles that ensue, an understanding of the process of 
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urban change emerges. 
At the same time though, these urban social movements 
prove to be limited. Castells discusses the role of these 
movements within the larger context of social change. He 
writes (1983:319): "Urban social movements are [not] the new 
historical actors creating social change, nor are they 
pivotal source of alternative social forms." Similarly 
(1983:329): 
They are not agents of social change, but symptoms of 
resistance to the social domination even if, in their 
effort to resist, they do have major effects on cities 
and societies. 
Finally, (1983:331) "Urban movements do address the real 
issues of our time, although neither on the scale nor terms 
that are adequate to the task." 
Yet, Castells allows for a long term contribution of 
these urban social movements. The movements can have an 
additive value directed towards social structural change. 
Accordingly, Castells (1983:331) notes: 
But they [urban social movements] are more than a last, 
symbolic stand and desperate cry: they are symptoms of 
our contradictions, and therefore capable of 
superseding these contradictions. They are the 
organizational forms, the live schools, where the new 
social movements of our emerging society are taking 
place, growing up, learning to breath, out of reach of 
the state apparatuses, and outside the closed doors of 
repressed family life. They are successful when they 
connect all the repressed aspects of the new, emerging 
life because this is their specificity: to speak the 
new language that nobody yet speaks of in its 
multifaceted meaning. When the vocabulary becomes too 
restricted (a single focus on rent control, for 
instance) the movements lose their appeal and become 
yet another interest group in a pluralist society. 
When they try to impose their programme, they become a 
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counter-society, and collapse under the combined 
pressure of multinational capital, a mass media system, 
and the bureaucratic state. 
In this regard, this analysis will also address the role of 
the stadium-based, urban social movements of this study and 
search for their contribution to urban change. 
Conclusion 
An investigation of the relationship between sports and 
stadium development within the urban environment has to 
integrate in its analysis the utilization of two theoretical 
frameworks. The first is the growth ideology and the second 
is the "new" urban sociology. In this regard, combining 
urban political economy and cultural factors allows to view 
sports and stadium development as being part of a culture 
industry. 
The stadium, as noted above, has become the connection 
between the city and its professional franchise. Cities 
across the country fear most the loss of a professional 
sports franchise due to an inadequate stadium facility. 
Thus, they invest considerable public resources to attract 
and/or retain professional sports franchises. This action 
is consistent with an ideology of urban growth since the 
perception on the part of local and state governments is 
that investment in these stadium projects is another way to 
create an attractive business climate. The urban 
development component of these investments and other 
related, socially perceived factors take center stage when 
cities attempt to rationalize their spending actions. 
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In the process, private interests and public needs 
overlap each other making it difficult to distinguish their 
specific objectives. The investigation of the relationship 
between stadium development and urban communities has to 
incorporate numerous factors. These factors include (1) the 
business climate within which urban centers across America 
operate, (2) the drive towards growth as an urban 
development strategy, (3) the competition between urban 
centers inherent within this framework, (4) state 
intervention and state investment in urban development, (5) 
the role of professional sports franchises as part of an 
urban development strategy, (6) the utilization of economic 
and cultural rationales to support these projects, and (7) 
the social implications and community effect of these 
projects. Regarding these community effects, an 
understanding of the community response and the 
reorganization of urban space as a result of these projects 
allow for a perspective within which the relationship 
between stadium development and urban communities can be 
analyzed. 
Such a perspective, being critical in nature, also 
considers the factors of race, ethnicity, role of the state, 
class, cultural images and symbols. All these factors, 
semiotics and otherwise, operate and influence the structure 
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of the urban environment and subsequently urban life. 
CHAPTER 3 
MULTIPLIER EFFECT AND STADIUM DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the use of the multiplier effect 
in input-output regional analysis. The multiplier method 
has been employed by government officials and private firms 
to assess the economic benefits resulting from public and/or 
private investments. These "investments" usually take the 
form of programs, projects or policies. Through the use of 
multipliers, economic impact studies report impressive local 
and regional benefits (sometimes over a billion dollars) 
The economic contribution of professional sport 
franchises, through the use of multipliers, has also been 
utilized to justify the construction of stadium facilities. 
However, the long term economic implications of these 
projects in cities across America remain questionable. As 
this chapter shows, it is very difficult to accurately 
measure the economic effect of these urban projects and even 
more difficult· to ensure that the proposed spending occurs 
within these local economies. Some of the problematic 
elements surrounding these assessments, which affect the 
reported findings, include definitional issues, estimation 
processes, numerous questionable assumptions, as well as the 
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self-serving interests of the "investors" themselves. 
After providing an overview of the methodology utilized 
in determining multipliers, a discussion of its use through 
impact studies is addressed. Such studies have been 
conducted in the defense industry, manufacturing, the arts, 
urban tourism, sports, etc. The chapter continues with a 
look at stadiums as urban regeneration tools and provides a 
brief outline of the perceived economic benefits resulting 
from the presence of professional sports franchises. The 
chapter concludes with a critique of the multiplier use in 
economic impact studies and the problems surrounding 
arguments made by those promoters who claim that increased 
neighborhood development is likely to result from the 
construction of stadiums. 
The Multiplier Effect 
Multiplier analysis emerged in the discipline of 
economics as a way to estimate the effects of expenditures 
on total income. The concept of income multipliers was 
utilized by Keynes in his theory of employment (1936), 
building on his earlier discussions of the effects of 
reemployment on total employment (1933:9). Many others 
(Johannsen, 1903; Pigou, 1929; Kahn, 1933) contributed to 
the development of the economic multiplier theory, making it 
a well established branch of economics. 
Since then, such analysis has been utilized to measure 
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the long and short term effects of various investments on 
economies. The use of multipliers has been a part of input-
output analysis. Its purpose has been to assess the 
relationships between fiscal contributions and economic 
outcomes within a given environment. 
Regional Input-Output Analysis 
The development of an empirical input-output system to 
analyze inter-industry relations was first introduced in the 
30's (Leontief, 1936). From that system, regional input-
output analysis began to further appear in the 50's. Isard 
and Kuenne (1953) for example, introduced an analytical 
model aimed at measuring the economic impact resulting from 
a major industry's expansion on a region. Leontief (1953) 
also developed a model to assess the impact of national 
market industries on local economies. 
In later years, the use of adjusted coefficients 
allowed for the development of models which were perceived 
to be more accurate in evaluating regional input-output 
economics. Such studies included the Moore and Petersen 
(1955) study of Utah and the Hirch (1959) study of St. 
Louis. 
After the 60's the use of interregional models became 
common in input-output regional analysis. According to 
Richardson (1972:53), interregional models "enables us not 
only to identify but, at the cost of certain rigid 
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assumptions, to measure the interdependence of the economic 
structure." In that regard, such models investigate the 
economic relationships between different regions based upon 
the introduction of public and/or private expenditures. 
Building on the theoretical work of interregional 
models conducted by Isard (1951) and Moses (1955), the 
applicability of these models has been widely expanded. 
Specifically, determining shifts in the location of 
industrial activity and employment; preparing regional 
impact studies; drafting transportation planning reports; 
establishing regional economic development programming and 
planning defense spending; assessing the regional economic 
effects of military and aerospace spending; and measuring 
the effect of increased economic development in wealthy 
regions on nearby poorer regions, have all been identified 
as areas where interregional models can be utilized 
(Polenske, 1969) . 18 
How are economic multipliers determined? 
Economic development multipliers are determined based 
on the distinction that there are two types of economic 
sectors operating within a single region. The first sector 
18 Studies have been conducted on the economic links 
between separate regions. These interregional analyses 
consider similar products as different commodities. The 
primary reason for that differentiation is the assumption 
that regional economies operate independently (Isard, 1951; 
Dalene, 1968; Riefler and Tiebout, 1970; and Isard and 
Langford, 1971) . 
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is referred to as the primary economy. This includes all 
those employers involved in activities which create products 
exported from the local to outside regions. The second 
sector is referred to as the secondary economy, which 
produces goods that are sold locally and supports the 
activities of the primary economy sector. 
Suppose a new factory which produces television sets is 
introduced in a specific region. Since the company will 
export its products across other regions, it would be 
categorized as part of the primary economic sector. Other 
smaller factories will be introduced into the local economy, 
possibly involved in the manufacturing of television tubes, 
plastic, knobs, and other smaller parts which the larger 
television factory will purchase to assemble its products. 
These smaller economic units would be then a part of the 
secondary economy sector. 19 
19 Stevens and Lahr (1988:89) provides a definition 
of a regional economic multiplier as "the total economic 
effect that occurs in a region per unit of the direct 
economic change that caused the effect." The employment and 
income multipliers are the two single multipliers which tend 
to receive the attention of policy makers and interest 
groups. The employment multiplier is intended to forecast 
the jobs created from an expansion activity within a given 
economy. The income multipliers can be either the amount of 
money added to the income of the residents in a given 
region, as a result of the direct and indirect employment 
due to an expansion activity, or the income change as a 
result of the direct, indirect and induced employment 
(Richardson, 1972:32-33). Other multipliers utilized in 
impact studies include value added multipliers, output 
multipliers and return on investment multipliers (Miller and 
Blair, 1985). Though the measurements of regional economic 
multipliers have a long history of development, the 
complexities and fluidity of economic forces, especially 
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The Use of Economic Impact Studies 
Numerous impact studies have been conducted to assess 
the economic effects of public and private investment 
projects. These assessments have extended from the economic 
effects of the presence of an airline maintenance hub 
(Kantor and Savitch, 1993), to the construction of a medical 
center (Real Estate Research Corporation, 1972), to local 
business patronizing eachother (Thompson, 1989), to stock 
shows (Raabe, 1994), and even the defense industry 
(Richardson, 1972; Leontief and Hoffenberg, 1961; Gordon, 
1966; Billings, 1970; Bolton, 1966; Karaska, 1967; Isard, 
1951; Miernyk, et al, 1967). These investigations have 
relied on the application of regional input-output analyses 
and multipliers. 20 
Though these and other related studies have been widely 
utilized by public officials and private investors, serious 
within a market economy, have made the development of a "one 
formula fits all" approach to output assessment absent 
(Richardson, 1985) . 
20 Defense and military spending by the government 
became a motivating factor for the use of regional input-
output analysis. The regional effects of military and 
defense government spending has served in the 60's, a growth 
period of this form of analysis, as the framework for 
assessing the economic effects of these public investments. 
In addition, these expenditures became a great opportunity 
for social scientists to methodologically "perfect" the use 
of input-output regional analysis. As a result, numerous 
other studies have been conducted in this area (Karaska, 
1966; Peterson and Tiebout, 1964; Benoit and Boulding, 1963; 
Isard and Schooler, 1964; Leontief, 1965; Leontief and 
Hoffenberg, 1961; Hughes, 1964; Tiebout, 1965; Peterson and 
Tiebout, 1964; Isard and Langford, Jr., 1971; Wiedenbaum, 
1966) . 
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questions persist about their validity and reliability. In 
the following, some of the areas outlined are: 
manufacturing, urban renewal and enterprise zone programs, 
urban tourism, the arts and sports, where many of these 
studies inform public policy decisions and public 
perceptions. 
Manufacturing and Related Impacts 
Manufacturing industries have been assessed to 
determine whether these investments contribute to the 
economic well-being of local and regional areas. In New 
York and in Philadelphia it was found that the steel 
industry had positively effected these economies (Isard and 
Kuenne, 1953), and the presence of the aluminum industry in 
the northwest region of the United States proved 
economically beneficial (Miller, 1957). Other studies have 
assessed the economic effect of factory jobs (Oppenheim and 
Swinney, 1992), recycling facilities (Cotliar, 1995), and 
steel industry facilities (American Iron and Steel Industry, 
1985) . 
On the impact of plant closings, Buss and Reduburn 
(1987:172-173) reported that the 1977-1978 shutdown of the 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Works in Campbell, Ohio has had 
wide and long term effects in the region. This shutdown 
eliminated over 5,000 workers employed in steel production. 
Buss and Reduburn concluded that: (1) Two years following 
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the closing, 27% of those who lost their jobs were still 
unemployed. Eight years later that percentage had remained 
identical. These findings also communicated long-term 
effects on incomes. (2) Demand for public assistance 
programs increased during that decade. (3) The "secondary 
economic effects" continued for years, as "the typical 
worker laid off in the closing ... held an average of two jobs 
from 1977 to 1985." As a result, "declining job status", 
"lessened job security" and "periodic interruption of 
earnings" are other measurable long-term losses, and (4) An 
increase in levels of "emotional stress" and "symptoms of 
psychiatric disorder" were observed. Buss and Reduburn 
conclude that the effects of plant closings will vary 
depending on the size of the economy affected. Smaller 
communities are more likely than larger communities to be 
extensively devastated from these shutdowns. 
The impact of factory closings is also communicated 
through "social cost analyses" and "job impact statements." 
These are part of the organizing efforts of labor to 
convincingly represent the effects of these shutdowns and/or 
relocations on various regions. These assessments include 
the effects of closings on tax revenues, taxes spent on 
public programs, indirect effects on other businesses, etc. 
(LeRoy, 19 9 2 ) . 
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Urban Renewal and Enterprise Zones Impacts 
Many government supported programs have been assessed 
to determine their effect at the local, regional and 
national level. For urban renewal and enterprise zone 
programs, multiplier effects are often utilized to account 
for their supposed success. Redevelopment activities 
following land acquisition in urban renewal programs and 
business incentives (ie., tax incentives, local political 
support) in enterprise zones, are part of the investments 
aimed at revitalization and growth. 
Many urban renewal projects which concentrated on the 
support and creation of manufacturing related economies 
have also been assessed. Through the concept of input-
output analysis, these assessments have been aimed at 
determining the cost and benefit ratios of these programs 
(Rothenberg, 1967; Weicher, 1972). According to Lineberry 
and Sharkansky (1978:378-379), a multiplier effect is the 
outcome of these programs: 
The most universally accepted claim for urban renewal, 
and probably the most valid one, is that it has 
expanded the tax base and improved the economic 
vitality of the city. The Urban Renewal Administration 
liked to emphasize the "before" and "after" tax effects 
of renewal. For 768 projects on which land acquisition 
had been completed by 1971 the estimated increase in 
property values was from $464 million to $1.7 billion; 
from this increase the cities could reap generous tax 
revenues. In economic terms, each of these projects 
also had a potential multiplier effect, stimulating 
more jobs and production in service industries ... [and] 
both direct and multiplier effects enhance municipal 
revenues and stimulate economic growth. 
Regardless of the proposed benefits outlined above, concerns 
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have been expressed about the success of these urban renewal 
programs. Anderson (1964), who conducted a study of the 
effects of renewal programs at Boston's West End, indicated 
that caution should be employed when assessing these 
projects. Anderson was critical of the extent to which the 
proposed tax benefits and land values for the city had 
increased. 
Another program, the enterprise zone concept-first 
introduced in the U.S. in 1979-has received considerable 
support from governments across the United States. It has 
been reported that in 22 states, between 1982 and 1988, 
these state or operational enterprise zones increased from 
135 to 510 (Gunn, 1993). This capitalist approach to 
addressing the socioeconomic ills of urban America has been 
perceived by politicians and the media to be economically 
effective in meeting its prescribed goals. 
According to Herman (1985), 60,000 jobs were created 
and over $2 billion of investments resulted. These 
assessment reports have continually increased to exceed 
660,000 new jobs and over $40.6 billion in investments (U.S. 
HUD, 1992). Yet, considerable problems exist with the 
evaluation process and assumptions made on the impact of 
these enterprise zone programs (Clarke, 1986; Skoro, 1988; 
Grady, 1989; James, 1991; Gunn, 1993). 
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The Impact of Urban Tourism 
Urban tourism has been traditionally associated with 
historic, capital, old industrial, and resort cities. 
Theoretically, urban tourism has been viewed as being part 
of an urban life cycle concept. As cities go through 
evolutionary stages of development and change; urbanization, 
suburbanization, disurbanization and reurbanization, it has 
been claimed that the industry of urban tourism complements 
the last of those stages as efforts toward central core 
revitalization occur (Jan Van Der Borg, 1991). 
Increasingly, tourism activities are perceived to have 
positive economic effects for cities across America and 
Europe. Urban tourism is visibly replacing the 
manufacturing character of some cities. In Baltimore, for 
example, tourism activities in Harbor Place have replaced 
the once dominant manufacturing industries. As a result, 
the tourism industry has been credited with the 
revitalization of downtown Baltimore (Levine, 1987) 21 
Overall, urban tourism has been viewed as a vehicle for 
downtown revitalization (Judd and Collins, 1979; Buckley and 
Witt, 1985; 1989; Vetter, 1985; Morton, 1985; Edgell, 1988; 
Page and Fidgeon, 1989; Law, 1991a; 1991b; 1992; 
Cullingworth, 1993). Even though one of the critiques of 
the urban tourism industry is that it creates low-paying, 
21 Berkowitz, (1987) has criticized these assessments 
in Baltimore noting the continuous urban social problems in 
the "targeted areas." 
seasonal jobs, for some (Law, 1992: 604) this industry can 
be viewed as a proper match to the types of inner-city 
labor: 
Whilst many of the [urban tourism industry] jobs are 
low-skilled, this could be in its favour when it is 
located in or near the inner city with its labour 
reserves of the unskilled. 
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Though this statement searches to provide labor fit for this 
industry, one has to be seriously concerned about the 
assumptions made here; that in fact low-paying, low-skilled 
and seasonal jobs are somehow acceptable for this segment of 
the urban population. 
The evaluation of urban tourism for cities and the role 
of these activities in urban regeneration, has become more 
and more a concern of public policy makers. Impact studies 
have been conducted, through the use of multipliers and 
national ratios, to determine the economic effect of these 
investments (Henderson, 1975; Vaughan, 1979; 1986; 1991; 
Hughes, 1982; Beekhuis, 1988; Myerscough, 1988; Jeffrey, 
1989; 1990). According to Law (1992:607), there are three 
types of impacts which these project assessment studies 
attempt to determine: 
Project impact studies attempt to calculate the number 
of jobs created directly at the facility or event 
(primary impact), the number of jobs created indirectly 
because of the expenditure of visitors (secondary 
impact), and the number of induced jobs as a result of 
the extra income in the local economy. The latter two 
topics require extensive survey work so that national 
ratios are frequently used to avoid this. Assessments 
are also made in terms of the profitability of the 
project, impact on the environment, perception of 
residents, displacement effects, use of facilities by 
local residents and, where grants are given, cost per 
job and additionality. 
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Theme parks, casinos and convention activities are also 
viewed to have considerable economic effect on generating 
tourism dollars for cities (Lawson, 1982; Abbey, 1987; Hall 
1987; Whyte, 1988; Smith 1989; Cambell, 1995; Worthington, 
1995; Sabo, 1995). The 1995 International Manufacturing 
Technology convention at McCormick Place was assessed to 
have contributed $165.8 million to the city, according to 
the Chicago Convention Bureau (Smith, 1995) . A recent 
Associated Press report (1996), noted that attracting 
military veteran reunion activities, has become a 
local/regional economic development strategy for many cities 
across the U.S. Thus, it has been estimated by the 
Montgomery, Alabama, Area Chamber of Commerce that veteran 
reunions have a "$10 million annual impact on Montgomery's 
economy." 
The Impact of the Arts 
The presence of the arts has also been viewed as a 
strategy toward urban development since their economic 
effects are perceived to be considerable (Zukin, 1982; 
McNulty, 1985; Tighe, 1985; Whitt, 1987; Myerscough, 1988; 
Whitt and Share, 1988). Cities have attempted to restore 
and revitalize downtown areas through the use of cultural 
anchors such as museums, art centers, libraries, theaters 
and other related cultural events (Logan and Molotch, 1987; 
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Bianchini, et al., 1988; Bianchini, 1991). Orum (1995:134-
136), for example, discussed how efforts to revive the 
vitality of Milwaukee included the War Memorial Museum. 
Attracting people to downtown Minneapolis-St. Paul is driven 
by the Minneapolis Symphony, which holds regular free 
outdoors and indoors concerts for the local residents (Orum, 
1995:183). Other cities, including Tampa (Mormino, 1983), 
Dallas (Tomkins, 1983), New Orleans (Hill, 1984), Knoxville 
and Atlanta (Schmidt, 1984), Salt Lake City (Wright and 
Jorgensen, 1993) utilize similar techniques to revitalize 
their downtowns. 22 
Multiplier effects have been utilized to show the 
economic impact of the arts on a state's economy. In 
Illinois, a study conducted by Laventhol and Horwath (1988) 
for the Illinois Arts Alliance Foundation utilized a 2.65 
multiplier for museum-related organizations and 2.36 
multiplier for non-museum related organizations. The study 
concluded that the indirect spending generated by the arts 
was $337 million for the state. 
Economic Impacts Through the Use of Multipliers in Sports 
Multiplier analysis has also been used to measure the 
22 The role which the arts play in urban development 
can be seen in Chicago. The announcement of new productions 
by Walt Disney at the Chicago Theater and theatrical 
performances at the renovated Oriental Theater, are expected 
to create considerable positive economic effects in the 
North Loop area (Allen, 1996) . 
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economic effects of these investments/projects on 
metropolitan areas. Economic impact studies of sporting 
facilities and sport franchises use a formal economic model 
based on location quotients to calculate direct and indirect 
impacts (Isserman, 1977). Yet, the figures employed in the 
determination of these economic effects are arbitrary. The 
multiplier effect figures utilized across the United States 
has varied widely from 3.2 to 1.2 points. Such difference 
points not only to the lack of uniformity when attempting to 
assess the financial outcome of these projects, but it also 
indicates the political influences of these determinations. 
The findings of these evaluations can have serious political 
implications since government support of stadium development 
projects must be rationalized. Politicians favoring the 
advancement of these expenditures must ensure that their 
decision is valid. It is through research then that the 
public can be informed of its proposed benefits. As a 
result, the use of multiplier figures has fluctuated 
tremendously, revealing in the process the politics of 
research. 
For example, the 3.2 figure mentioned above was 
employed in a study conducted by the Chicago Cubs (Melaniphy 
and Associates, 1986), while a 3.0 figure was utilized in a 
study conducted on the impact of a Class A baseball stadium 
in South Bend, Indiana (Peck, 1985) . A Minnesota study 
conducted by a State Task Force utilized a 2.6 multiplier 
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(Minnesota Major League Baseball Task Force, 1985), and a 
similar analysis by the City of Denver employed a 2.3 
multiplier (Midwest Research Institute, 1983). Other 
multipliers have ranged from 1.7, used to assess the 
contributions of professional sports on Philadelphia 
(George, 1989), and a similar 1.7 figure and a 2.0 figure to 
calculate the economic impact of the White Sox on the City 
of Chicago and the State of Illinois respectively 
(Department of Economic Development, 1986) . Finally, the 
economic effect of the Pirates of Major League Baseball in 
Pittsburgh was determined through a 1.2 multiplier for goods 
and services and a 1.6 multiplier for wages and salaries 
(Greater Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce, 1980). 
There have been three forms of assessment which have 
been taken into consideration when accounting for the 
effects of a professional sports franchise on local and 
regional economies. Those are the direct, indirect and 
intangible effects. 
Direct and indirect economic benefits include revenue 
created not only in the form of ticket sales, parking, and 
franchise employee salaries, but also in employee taxes, 
ticket and parking taxes, food and souvenirs at the game, 
stays at hotels, entertainment after the game, etc. As a 
result, the combination of spending at the stadium or the 
arena and the revenue generated in service industries 
because of the sports events, makes up the direct and 
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indirect economic benefits. These benefits have been viewed 
to stimulate the local economy by generating additional 
funds for the municipalities and promote economic growth 
(Euchner, 1993; Leonard 1993). 
An economic study in Austin, Texas, for example, 
advocated that the presence of a new stadium in the city for 
a new AAA baseball team would provide substantial direct and 
indirect economic benefits to the area. According to the 
study, three different multipliers were utilized to assess 
the overall economic contribution. One for "total output" 
which represents the total direct, indirect and induced 
spending effects surrounding the project. Another for 
"total earnings" which represents wages and salaries as well 
as earnings of proprietorships, partnerships, corporations 
and other entities. Finally, the third multiplier was used 
for "employment" which represents the number of jobs 
generated by the project. The study concluded that over 450 
jobs would be created and a total of over $37 million would 
be contributed as a result of the presence of a new minor 
league franchise in the city. 23 The total construction 
costs were also estimated at $18 million (Coopers and 
Lybrand, 1995) . 
Similarly, a 1985 report by Edward B. Shils noted that 
23 Economic impact studies in the area of sports 
report number of jobs without indicating the types of jobs 
and the average wages. Such reports tend to be misleading 
since without data on wages, the real employment 
implications are left to individual interpretation. 
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the total indirect economic impact of the professional teams 
on the city of Philadelphia during 1983 was $343 million and 
on the Philadelphia SMSA (made up of five counties in 
Philadelphia and four in New Jersey) was over $574 million. 
Shils reached these figures by first determining the direct 
revenue and then adding, (1) spending on ticket and 
television/radio payments and concessions, (2) spending on 
food, entertainment, public and private (i.e. taxi and 
shuttles) transportation as well as lodging and (3) revenue 
paid by advertisers to television/radio stations during 
broadcasting. He concluded that these three sources of 
revenue generated $202 million. To identify the overall 
economic impact on the city of Philadelphia, he utilized a 
1.7 multiplier effect which estimates the indirect economic 
impact coming out of direct spending. The overall economic 
impact on the city then becomes $343 million. Shils used a 
multiplier effect of 2.6 to calculate the $574 million 
figure for the SMSA of Philadelphia (George, 1989) . 24 
24 Direct and indirect economic benefits in sports 
are widely communicated across America. Such assessments 
have included the economic effects of a professional 
basketball team in New Orleans (Finney, 1994), the annual 
contribution of the Bears (WBBM-TV2, 1995) and of the White 
Sox (Laventhol and Horwarth, 1985) on Chicago's economy, as 
well as the impact of the professional leagues on U.S. 
cities (CNN Headline News, 1994) . Other reports have 
included the economic effects of the Indiana Sports 
Corporation on Indianapolis (Macnow, 1989), the economic 
impact of the 1993-1994 MLB player strike on Chicago 
(Carlino, 1994), the financial contributions of the McDome 
project on Chicago (Mccarron, 1990) and the economic impact 
of the Louisiana Superdome and the 1990 Super Bowl on New 
Orleans (Ragas, et.al, 1987; New Orleans, 1995). 
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Intangible effects, the economic benefits which result 
from the attention which cities receive as a result of its 
professional sports team are also assessed. Specifically, 
it is believed that nationally and/or regionally broadcasted 
games, in addition to team coverage, provides citizens 
across the country with an opportunity to become exposed not 
only to that team but also the city's attractions. The 
presence of the city's name in the score box of local 
newspapers across the country can be sources of economic 
growth. In this regard, sports teams become an influential 
source of advertizement for urban centers. 
For the city of Chicago, these intangible economic 
benefits can prove substantial. According to a report by 
the Department of Economic Development, (1986:5-6): 
... these 'intangibles' make a very real contribution to 
the economy of Chicago, for any exposure of the team to 
outsiders--whether potential tourists or businessmen--
also indirectly promotes the city of Chicago. . .. the 
Department estimated that a Chicago baseball franchise 
produces about three million dollars worth of 
intangible benefits in an average year, and that a team 
in a peak year could generate up to eleven million 
dollars. Throughout these calculations, the Department 
was conservative as possible. Just how conservative 
becomes clear when we compare these calculated 
intangibles with other estimates of the impact of 
sports publicity. Local advertizing executives 
hypothesize, for example, that the championship-winning 
1985-1986 Chicago Bears football team produced 
publicity for Chicago equivalent to a $30 to $40 
million promotion campaign. 
Even smaller cities like Aurora, Illinois, view a 
professional sports team as a source of exposure. According 
to Paul Borek, executive director of the Aurora Economic 
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Development Commission (Dardick, 1995): "You can't possibly 
put a price tag on the exposure and recognition that a 
national sports franchise would bring to a community. 
Aurora would be good for the stadium and the stadium would 
be good for Aurora." 
The problems with accurately estimating the economic 
benefits for local and/or regional economies, because of the 
activities of a professional sports franchise and a new 
stadium are numerous. Private interests concerned with 
prof it and public officials in pursuit of growth have 
utilized these findings to push their separate but 
converging agendas, making these investments realities. 
Yet, serious concerns exist about the estimates and 
predictions on which the multipliers and impact studies rely 
as they identify the economic effects of a given project in 
local/regional economies. These concerns exist in both the 
calculation assumptions made by the firms and the individual 
business interests of those involved in conducting these 
studies. 
A Critique of Regional Economic Multipliers 
Various aspects of the regional economic multiplier 
have been criticized since the introduction of this 
analysis. Some criticisms concentrated on the bias of its 
matrix (Dietzenbacher, 1995), problems with the use of 
constant coefficients (Conway, 1980), effects of errors on 
the eigenvector corresponding to the dominant eigenvalue 
(Dietzenbacher, 1990), its applicability to small and 
underdeveloped communities (Mulligan and Gibson, 1986; 
Rephann and Isserman, 1994), its accuracy (Jensen, 1980), 
etc. 
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There are numerous problems with the use of multipliers 
in assessing the total regional impacts of proposed or 
existing projects, policies or programs. These problems can 
be the outcome of (1) definition, (2) estimation, (3) 
assumption, and/or (4) vested interest. 
Problems with Definition 
The issue of definition is important because the 
information presented as a result of regional input-output 
analysis can differ based on concept description(s). Most 
of these definitional problems tend to be about employment 
and income. Specifically, regarding employment, the 
relationship between "jobs'' and "full-time equivalent" or 
FTE, is one which tends to obfuscate the employment 
projections that are often communicated in regional input-
output analysis (Stevens and Lahr, 1988:90-91). 
The employment multiplier estimations are made based on 
jobs not FTE's. The reason for that is because the data 
utilized for the multiplier determination derives from 
sources such as the U.S. Department of Commerce or the 
Bureau of Economic Analyses. These sources present data 
figured out in number of workers or number of jobs, not 
FTE's. 
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This could be problematic, especially when employment 
multiplier estimation is conducted for different 
occupational sectors. For example, certain sectors (i.e. 
mining, heavy manufacturing) tend to have a low ratio of 
workers to FTE, whereas other sectors (i.e. retailing, 
service) tend to have a high ratio of workers to FTE. In 
addition to the occupational sector, the area of the 
country, as well as the season could play an important role 
in communicating serious inconsistencies in multiplier 
estimations (Stevens and Lahr, 1988). 
As a result of these inconsistencies, the employment 
multiplier estimation for two projects would be presented in 
jobs and not FTE's. From that, the presented employment 
effect would be both misleading and inaccurate. Thus, for 
example, a $100 million public investment in renovating the 
stadium of a professional sports franchise might be hailed 
as a project retaining or generating many more jobs than the 
number of jobs which the same amount of money would produce 
if invested in the steel industry. The difference here 
would be that the jobs in the steel industry are more likely 
to be FTE's and year round, whereas the professional 
franchise would employ seasonal and part-time workers. 
Another definitional concern is the income multiplier 
estimation, specifically the induced multiplier effect. The 
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value of output multiplier is employed widely to assess the 
economic impact. This total economic value of output, 
resulting from the exogenous change, tends to be quite 
impressive. Yet, a careful evaluation of its definition 
should pose serious concerns for its accuracy. 
Specifically, the total exogenous value might not be 
regionally grounded. For example, products consumed in the 
regional economy as a result of a given economic activity 
might not themselves be produced in part or in whole by that 
same economy. According to Stevens and Lahr (1988:91): 
The difficulty here comes about because the induced 
multiplier effect ... should depend on the marginal 
propensity to consume regional goods out of regionally-
generated incomes. This marginal propensity is much 
more difficult to estimate for a region than for U.S. 
as a whole. In fact, most regional income multipliers 
are really average propensities to consume out of a 
restricted definition of income .... Output, or sales, 
is almost always misleading because of the double-
counting inherent in this measure. The output per 
employee of a region could be very high, for example, 
if its only industry consisted of assembling high-
priced computers out of costly components imported from 
outside the region. 
As a result of these definitional problems with determining 
induced effects, misleading figures would be likely to 
emerge. A value added multiplier might be a better approach 
to isolating these economic effects. However, the outcome 
of that approach would be very likely to produce def lated 
impact values from those currently reported. 
Other definitional problems have arisen with the 
explanation of the concept under investigation. For 
example, studies about the effect of tourism have identified 
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the tourist in different ways. A tourist has been defined 
as the visitor who has, at a minimum, stayed overnight at 
the place of attraction. On the other hand, other studies 
considered those visiting for one day only to also be 
tourists. If the latter is the case then, it is possible 
that spending at the attraction is merely displaced from 
within the same economy. As a result, the definition of the 
regional economy itself is very likely to vary, producing 
incompatible outcomes (Johnson and Thomas, 1990) . 
Problems with Estimation 
In addition to the employment and income effects 
surrounding the multiplier definitional problems, there have 
also been problems related to the process of estimating 
these economic multipliers. The major concern in estimation 
has been the accuracy of measuring the product consumption 
following a given program, project or policy. The indirect 
and induced economic benefits are often, by far, most 
financially impressive. The multiplier estimation concerns 
are more likely to affect these types of benefits. 
In the case that products are imported from the 
outside, the acclaimed benefits in the production, 
employment, income, etc, as a result of a given program is 
seriously questionable. The consistent estimation of the 
"leakage", resulting from regional purchases produced 
outside the region has been a problematic aspect of 
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multiplier assessment. 
Let's say, for example, that a public investment of 
$100 million to expand the seats of a stadium in a given 
city from 50,000 to 75,000 spectators is hailed to generate 
additional dollars, resulting from the increased consumption 
of foodstuffs sold during the games. That would obviously 
account for the direct spending. The indirect and induced 
benefits would include the additional foodstuff production 
to be sold at the stadium. Such increased production might 
be acclaimed to create additional jobs for the factories 
involved in the supply of these products, additional income 
spent by these newly employed workers, etc. 
Therefore, one would conclude that the more local 
production as a percentage of the total production exists, 
the stronger that local economy would be. As a result, 
changes in export activities (assuming that 25,000 
additional spectators come from outside the regional economy 
to view the game) would have positive economic effects on 
the local production activities and thus, the regional/local 
economy. Since the local employment depends on its 
relationship to the total employment, the question then is: 
How can we determine what part of the regional economy is 
serving the local economy and what part serves the export 
economy? If the answer to this question is that the local 
economy serves exclusively the export activities, then the 
multiplier effect would be considerable, making the 
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investment in the expanded stadium worthwhile. Otherwise 
the proclaimed indirect and induced benefits should be 
questioned. 
Problems with Assumptions 
Various assumptions are also being made during the 
assessment process as to the effect of private and public 
investments on regional economies. These assumptions tend 
to be responsible for creating the extraordinary amounts 
which are typically reported. Consider the case of stadium 
construction and its effects on local economies. According 
to Euchner (1993:71): 
The biggest problem with the multiplier argument is its 
assumption that the spending that occurs at the stadium 
would not occur elsewhere in the local economy without 
a sports team - in other words, the dollars spent at a 
game would not otherwise be part of the urban economy. 
This conclusion is valid since within large urban 
centers there are multiple attractions, many of which 
compete for the consumers' money. Thus, if people do not 
spend their money at the stadium watching a professional 
sporting event, they will spend it at the local zoo or 
museum. On the other hand, what would the economic impact 
be on smaller towns which might provide limited attractions 
to its residents? This argument has been made (Reich, 
1989) to show the economic impact of professional franchises 
for smaller towns: "But such an easy transfer of dollars 
[within large cities due to the multiple attractions] is 
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less likely in a small community, with only a few 
attractions ... '' (Reich, 1989:48). The position taken here 
by Reich is inaccurate. Having many or few attractions in a 
city, does not necessarily mean that the consumption 
patterns of its residents will increase. More specifically, 
the consumption volume will continue to be the same. People 
in the smaller towns will spend their money purchasing other 
goods or making investments, and by doing so they are 
impacting the local economy as if they were spending their 
money at the local stadium. 
A recent economic impact study conducted in Austin, 
Texas (Cooper and Lybrand, 1995:14), outlined the 
possibility of "displacement" money being spent regardless 
of the presence and activities related to a professional 
sports team and of a stadium. However, it rationalized the 
economic benefits. Specifically, the study assumed that (1) 
there are increased taxes imposed on spending inside the 
stadium and, (2) stadium related spending is a "significant 
entertainment opportunity", greater than any of the others 
being available to its residents. This study noted: 
It should be noted that the operations of a new sports 
and entertainment project, the phenomena of 
"displacement" will take place to some degree. 
Specifically, this refers to the fact that some portion 
of the spending generated by the new project may take 
place on some other entertainment activity if the new 
facility is not built. For example, an individual, 
attending a concert or the Firebirds game at the 
Stadium may instead go to a movie without the 
development of the stadium. As a result, the spending 
by the attendee may not be entirely new to the local 
area. While this displacement of spending will take 
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place to some degree, it is important to note that [l] 
spending which results in place of the stadium related 
spending, should the project not be completed, may be 
on goods and services taxed at lower rates, and [2] 
without the significant entertainment opportunities 
associated with the Stadium, less overall spending in 
the County may result. 
This emphasis on consumption patterns, often outlined 
by these studies, serves as the primary means of providing 
an economic rationale, and explaining the overall impact of 
stadiums and professional teams in various communities. 
Since consumption is related to production within a 
capitalist system, rather than assessing consumption 
patterns, it would be more beneficial to research the impact 
on production within the local economy. What kind of jobs 
and how many jobs are produced by the presence of a 
professional team? An answer to this question would allow 
for an accurate gaging of the economic impact of 
professional teams and the rationalization for building 
stadiums to attract them. Regarding this question, there is 
no evidence that the creation of jobs is an outcome of the 
presence of sports franchises. It has been argued (Baade 
and Dye, 1990) that because of the subsidies extended to 
franchises by the local government, low-paying jobs are 
being created. These types of jobs do not have the economic 
effect claimed by politicians and team owners. 
Another assumption that has been utilized widely across 
the country, when conducting impact studies, has been the 
"Taj Mahal Syndrome" (Hunter, 1989) . According to Hunter, 
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it is believed that the larger the project to be conducted 
the greater its economic impact will be. Hunter showed that 
a multiplier analysis of a bridge construction would 
generate twice as much in community income as that produced 
from repairing the existing bridge. As a result of that 
observation, Hunter (1989:1008) concluded: 
The use of the new multiplier in the comparison between 
old bridge repair and new bridge repair construction 
makes the bias of the analysis clear. By increasing 
public expenditures, even greater increases in 
community income can be effected through the 
multiplier's ripple effect. Why then stop with just a 
new bridge? Why not build an even larger bridge, or 
perhaps several bridges? Why not build new highways 
connected to the new bridge? Certainly if one bridge 
can generate far more community income than additional 
community cost, several bridges connected by new 
highways will bring even more income. Can this 
analysis be correct? 
The approach that a larger, more capital-intensive project 
would bring about greater economic benefits than a smaller, 
less expensive one is an assumption which multiplier 
analysis supports. Similarly the assumption that the return 
of a larger project will always outweigh the public 
investment is incorrect. In reality, such thinking stands 
opposite to logic. If spending more meant increased 
economic growth, then, local governments across America 
would spend themselves into affluence. 
Another assumption found when analyzing multiplier 
effects is that which views the use of local services for a 
given public project as fiscally better for the local 
economy than a scenario where out-of-region services were to 
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be utilized. It is possible that, the completion of a 
public project conducted by purchasing in-state only 
materials and utilizing exclusively local labor, to prove a 
financial loss. The multiplier predictions of such a 
project would then be inaccurate, making the proclaimed 
economic development outcomes questionable. Consider that, 
in its efforts to stay within the state, the project 
materials and the labor utilized might prove to be more 
expensive than that which could have been purchased from out 
of region locations (Hunter, 1989). Under this scenario, it 
is possible that in an effort to create economic growth, the 
public project is likely to run over its projected budget 
and become more expensive to complete. What would then be 
the cost to the taxpayers? Taxpayers will have to subsidize 
a costlier project. Does advocated economic expansion then 
result into hidden financial costs? As the above scenario 
shows, local spending does not always guarantee positive, 
short-term or long-term economic effects. 
Finally, the issue of opportunity cost is not taken 
into consideration when multiplier effects are reported. 
According to Hunter (1989:1010): 
Estimates of the income and employment multipliers for 
private firms are misleading for the same reason that 
they are misleading when applied to public works 
projects: they neglect to factor in opportunity cost. 
What are the alternative uses for the business' 
productive resources: labor, plant and equipment? If 
the business were to go bankrupt or for some other 
reason to cease operation, would its workers find other 
employment? Would the buildings be used for other 
productive purposes? Could the equipment be sold to 
87 
other productive capacities? 
In the case where these transfers are likely to transpire, 
and in most cases they do, then, based on incorrect 
assumptions, the multiplier effect proves misleading. In 
this case then, the multiplier business effects reported are 
not unique to the specific business since such economic 
benefits are likely to also occur without its presence. 
Problems with Vested Interests 
Another issue which should be taken into consideration 
when reviewing the results of an impact study is that of 
vested interests. Who benefits from the over-inflated 
figures reported by these studies? Also, who conducts these 
studies? Answers to these questions should provide an 
insight into the inherent biases which might exist even 
prior to the analysis of any data. According to Hefner 
(1995), because of the multiplier effect, economic impact 
studies, such as those conducted to forecast the effect of 
the 1996 Olympics on Atlanta and Georgia, can be 
manipulated. 
Multiplier analyses have been utilized for both private 
and public projects. Yet, what remains consistent in both 
circumstances is that almost all of these impact studies are 
either attempting to (1) rationalize new spending, (2) 
maintain current spending, or (3) increase spending. 
Regarding public projects, large contracts end up going 
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to private interests, thus, showcasing large benefits 
through the use of multipliers only rationalizes the direct 
support of private capital by public funds. On the other 
hand, regarding private investments, multipliers effects 
have been utilized by businesses to draw additional economic 
benefits from local, state and/or federal governments. For 
example, owners of professional franchises will utilize the 
"ripple- effect" argument to receive public financial 
support for the construction/update of their playing 
facilities. Continued funding for the arts might be 
rationalized when, as expressed by various impact studies, 
one takes into consideration the possibilities for fiscal 
urban regeneration. Tax benefits for business might also be 
justified when considering the local economic effects of 
their activities. 
Finally, the fact that many private firms are employed 
to conduct these analyses also points to the inherent bias 
in this process. The results of these analyses will serve a 
specific purpose and in a situation where the methods of 
input-output investigation are extremely fluid, the "right" 
results can be easily compiled. Also, the lack of knowledge 
on the part of the public to critique the specifics of these 
impact studies makes them indisputable. 
Sports, Stadiums and Economic Development 
Though incentives provided by cities are often expected 
to generate local economic development, it has been shown 
that, in the majority of the situations, this is not the 
case (Willis, 1985; Wren, 1987; Okuno and Yagi, 1990; 
Storey, 1990; Boviard, 1992; Folley, 1992; Wassmer, 1990; 
1994). The economic impact studies in sports most often 
tend to exaggerate the benefits making these reports 
misleading and unnecessary. 
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In recent years, the economic effects of sports 
facilities on local/regional economies has been questioned 
(Baade and Dye, 1988b; Nicklaus, 1991; Howe, 1993; 
Colclough, Daellenback and Sherony, 1994; Dauten, 1995) 
Robert Baade and Richard Dye (1990) attempted to assess the 
influence of professional sports and stadiums on the economy 
of a metropolitan area. Utilizing census data from nine 
different metropolitan areas (Cincinnati, Denver, Detroit, 
Kansas City, New Orleans, Pittsburgh, San Diego, Seattle and 
Tampa Bay) , and methodologically employing a regression 
analysis, Baade and Dye concluded that the effects of 
stadiums and professional teams on area development were not 
as positive as those advocated by the local government and 
the professional teams themselves. The often recommended, 
multiplier assumption proved a doubtful factor in urban 
development. New or renovated stadiums do not increase 
personal income and, according to Baade and Dye, they could 
even have a negative impact on local development. Baade 
(1987:15), in an earlier report published by the Heartland 
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Policy Institute in Chicago, utilized the results of this 
analysis to conclude that: 
And, 
The construction or renovation of a stadium, or the 
presence of a professional sports franchise, might well 
have a positive effect on the economy in the stadium's 
immediate neighborhood. But at what cost to the rest 
of the city or to the region as a whole? Perhaps a new 
restaurant will open up in the vicinity of a new sports 
stadium; it is however, just as likely that an 
established restaurant fifteen blocks away will close 
its doors as a result. Is this what stadium proponents 
consider economic growth? 
The results of this third regression confirm the thesis 
that stadiums and professional sports induce a 
reduction in SMSA income as a percent of regional 
income. In five of the nine cities, stadiums and 
professional sports had a significant negative impact; 
in the remaining four cities, the stadium and 
professional sports variables, failed to exert a 
significant impact, positive or negative, on city 
incomes. In no instance did a positive, significant 
correlation surface among stadiums, professional 
sports, and city income as a fraction of regional 
income. 
The changing internal construction of sporting 
facilities, local/state laws and the positioning of stadiums 
close to expressways, all must be taken into consideration 
when attempting to assess the economic impact of sports 
facilities on local economies. In addition, the 
beneficiaries of labor contracts from the construction of 
these sports facilities have not come from local 
communities. The rise of the suburban economy and the 
decentralization of the industry in the 40's and 50's has 
taken away many of the labor opportunities once held by the 
central cities (Ashton, 1984). As a result, many contracts 
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given for the construction of sports facilities have gone to 
companies which operate from surrounding suburbs and most 
often out of the state. 
The Malling of Stadiums: Capturing the Consumer 
The changing character of sport complexes should be 
taken into consideration when assessing the multiplier 
effects of stadiums on local communities. Newly constructed 
sporting facilities have become more geared towards consumer 
spending on products which are sometimes completely 
unrelated to the sporting event itself. For example, the 
United Center in Chicago, Illinois, conveys an impression 
similar to that of visiting the local mall or walking 
through an airport concourse being full of small shops on 
either side of the walkway. According to architecture 
critic Blair Kamin (1995) : 
The hypercommercialized arena [United Center] is part 
theme park, part shopping mall, part circus, part movie 
theater, part hotel lobby, part airline terminal, part 
Niketown-everything, in short, but a match for the 
Madhouse on Madison Street ... Maybe Benny the Bull 
[mascot of the Chicago Bulls] should wear mouse ears 
instead of horns. 
This ''malling" of stadiums encourages spending within its 
structure, thus discouraging opportunity for the local 
community to benefit from the presence of the crowds coming 
92 
to the games. 25 
The $308 million SkyDome in Toronto, Canada, is another 
example of a sports facility which captures the spending of 
the fans in multiple ways. In addition to being the home of 
the Blue Jays of the American League, the Skydome is also an 
entertainment center. According to David Garrick, vice 
president of Marketing for the Stadium Corporation of 
Ontario, the downtown Skydome can provide an evening worth 
of entertainment. He noted (Buursma, 1988): 
It's [Skydome] a city within a city. People will be 
able to leave work at 4:30 p.m., play a game of squash, 
shower, have dinner, go to a baseball game, then go to 
a nightclub after the game if they want, all without 
ever leaving the complex. 
Finally, the fact that new stadiums are being built 
close to expressways making them easily accessible to the 
public, and/or in communities which suffer economically, can 
have negative affects for the neighboring communities. By 
the easy expressway access to the stadium, fans will never 
become exposed to the restaurants or other various 
entertainment attractions and small businesses available 
within the local community. In addition, because of the 
harsh social and/or economic conditions experienced within 
25 Other factors have also contributed to limiting 
the economic growth of surrounding neighborhoods, resulting 
from the presence of a stadium. For example, a local 
Chicago Park District law prohibits fans from bringing 
foodstuffs and alcoholic beverages into Chicago's Soldiers 
Field. Similarly, an Illinois state law passed in 1988, 
gave the White Sox exclusive rights to sell food and liquor 
within and around their South Side stadium. 
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these local communities, those who attend home games will 
choose not to even purchase gasoline from the local station. 
Many will do their spending either at their home communities 
or within the stadium itself. 
In Search of an Economic Impact 
At the heart of every multiplier analysis is the 
assumption that the amount of money invested on a given 
project will be smaller than the amount predicted to be 
generated by that same project. As a result, state 
subsidies have often exceeded the impact expectations. 
Mitsubishi/Chrysler were provided with over $85 million in 
the form of incentives to operate in Illinois. In return 
the state expected to capitalize on the corporation's 
considerable subcontracting business within Illinois. Yet, 
as it turned out, the forecasted 8,000 new jobs and the 
additional $300 million a year in personal income never 
materialized. Only 16 percent of the subcontracts went to 
Illinois firms. As a result, in this case, the multiplier 
inflated the outcome of the state subsidy (Hunter, 1989). 
Similarly, the amount of dollars generated for the city 
by having a professional team of ten proves to be less than 
the amount invested by the city to support that team's 
operations. A study of Baltimore's support for the MLB 
Orioles and the NFL Colts from 1977 to 1983 by Arthur 
Johnson (1986), provided some interesting findings. The 
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study showed that for 1977, 1978 and 1982 the city 
expenditures on these professional franchises, outweighed 
the city revenues by $2,628, $442,530 and $774,043 
respectively. The net city revenue for 1979, 1980, 1981 and 
1983 was $798,653, $393,685, $91,191 and $801,096. Also, 
these public subsidies do not translate into increased 
access to the games for the public. Thus, the savings which 
the owners enjoy are not passed down to the consumers of 
their product. Coakley (1989a) reports that even though the 
residents of the state of Louisiana subsidize the New 
Orleans Superdome deficits by $3 to $5 million a year, most 
of these residents cannot afford to pay for a guided tour of 
this massive structure. Similarly, in Michigan, taxpayers 
have subsidized the Pontiac Silverdome between 1976 and 1987 
to the amount of $11 million (Baade and Bast, 1987). Such 
findings definitely question the extent to which the 
presence of professional franchises adequately represent the 
proposed economic success for the city. 
If it is the case, that there is no economic benefit 
for the community, then why do cities continue to compete 
and be willing to invest such extraordinary amounts of money 
to host a team? To answer this question it is important to 
note how the beneficiaries of these activities (stadium 
construction) strategize to convince cities of their (city) 
"perceived benefits." 
Baade and Dye (1988a:38) describe the process and the 
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various stages through which proposals for the utilization 
of public resources to support sports franchises advance. 
The different types of benefits are not economically 
grounded. Rather, proposed economic development through the 
use of multipliers and impact studies, serves 
political/persuasive needs: 
At the first level, there is disagreement on the meaty, 
earthly matters relating to direct municipal revenue 
projections on stadium income statements. If these 
projections fail to support stadium plans, the 
discussion usually ascends to a second stage, where the 
stadium advocates recruit indirect benefits or 
multiplier effects in boosting their stadium proposals. 
Failure here generally ignites a third booster-phase, 
in which the city economy is said to be propelled 
upward by the ability of stadiums and their big-league 
sports franchises to attract other business to their 
environs. Failure to convince skeptics at this level 
produces deep space debate on the stadiums' intangible 
benefits. In deep space, any weight can be assigned to 
these benefits, and stadium advocates have assigned a 
weight sufficient to support their case on "rational" 
grounds. 
As a result, public officials become convinced that spending 
public money will result in economic growth and 
redevelopment opportunities, especially for the inner-city. 
Baim (1994) conducted two studies aimed at better 
understanding the relationship between local/state 
governments and public subsidies provided to professional 
sports franchises. His objectives (1994:217) included: (1) 
determining the existence of these public subsidies, and (2) 
identifying the extent of the size of these subsidies. Baim 
analyzed financial data on fifteen stadiums of the NFL and 
MLB and he reached the following conclusions: (1) municipal 
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investments almost always involve taxpayer support, (2) the 
size of these subsidies vary, (3) the fans receive none of 
those subsidies, (4) the presence of external benefits which 
are utilized to retain/attract a professional franchise are 
not universal. 
Findings such as those above strongly suggest that the 
economic benefits are not as extensive as the ones 
predicted. Stadium construction and economic development, 
at the local or regional level, are not an automatic given, 
and the economic outcomes of this relationship is either 
negative or not equivalent to those publicized (Okner, 1974; 
Johnson and Frey, 1985; Harvey, 1990; Baade and Dye, 1990; 
Bale, 1993; Euchner, 1993; Hiestand, 1993; Baim, 1994; 
Wilson, 1994). 
Conclusion 
Multiplier effects have been employed in economic 
impact studies to show the fiscal contribution of a given 
investment. Though this type of analysis has been conducted 
for the last few decades, serious questions should be raised 
regarding the accuracy of reports which have employed 
multipliers and outline extraordinary economic benefits to a 
local and/or regional economy. 
Multipliers have been utilized to forecast the economic 
effect of manufacturing, urban tourism and the arts, urban 
renewal and state enterprize zone programs, sports and 
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stadiums, amongst others. Yet, due to multiple assumptions, 
estimation and definitional problems, many of these studies 
are deceptive and incorrect. As a result, the 
interpretation of reported findings often does not 
adequately describe the actual economic impact of the 
assessed project or proposed investment. 
In the area of professional sports, the financial 
subsidies offered by the cities are aimed by the local and 
state government at generating direct, indirect and 
intangible economic benefits. Though these claims are made 
by local officials, team owners, the media, and commissioned 
impact studies, research shows that there is no empirical 
link between public investments in stadium construction and 
urban development. 
Estimating the positive economic effects of having a 
professional sports franchise in a city is clearly 
subjective. Reliance on multipliers and impact studies in 
sports and stadium development has resulted in the 
rationalization of public support for private enterprise. 
CHAPTER 4 
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF SPORTS: ARE THEY REAL? 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an insight into the way public 
officials, professional team representatives, supporters of 
sports franchises and the mass media, utilize social factors 
and cultural representations to convince the public that the 
presence of a sports team is vital for a city. In addition, 
the quality of the city is measured by the presence of a 
professional franchise. To that extent, such reasoning has 
been employed to justify the public support for stadium 
development. Arguments that a professional franchise 
represents and symbolizes the city in which it plays, have 
become increasingly common. Similarly, it is believed that 
the team reflects on the city itself and a successful team 
on the field, the ice or the hardwood floor, is a sign of a 
first class city. Additionally, it has been noted that a 
professional franchise is essential for a community since it 
serves as a generator of social cohesion and community 
building. 
These arguments have been based on the social roles 
which sports play in society. Drawing from within this 
framework, these claims concentrate on processes of order 
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and stability. Thus, structure, function and equilibrium 
are the critical factors on which these arguments rely. The 
presence of a professional team in a city, has been claimed 
to provide positive role models to the youth and even to 
decrease crime. 26 
After providing a brief overview of the social function 
which sports play in society, the issue of status and 
representation will be addressed. Supporters of 
professional sports franchises across America have 
identified increased city status as a direct result of these 
teams' activities. I will also outline other arguments, 
namely those related to community building and social 
cohesion. The chapter concludes with some drawbacks, when 
attempting to understand sports and professional franchises 
in society by exclusively relying on their social 
contributions. 
The Social Function of Sports 
Society has been viewed as an organism which has a 
structure and, as a system, is composed of interrelated 
parts (Parsons, 1951). Some of these parts, or social 
institutions, include the family, education, religion, the 
political system and the economic system. In addition, each 
26 The testing of a correlation between sports teams 
and crime showed that there is no overall, statistically 
significant relationship between the two variables (Baim, 
1994:186-188). 
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of the parts of the social system have manifest and latent 
functions (Merton, 1968) . Accordingly, like many other 
social institutions, sports serve various functions for 
society. Thus, sports contribute to the smooth functioning 
of the social system. 27 
In its most direct way, one of the functions of sports 
in society is to provide opportunities and encourage its 
citizens to engage in physical exercise and thus, develop a 
healthy population. Sports can also serve as a way for 
citizens to exert aggression in a manner which is non-
threatening to the social system. In that regard, sports 
become a "safety valve" for society (Proctor and Eckard, 
1976; Marsh, 1978). Similarly, sports can be utilized to 
manage tensions, promote stability and ensure that society 
continues to function within its existing status quo 
(Riordan, 1977; Pickering, 1978; Riordan, 1981; Whannell, 
1983; Allison, 1986; Hoberman, 1986; Redmond, 1986; Hulme, 
1990). 
Sports can also bring people together. It generates a 
sense of collective identity and even represents the values 
of the society itself. So, for example, teamwork, 
perseverance, success, competition, discipline, all become 
27 Coakley (1982; 1989b), in his examination of the 
social functions of sports, utilized a four "system needs" 
approach (Parsons and Smelser, 1965). According to Coakley 
(1989b:26-28), the four areas include: (1) sports as a 
pattern of maintenance and tension management, (2) sports as 
a means of integration, (3) sports as a means of goal 
attainment, and (4) sports as a means of adaptation. 
101 
communicated through sports. According to Eitzen (1989:44): 
"· .. American sport, like American society, is authoritarian, 
bureaucratic, and product oriented. "28 In this regard, 
there is a strong interrelationship between sports and the 
social system. 
Another function of sports in contemporary society has 
been that, like education, the family, the peer group, 
religion, etc, sports serves as an agent of socialization. 
Within the organized setting of sports, young children learn 
to value order, structure, patience, commitment, authority, 
stability and realize the notion of hierarchy (Ball, 1976; 
Watson, 1977; Kohn, 1980; Fine, 1987; Eitzen, 1989; 
Underwood, 1989) . In the process, these children become 
prepared to enter society with the attitudes and 
understandings which the larger culture values. So, for 
example, the acceptance of the calls made at the game by the 
official, signifies the power and powerlessness of its 
participants (players and officials) . These judgements by 
the officials also occur within a highly structured 
environment. Such an environment is usually composed of 
records/statistics, disciplinary actions against the 
individual which often affect the team, credentialism, etc. 
Within the larger society, similar elements can be found as 
28 Sports have also been viewed as a reflection of 
society. Curry and Jiobu (1984:17), note that the events 
and issues (i.e., sexism, racism, drugs, corruption, 
violence, crime, etc) which take place in society can also 
be found in the social institution of sports. 
one observes the operation of the legal system and the 
enforcement of laws. 
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Drawing from this perspective of sports, arguments of 
status, cohesion and community building have been utilized 
to rationalize the need for the presence of a professional 
sports team in cities across America. Thus, the high social 
value of these franchises becomes another reason for cities 
across America to find themselves competing against 
eachother for an opportunity to receive the national 
attention promised by the leagues and their teams. Sports 
teams have also been viewed as representing the city to the 
rest of the nation. These factors have been employed to 
def end the use of public funds expended on renovating 
existing sports facilities or building new stadiums. 
A Professional Franchise as an Urban Status Symbol 
It is believed that having a professional team in a 
given city places that city on the national "map." 
Amplifying the prestige of the community and improving the 
morale of the citizens have also been cited as some of the 
factors for the willingness of cities to rent their 
facilities inexpensively to professional teams (Okner, 
1974). These and other related factors have in recent years 
supported decisions for considerable public expenditures in 
stadium construction. 
Recently, St. Louis, Missouri offered an excellent 
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financial package to attract a professional football team 
back to that city. The city identified the presence of a 
football team as a way of regaining its national image. 
According to former Missouri Senator Thomas Engleton 
(Kramer, 1995b), the presence of the Rams in St. Louis is 
nothing short of a blessing, making every effort and dollar 
spent rewarding. He noted: 
Whether one agrees with it or not, some people measure 
the caliber of a city in terms of having a professional 
baseball team and a professional football team. When 
St. Louis lost football, it became a second-class city. 
With football back, St. Louis is once again a first 
class city. 
Having a professional team then denotes an increased 
image for the city and makes that city enter into a unique 
club of cities which can be called ''major league cities." 
Hoffman and Greenberg (1989:154), reported the comments of 
an executive who analyzes the values of various companies 
across the country. He said: 
I talked about what teams mean to cities to the 
chairman of the board of Westinghouse. He said, 'How 
can I bring people to Pittsburgh to work for 
Westinghouse if I can't tell them that we have a major 
league community?' Now you want to translate that into 
dollars. It can't be done. But that's not the 
important thing. It's the desire, the image. 
And, according to Dave Mona, a public relations executive 
who worked to keep the Timberwolves in Minnesota after they 
threatened to leave for New Orleans: 
There is a real benefit to people in other parts of the 
country looking in their newspapers and seeing 
"Minnesota'' in stories and in agate. It's one of those 
intangibles that makes an area "major league." For a 
long time, this was the smallest area that had every 
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major-league sport. 
The defection of a professional team can also have 
negative perceptions towards the community. University of 
Minnesota Athletic Director, McKinley Boston concludes: "My 
sense is that [the relocation of a professional team] 
changes the overall perception of our [Minneapolis] 
community. I think professional sport franchises have a lot 
to do with how people out of the area view you" (Bennet, 
1994). 
Cities also take pride in their sports teams. Often, 
the success of the franchise on the field is perceived to 
add considerable prestige and status to the community. 
Claims that Chicago is the greatest sports town in the 
country and that its residents should be proud to reside 
there are constant subjects of discussion on the local 
sports radio shows (SCR-820 and WMVP-1000). In these sports 
stations, during the period of the championships won by the 
NBA's Chicago Bulls (1991-1993), it was common to hear 
analogies being made between the success of the team and the 
greatness of the city. Similarly, the sudden decision to 
move the Browns of the NFL from Cleveland to Baltimore in 
1995 was viewed as unfair by the residents of Cleveland. 
They repeatedly described themselves as members of a first-
class city which continued to support the franchise over the 
many years when the Browns exemplified poor performance on 
the field (Pearson, 1995). 
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Civic-identity and civic self-esteem arguments have 
also been made to support the construction of sports 
facilities at considerable public cost. Edward Williams in 
1988, as part of a request to the Maryland General Assembly 
to fund a stadium replacement (retire the 35-year-old 
Memorial Stadium in Baltimore) for his Baltimore Orioles, 
argued for the status that his team provided to that city. 
It was portrayed that, if the Orioles decided to leave 
Baltimore, the social cost to the city would be extremely 
high. 
Fearing the loss of this baseball franchise, especially 
when a few years earlier in 1984, the Colts of the NFL 
carried through their threats and moved to Indianapolis, the 
State Assembly voted for a new baseball stadium. According 
to Marc Ganis of SportCorp, a stadium development and 
financing company: "Baltimore is a perfect example of a 
community that developed an inferiority complex because they 
lost a team" (Buursma, 1988). As a result, the proposed 
50,000 open-air seat stadium was expected to cost the 
Maryland taxpayers $155 million. Yet, as it turned out, the 
48,000 seat Camden Yards actually cost them $206 million. 
In order for a city to gain the perceived status 
resulting from the presence of a professional franchise, it 
is believed that, that city should be willing to make 
considerable financial contributions to its team(s). 
Michael Mccaskey, the owner of the Chicago Bears of the NFL, 
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in 1995, requested over $185 million in public funds for a 
new stadium. On a question as to whether the state and the 
city should provide him with these funds or invest the money 
in education and health care, Mccaskey responded: 
In logic class we call that a false dichotomy. It is 
not a question of choosing between schools or inner 
city hospitals on the one hand and sports and 
entertainment amenities on the other. A great city has 
resources to do both. I firmly believe that Chicago is 
a great city (WBBM RADI0-780AM, 1995) . 
A sports franchise also, according to some, has the 
ability to transform the status of a city. Hudnut (1995), 
former mayor of Indianapolis, pointed to the effects which 
the presence of a team can have: 
In Indianapolis, we fought to keep the Indiana Pacers 
from moving to Sacramento because we realized it would 
be devastating to our image as an emerging American 
city if the team relocated. We fought for the Colts 
against Baltimore, San Antonio, Phoenix, Birmingham, 
Jacksonville and Memphis because the potential benefits 
were equally as dramatic .... They [Colts] transformed 
us from "India-no-place" into a destination city, "a 
Cornbelt city with Sunbelt sizzle." 
Some cities will even promote new sports stadiums as 
landmarks since they believe that they add to the status of 
their city. For example, The Ohio Turnpike Commission 
(1994) went as far as to advertize Cleveland's Jacobs Field 
in its James W. Shocknessy Ohio Turnpike Map as a site for 
tourists to visit. The Indians' ballpark was listed along 
the Toledo Museum of Art, the Toledo Zoo, Sea World & Cedar 
Point, and a variety of other theme parks. In addition, the 
inclusion of stadiums as landmarks informs us of the extent 
to which city officials will go to present these structures. 
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In the process, cities engage in the debasing of landmark 
status. 
The presence of a professional sports team is also 
perceived to ''put on the map" and benefit small cities which 
search for the attention that large cities gain. Attracting 
the Giants from San Francisco to San Jose has been viewed as 
a status builder strategy for San Jose (Seal, 1992). 
Kenneth Adams, an attorney who worked on the Irwindale, 
California stadium deal is quoted in the Reich (1989) 
article saying: 
The value of a major professional sports franchise to a 
young and growing community that is trying to put 
itself on the map is inestimable .... The inescapable 
conclusion of the last 10 years is that a professional 
sports franchise has more value to an Irwindale or a 
Sacramento than to a Los Angeles or a San Francisco. 
And accordingly it's very difficult to persuade the 
citizens in the big cities to spend taxpayer money on 
retaining a team. 
This notion of the difference between newer and older 
cities, as it relates to the extent to which they are 
willing to attract a professional franchise, depends on 
factors such as local political organization, organized 
labor and citizen interests. Wilson (1994: 241) addresses 
some of these factors: 
The bidding war for franchises tended to pit newer, 
prodevelopment cities against older, more 
democratically run communities. Cities in the South, 
Southwest, and West, such as Atlanta, Houston, Dallas, 
San Antonio, Phoenix, Los Angeles, Miami and San Diego 
were especially well adapted to more open competition 
because they had weaker public sectors, fewer calls for 
public accountability, an unorganized working class, 
and a far stronger military influence. Their goal was 
to encourage growth, rather to regulate it. They were 
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not disturbed by the fact, commonly acknowledged, that 
the sports business mainly benefitted developers, 
financiers and realtors, rather than the average 
citizen, who could only be expected to enjoy its 
benefits as they "trickled down." 
Recently this ''easier acceptance" of propositions to 
accommodate the interests of professional teams in the 
Southwest is changing. Such challenges to the intentions of 
local government come from residents who have retired to the 
Southwest and might be more aware of the uneven benefits 
which come from building a new stadium. A proposal to build 
a new stadium to replace the Cubs' current winter home of Ho 
Ho Cam in Mesa, Arizona with a new $24 million reminiscent 
of Wrigley Field, was opposed by area residents. The locals 
felt that taxpayers' money should not assist the Cubs' 
interests (de Lama, 1994). 
Other Proposed Social Benefits for the City Resulting from 
the Presence of a Professional Sports Franchise 
Additional social benefits have also been advocated to 
result from the presence of a professional sports franchise 
in a city. The perceived value of a franchise has made 
public officials view the team as being one with the city 
itself. Pat Quinn, an Illinois Democratic candidate for 
U.S. Senate, who proposed the "Sports Fans Bill of Rights", 
indicated that the Bears of the NFL are one with the 
community of Chicago (WBBM-TV2, 1995). He noted: 
The Bears are like utilities. They belong to the fans. 
There is an issue of trust. Generation after 
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generation people have come to see them. They belong 
to the community. 
But, how did statements like the one above, which indicates 
a very strong relationship between the city and the 
professional franchise, come to be? In attempting to answer 
this question, I will discuss the way city officials and 
others across America, who are involved in attracting or 
retaining professional franchises, argue the prevailing or 
anticipated social benefits. 
A Professional Franchise as a Generator of Social Cohesion 
and Community Building 
In addition to the status related arguments mentioned 
earlier, the presence of a professional franchise has also 
been viewed as a means of community empowerment, pride and 
community maintenance. Jerry West, a long-time NBA great 
and most recently General Manager of the Los Angeles Lakers, 
described the 1995-1996 regular season success of the 
Chicago Bulls as a community building experience for 
Chicago. For him, Chicago is fortunate to have this great 
team play there. According to West, the achievements of the 
Bulls on the court "builds community pride ... It is great for 
Chicago ... This is great to have in your city ... [and], I wish 
that we had it here in Los Angeles" (WSCR-SCORE 820 AM, 
1996). William Hudnut (1995), former mayor of Indianapolis 
also noted that the Colts of the NFL have served a similar, 
socially cohesive function for that city: 
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The team can supply some of the glue that holds a 
community together. The Colts galvanized the spirit of 
Indianapolis. 
This notion of community building has also been 
expressed recently in Tampa, Florida. As the NFL Bucs 
threatened to leave the city, unless they received a 
commitment for a new stadium, social cohesion and community 
building arguments surfaced. These arguments were 
constructed to support every effort to keep the team in the 
area. According to Edwin Roberts, Jr., (1995), columnist 
for The Tampa Tribune, the economic benefits, though 
critical, are not the most important reasons for keeping the 
franchise. Rather it is the "civic worth" which is "the 
major reason for keeping the Bucs." He wrote: 
The economic benefits accruing to the citizenry as a 
whole from the presence of a professional football team 
are probably smaller than advertized. Nevertheless, 
the civic worth of a sports franchise has less to do 
with expanding local wealth than with expanding local 
pride, and that's not easy to evaluate. . .. when the 
[Washington Red] Skins won their first Super Bowl, there 
was so much hugging among strangers in Washington and 
its suburbs that the celebration put one in mind of V-J 
Day. Nothing, absolutely nothing can bring to a 
diverse community so much shared rapture .... The Bucs' 
great gift to us is the unity they inspire among so 
many different sorts of people, and it is a unity that 
thrives on the team's success but doesn't entirely 
dissipate when the team fails. 29 
Similarly, in Chicago, when the Bears of the NFL 
threatened to leave the city for a suburb or another city, a 
29 It is important to note that success on the field 
does not always result into happy street celebrations. The 
Chicago Bulls' championship victory in 1993 led to deadly 
riots after the game. 
111 
Chicago Tribune commentary (Papajohn, 1995) responded: 
The Bears have long been a unifying element for a city 
where North Side, South Side, West Side and the Loop 
all distrust one another, where the Sox and the Cubs 
split the baseball community and where racial divisions 
run below the surface like so many fault lines. 
Public officials and community leaders have also 
outlined the social effects which a professional team has on 
a city. In a Los Angeles Times article, Keneth Reich (1989) 
assesses the value of sports teams for various cities. In 
that same article a number of public officials proclaim 
their importance. Alameda County Supervisor Don Pareda, 
addresses why focusing on bringing the NFL Los Angeles 
Raiders back to Oakland is important for building city 
morale and social cohesion. He noted: 
It really provides a galvanizing affect for the 
community. It fuses an identity. It provides the 
community a separate and distinct interest which people 
share in common, and for us, in Oakland, that is very 
important because we have such a diverse community, 
socially, economically and ethnically. It provides a 
common reference for us and we know that that's very 
valuable. 
It is a similar value for the city of Los Angeles that 
California State Senator Bill Cambell identified: 
I think there is an extreme value, even to Los Angeles, 
in these teams. You have the community pride, the 
cohesiveness that a sports franchise brings. . .. In the 
office, everyone is talking about the game the day 
before or the night before. It brings an esprit de 
corps to a community that otherwise is not there. 
This idea of community togetherness and identification 
is also interestingly argued by labor leaders such as Bill 
Robertson who was instrumental in bringing the Raiders from 
Oakland to Los Angeles. In assessing the value of a 
professional franchise for the city of Los Angeles he 
stated: 
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The same conditions apply today. Not only the primary 
economic effect, and the ripple effect in Los Angeles 
at large, but also because the [Los Angeles] Coliseum 
is located in a depressed area and it's very important 
for the morale of the people living in that community 
to keep it busy. 
What might also be inferred from this statement is that 
professional sports have the ability to pacify the masses 
and to misdirect their attention from the issues facing 
their community. 
Cultural and Symbolic Elements 
Cities across America pride themselves in their 
museums, orchestras, art galleries, etc. These cultural 
institutions prove capable of communicating the status of 
the city. As a result, the recent Monet Exhibit at the Art 
Institute of Chicago, was viewed to not only convey artistic 
expressions, but also proved to be an opportunity for 
Chicago to showcase itself to the rest of the nation. Thus, 
through art, the connection between the Institute and the 
city becomes reinforced. 
Yet, the symbolic influence which a museum and an 
orchestra have on its citizens is limited. As forms of high 
culture, these institutions prove mostly accessible to a 
segment of the city's population (those with higher 
socioeconomic background) . Sports on the other hand, are 
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part of a mass culture, which, because of extensive media 
coverage, proves widely available to the city's residents. 
In this regard, the success and/or failure of a professional 
team, its style of play and its history will be likely more 
known within the community than the latest exhibit at the 
museum would be. As a result of this broader audience base, 
sports and professional franchises become strong 
representations of urban centers across America. 
Numerous cultural and symbolic elements serve as means 
of strengthening the relationship between the professional 
team and the city. The team shapes the identity of the 
community and in turn, the team becomes shaped by the values 
and attitudes of the community itself. The "finesse", 
"fast-pace" and "flamboyant" type of basketball played by 
the NBA Los Angeles Lakers at the L.A. Forum during the 
1980's, communicates the life style and culture of the city 
of Los Angeles. In Chicago, sportswriters and sportscasters 
use the term "Bear football" to describe the playing style 
by the Chicago Bears in the NFL. "Bear football" means 
hard-hitting, in your face, as players reach deep within 
themselves when no energy is left. It is these same 
descriptions that also characterize the residents of the 
city, as well as its roots. Such descriptions imply that 
Chicago is an honest city whose residents are not afraid to 
work hard and get the job done the laborious way. These 
descriptions have emerged out of the historical position of 
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Chicago as a manufacturing center and out of the blue-collar 
attitudes and values which characterized its residents. In 
the 1970's, the NFL Pittsburgh Steelers, through their style 
of football, represented the values of the working class 
"Steel Town." Their dominant defense on the field was 
referred to, even today, as the "Steel Curtain." Finally, 
as observed in nationwide radio sports shows, the image of 
the NBA Detroit Pistons as a "dirty" team in the late 1980's 
and early 1990's, carried on to generate a similar 
impression of its residents. Thus, there is a dialectic 
relationship between the city and its team(s). The image of 
the team can inform us of the city, as the image of the city 
can affect the actions of the team. 
When the Raiders of the NFL moved back to Oakland in 
1995, the city welcomed the franchise and according to Elihu 
Harris, Mayor of the City: "There are clear economic 
benefits, because corporations can identify with sports 
teams. And it's a source of pride, at a time when there are 
so many negative influences" (Witt, 1995). 
The move back to Oakland, brought the Raiders to their 
"heritage." The hard working, blue collar approach of the 
Raiders on the field, exemplified by Davis's motto "Just win 
baby", best complemented the Oakland community than the 
'glitsy' and football passive community of the City of Los 
Angeles. Bringing the franchise back to the bay area meant 
that the City of Oakland and the Raiders belonged to each 
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other all along. According to Matt Millen, a football 
player who played with the Raiders at both Oakland and Los 
Angeles: "Los Angeles is where the score is tied in the 
third quarter, you're driving for the go-ahead touchdown, 
someone yells 'Surf's up and ... everybody heads for the 
beach." Gene Upshaw, head of the NFL players association, 
and a Hall of Fame Raider also noted: "Anyone who played in 
both cities knows the difference. There was a passion to 
the Oakland fans. Every game was life and death. They 
talked about us in the bars. In Los Angeles we were just 
another bit of passing entertainment" (Goldberg, 1995). 
The city and the team then become representations of each 
other. 
Can New York City think of itself without the Yankees, 
Boston without the RedSox, or Chicago without the Cubs and 
the White Sox? These franchises often, through traditions, 
take on a life of their own within the urban environment and 
develop influence over the metropolis that very few other 
businesses could showcase. These cultural and symbolic 
elements depict the strong relationship between the team and 
the community. It is because of this strong relationship 
and the perception that the team represents the community, 
that local governments will often go to extremes to satisfy 
the business needs of these professional franchises. 
A recent commentary by Chicago Tribune staff writer 
George Papajohn (1995) best exemplifies the relationship 
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between a sports team, the Chicago Bears and the City of 
Chicago. He writes: 
The Bears, more than any other Chicago franchise, 
represent every cherished character trait and every 
tour-bus cliche that gives the city its identity. 
Thinking of big shoulders? Think Dick Butkus. The 
ethnic success story? Think Bears founder George 
Halas, the son of Bohemian immigrants. Personalities 
as unforgiving as steel? Think "Iron Mike' Ditka. 
Tough but graceful architecture? Think of Walter 
Payton's bruising and baletic build. The beautiful 
lakefront? Think Soldier Field. The brutal Chicago 
weather? Think Bear weather. The Bears are the only 
reason Chicagoans can take pride in our miserable 
winter. 
These symbolic and cultural connections between the 
city and the professional teams have been at the core of 
many social arguments made to support the interests of 
professional franchise owners. In the process, the notion 
that cultural images are increasingly utilized to represent 
and define cities and the urban environment (Bourdieu, 1984; 
1986; Harvey, 1990; Gottdiener, 1994) also finds support in 
sports. 
Stadium Construction as a Source of City Greatness 
Cities have also viewed the construction of a sports 
stadium as a way to showcase their position as progressive 
cities or identify themselves as being capable to rebound 
from natural disasters or other catastrophes. The 
construction of stadiums, especially domed facilities, have 
in recent decades become sources of civic identity and 
pride. 
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The Astrodome in Houston, the Superdome in New Orleans, 
the Metrodome in Minneapolis, the Kingdome in Seattle, the 
Silverdome in Detroit and the RCA Dome (formerly Hoosier 
Dome) in Indianapolis, have all been sources of pride for 
their residents and have also been viewed as signs of city 
progress (Gershman, 1993). In New Orleans, for example, the 
Superdome is more than just a place to play. During its 
construction, Moon Landrieu, the Mayor of New Orleans, 
noted: "The Superdome is an exercise of optimism. A 
statement of faith. It is the very building of it that is 
important, not how much it is used or its economics" (Reid, 
1974) . 
On the other hand, in San Francisco, Bob Lurie, the 
owner of the Giants of the National League vowed in 1989 to 
take the team to another city if he did not get a 
replacement stadium. The city attempted to generate support 
for a publicly financed ballpark. The November 1989 
earthquake in San Francisco, directed the attention of its 
residents to issues other than the stadium proposal. Yet, 
the Mayor of the city, Art Agnos, used the stadium 
development proposal as a way to bring the city together 
after this natural disaster. He noted that "It's our last 
and final shot to keep the team in San Francisco. It's now 
or never." Agnos also viewed the construction of the 
stadium as a civic response to those who challenged the 
ability of the city to recover from its most recent natural 
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disaster. In a letter to the residents of the city he 
noted: "Building the ballpark will be a signal that says to 
the rest of the world that we believe in our future" 
(Buursma, 1989) . 
Perceived Social Benefits as Reasons for Franchise Support 
Sports franchises are communicated to be ways of 
citizen identification and part of a process toward 
community building (Mitnick, 1984; Bickley, 1995). 
Regardless of citizen doubts, the commitment to the 
professional franchise by the local government and the 
perceived status symbol which it brings for the city has 
persisted. In the end, these social effect arguments ensure 
public support for professional franchises. 
The following quote by the Mayor of Kansas City Richard 
Berkeley from a U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the 
Judiciary hearing in 1983 shows the importance of the team 
for the city and the support his city is willing to extend: 
Professional sport leagues are a unique form of 
business. One level they sell entertainment, but they 
also sell civic identity, emotion and community 
involvement. The name Kansas City Chiefs says it all. 
The Chiefs belong to the fans and the community of 
Kansas City. We support the team. We share the glory 
of their victories. We share the bitterness of their 
defeats. It is because we, the citizens of Kansas 
City, share so much with our team that we have been 
willing and we will continue to be willing to make the 
public investments in stadia and other projects to 
provide the teams with the facilities which are 
necessary to operate (quoted in Wilson, 1994, p. 246). 
Similarly, a civic task force in Milwaukee, the Greater 
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Milwaukee Committee, fearing the loss of the Brewers of the 
American League noted: 
The success of the team as a business is the 
responsibility of team management. However, a 
community can and should take supportive steps to 
assist a team's survival and to help ensure that it 
will remain a part of the community. Teams need civic 
support (Buursma, 1988) . 
By considering the above comments, one would conclude 
that there is a symbiotic relationship between the franchise 
and the community. In the case of the Brewers, such 
strategy worked. Late in 1995, the state of Wisconsin 
approved the public financed construction of a new stadium 
for the baseball franchise. 
The Problematic of Exclusively Viewing Sport 
as a Social Function 
One of the general critiques of viewing sports as a 
social function has been the extreme emphasis on social 
order and stability, while failing to fully account for 
social change (Edwards, 1973; Melnick, 1975; Figler, 1981; 
Gruneau, 1983; Coakley, 1989b; Leonard, 1993). A number of 
assumptions are being made to view the social institution of 
sport in a manner which always makes positive contributions 
to society. When considering the arguments by public 
officials, franchise supporters and the media, no reference 
is ever made to any negative implications which sports might 
have on society. Coakley (1989:29) outlines this point: 
Since sport has been around for some time and is an 
increasingly significant component of our social 
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system, most functionalists conclude that it does make 
positive contributions to society. This conclusion 
leads them to ignore or underemphasize the negative 
aspects of sport. After all, it is also possible that 
sport could distort values and behavioral guidelines 
(norms) . It could impede goal attainment and interfere 
with methods of coming to terms with the external 
social and physical environment by diverting a group's 
attention away from crucial personal and social issues. 
Sports also allows for the development of a citizen 
consciousness which does not engage its members into 
substantive dialogues as they relate to the social system. 
As a result the activities within the stadium and the 
sporting industry as a whole, work to pacify the crowds and 
assist in the development of a culture which does not 
challenge the existing social status quo (Hoch, 1972; 
Aronowitz, 1973; Petryszack, 1978). This "opiate" function 
of sports diverts attention and even supports the interests 
of the upper class. 
Viewing the social role of professional sports 
franchises also tends to assume that what might be good for 
the social system is good for the individual. The 
possibility of exploitative and coercive strategies employed 
by the owners of the franchises in order to get the best 
deal possible for themselves at the expense of the public is 
not considered within this framework. The innerworkings of 
powerful interests within sports is also downplayed. Thus, 
as a result of city efforts across the country to benefit 
professional franchises, issues of displacement, maintenance 
of the political and economic interests of big business, 
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deterioration of the physical and/or cultural environment 
when stadium construction occurs, etc., receive no serious 
consideration. 
Conclusion 
Cities are connected to their cultural institutions; 
their museums, the arts, the orchestras and even their 
professional sports teams. Professional franchises are 
viewed to be urban representations, to have symbolic value 
and to communicate civic status to the rest of the nation 
and to the world. 
Integration, tension management, and the stability and 
maintenance of the social order are at the heart of these 
community status and social cohesion arguments. Civic 
identity, community involvement, and civic pride have been 
identified as some of the ways through which professional 
teams contribute to the city. As a result, the professional 
franchise becomes more than a team on the playing field. It 
becomes an integral part of community. 
These social factors prove to be another intangible 
which has been utilized by public officials and the owners 
of the various professional franchises as the justification 
for the use of public resources to construct stadium 
facilities. Because of these advocated social benefits, 
public policy decisions have directly and indirectly 
supported the interests of private enterprise. In the 
process, the existing capitalist social relations, social 
structure and ideology become reproduced. 
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Regarding the social effects such as community 
identity, status, overall social cohesion and instillment of 
pride, it is true that a sense of identity is provided by 
having a professional franchise. Professional franchises do 
allow residents to identify with the successes and failures 
of their team. Yet, the exclusive reliance on these factors 
must be reconsidered. 
The validity of this socially-based approach to 
assessing the social significance of professional franchises 
on urban centers across the United States is questionable. 
Though certain aspects of its analysis could be accepted, 
when these social assessments are considered, gross 
generalizations should not serve as a complete understanding 
of the relationship between sports and society, nor should 
they be considered as comprehensive knowledge in guiding 
public policy decisions. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW COMISKEY PARK 
IN SOUTH ARMOUR SQUARE 
Introduction 
The intense competition among cities for professional 
franchises has led to the public finance and maintenance of 
stadiums. In the cases where city and state governments do 
not provide these franchises with the incentives they 
require, the teams threaten to leave for another city. This 
strategy results into a bidding war as cities battle with 
their public resources to retain or attract professional 
teams. 
The case of the White Sox in Chicago, is an example of 
how, through threats, a professional sports team can 
successfully pressure the City and the State into financing 
a new stadium. The old Comiskey Park, which until the 1990 
season was the oldest ballpark in America, lacked the profit 
generating features that most of the newer facilities could 
showcase. The co-owners of the team, Jerry Reinsdorf and 
Eddie Einhorn, successfully convinced the city that the old 
facility was too costly to maintain and even structurally 
dangerous for the public. In addition, they threatened that 
unless a new stadium is provided, the White Sox would move 
out of Chicago and even out of state. 
123 
124 
Fearing the loss of this franchise to another city and 
state, the Illinois General Assembly voted in December of 
1986, and later in June 1988, to finance the construction of 
a new baseball-only stadium for the White Sox. The state 
and the city gave absolute negotiating power to the Illinois 
Sports Facility Authority (ISFA). The responsibility of the 
ISFA was to oversee the construction of the new facility, 
and afterwards own and operate it. The board membership was 
appointed by both the governor and the mayor. Despite 
efforts by fan groups to restore the old Comiskey Park 
because of its historical status, and despite a well 
thought-out proposal which would create a ballpark 
responsive to the corporate needs of the White Sox and of 
the local community, 178 privately owned housing units and 
12 community businesses were pushed aside to make room for 
the construction of the New Comiskey Park. 
The case of the Chicago White Sox provides an 
opportunity to investigate the relationship between the 
state and private interests within the context of 
professional sports, as well as the social effects of these 
policies on urban communities. Pelissero, Henschen and 
Sidlow (1992:70) in an analysis of the political policy 
implications as they relate to professional sports in 
Chicago, concluded that the White Sox case was an example of 
emerging, progressive, urban politics. Such assessment 
poses serious questions about the social component of these 
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policies. They write: 
The Washington-Sawyer coalition of 1983-1989 delivered 
an acceptable stadium package to the White Sox while 
successfully mediating the competing needs of social 
and economic development in Chicago. The policy 
response was innovative when it came to the use of 
economic development tools, eminent domain, regulation, 
public authority, and social policy. 
Though this assessment is accurate in describing a recent 
shift in the development of politics aimed at the mediation 
of conflicting interests, serious questions remain regarding 
attainable outcomes of social and economic development. To 
what extent did such progressive policy achieve a union 
between urban economic/social advancement, and satisfaction 
of private interests? Was there even an intent to produce 
any related economic and/or social development? This case 
study concludes that the state, through its deliberate 
actions, promoted the interests of private enterprise at the 
expense of a politically and economically powerless minority 
community. 
At the same time, several additional issues emerge from 
an investigation of this case. Specifically, (1) the 
apparent competition amongst cities to attract or retain a 
professional sports team is the outcome of a strategy, 
resulting in financial gains for the franchise's ownership, 
(2) government intervention supports the activities of 
private enterprise since it perceives that its loss would 
pose negative economic, political and social effects, (3) a 
predominantly African-American, low-income community becomes 
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displaced to make room for the new stadium, (4) alternative 
baseball stadium restoration and construction plans, which 
could have proved beneficial to residents and developers, 
receive no serious consideration, and (5) in addition to the 
political and economic implications surrounding the 
construction of the new sports facility, the cultural 
environment of an urban community becomes reshaped. 
This case study is divided into two chapters. The 
purpose of this segmentation is not to distinguish between 
politics, economics and community response as they relate in 
this case study. Rather, the division into two sections is 
conducted for the purpose of organizing this analysis in a 
coherent manner and it is not intended to reflect a thematic 
split. 
The first chapter outlines the political economy of the 
White Sox stadium development plans. While taking into 
consideration the franchises' intense motivation for profit, 
this chapter addresses: (1) the franchises' declaration of 
the old Comiskey Park as structurally dangerous and the 
opposition of "Save Our Sox", a fan group, (2) the efforts 
of the ownership to create a climate of competition for the 
White Sox between the city, the suburbs and St. Petersburg, 
Florida, (3) the perceived economic benefits of the team for 
the city, the county and the state, (4) the role which the 
media and the government played, leading to the passage of 
the 1988 Illinois Sports Facilities Authority Act, and (5) 
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the new Comiskey Park, a failed attempt at the construction 
of an urban ballpark. 
The second chapter concentrates on community issues and 
the community response to the stadium development plans. 
Specifically, this chapter of the case study, provides (1) 
information about the South Armour Square community, (2) an 
historical insight of the relationship between the old 
Comiskey Park and the surrounding communities, (3) the 
political implications of displacement and the community 
division over the proposed relocation program, (4) community 
tactics, (5) the cultural transformation of the area, 
resulting from the destruction of McCuddy's, a local 
landmark and the laws restricting locals from selling their 
products during the games, (6) proposed stadium development 
alternatives, including the restoration of the old Comiskey 
Park and the Armour Field proposal, and, (7) community 
redevelopment following the completion of the new Comiskey 
Park. 
Stadium construction within the urban environment is 
becoming a unique, urban development tool. Beyond the 
economically related arguments, social considerations have 
been also utilized to support stadium development. In the 
case of the White Sox, loosing the team was perceived to be 
an embarrassment to the city and a bad way to showcase the 
political will of its residents. Yet, as this case study 
shows, social inequality becomes a central outcome of these 
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"pro-growth" efforts. 
Was it Unsafe or was it the Posts? 
When it was announced that the White Sox were 
interested in moving from the existing old Comiskey Park to 
a new facility in the Chicagoland area or in another state, 
a group of fans organized themselves to resist those plans. 
The group called itself "Save Our Sox" and it had a two fold 
strategy. Mary O'Connel, a leader of the group told me: 
We were so surprised to hear the ownership making these 
proposals. I have been a White Sox fan all my life and 
we could not let that happen. Our interest was 
initially to preserve the old Comiskey. Some of the 
questions we asked included: why should it be torn down 
and if there is money to build a new ballpark why not 
restore the old one? 
The ownership of the old Comiskey Park and of the White Sox, 
contended that the facility was structurally unsafe and too 
costly to maintain. The "Save Our Sox" group took issue 
with that approach and searched to identify the extent to 
which the ballpark had "truly" deteriorated, beyond 
restoration. A letter from structural engineer Peter 
Krallitsch of George A. Kennedy & Associates to the group 
read in full: 
The purpose of this letter is to emphasize some of the 
points we raised at yesterday's meeting. As we 
indicated, we were very surprised at the rapid 
deterioration that has occurred at Comiskey Park since 
the extensive renovation project just three years ago. 
Unfortunately, we foresee the likelihood of significant 
expenditures on an annual basis to keep the park in 
safe and usable condition through the 1989 season. 
Beyond that time there are no realistic long-term 
solutions since the deterioration is irreversible. 
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Simply put, Comiskey Park is nearing the end of its 
useful life (letter released by Jerry Reinsdorf, July 
11, 1986). 
Was the condition of Comiskey Park so deteriorated that it 
rendered replacement or did the White Sox inflate its 
condition so that they could campaign for a new stadium? 
Would a new stadium provide the franchise with the prof its 
that only new ballparks can offer? It was the latter 
approach which the "Save Our Sox" took and one which 
community residents adjacent to the park later supported. 
According to this group, the White Sox claims that the 
park had deteriorated irreversibly were false. This group 
challenged the franchises' recommendations noting that: 
(1) The short letter provided by the structural 
engineer who assessed old Comiskey and was employed by the 
franchise, communicated no technical data. In addition it 
generated no cost estimates of renovation and maintenance or 
any other information which could be utilized to compare the 
renovation cost to the proposed cost of constructing a new 
facility. 
(2) The ownership of the White Sox avoided any 
discussion about the condition of the Comiskey Park. Such 
discourse, according to "Save Our Sox", would have worked 
against the corporate interests of the franchise, since it 
would have brought the issue to the public's attention. In 
the Addison Press (November 14, 1986, p. 1) of Addison, IL, 
one of the proposed sites for a new stadium, team vice 
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president Howard Pitzer was reported saying: " ... the Sox 
released an engineer's letter explaining the report and do 
not have to justify the contents of that report to anyone." 
(3) Other information on the condition of the facility 
by city inspectors indicated that the park was not in an 
extremely deteriorating condition as reported by the team. 
Though city inspectors reported numerous concerns with the 
structure of the ballpark, they did not close the park and 
the team continued to generate income from its activities. 
In addition, prior to a game between the Cubs and the Sox at 
Comiskey, city inspectors declared the condition of the 
ballpark as safe. 
(4) When the team was for sale in the 1980's inspectors 
for prospective buyers reported its structure to be sound 
and safe. 
(5) Though skyboxes were added in 1982, at that time, 
there was no report indicating the inability of the ballpark 
to accommodate their weight. 
(6) Other reports showed that the facility was sound 
and it could accommodate activities for many years. 
(7) The franchise had been continuously successful in 
obtaining liability coverage for their game seasons, thus 
precluding its sound structure (Bukowski, O'Connell and 
Aranza, 1987) . 
But, why did the White Sox attempt to show the ballpark 
as dangerous and too expensive to maintain? It is because a 
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new stadium would provide increased prof its to the 
franchise, since the architectural style of old Comiskey was 
not conducive to generating the expected income. 
An integral part of architecture in old ballparks is 
the presence of posts which provide support for the second 
deck, while allowing for a slow incline, bringing those on 
the upper deck close to the action. The old Comiskey Park 
had many of those posts supporting its structure. Yet, this 
set-up created many obstructed view seats, thus, minimizing 
potential income. The old Comiskey Park had 2,000 
obstructed view seats due to these posts, many more than 
other baseball ballparks. 30 
Furthermore, the presence of posts in the old Comiskey 
Park made the installation of additional luxury boxes 
practically impossible. A comparison of old and new 
Comiskey Park aerial pictures, on September 30, 1990, during 
the last game day played at the old ballpark, shows 
according to Gershman (1989:228) that: 
Side by side, the old and the new (unfinished) Comiskey 
parks have little in common ... particularly the 
steepness of the rake of the upper deck and the overall 
height of the new park compared to the old. It is due 
to the inclusion of log seating between the upper and 
lower decks, a way of gouging a few more dollars from 
the well to do, while ignoring the legitimate interests 
of the average fan. 
And according to O'Connell: 
3° For example, Wrigley Field (1914) has 500 column-
obstructed seats, Riverfront Stadium (1970) has 0 column-
obstructed seats, and Royals Stadium (1973) has O column-
obstructed seats (Bess, 1989). 
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Posts generated obstructed view at the old Comiskey, 
thus, with the assumption of removing them to increase 
revenue, every report on the old Comiskey Parks' 
viability would turn negative. Under this assumption 
it would be very costly to renovate the ballpark. It 
was this large cost which provided the justification 
for the construction of a new stadium. 
Similarly, independent architect Philip Bess, who proposed 
the construction of Armour Field in the area, told me that: 
One of the distinct features of old ballparks is the 
columns which allow for a close and intimate viewing 
experience. Though viewing would have been obstructed, 
architecturally, it is possible to carefully place 
limited columns, control the obstructed viewing, and 
still allow for an intimate viewing experience. 
Another reason reported for "making" the old Comiskey 
structurally dangerous was that Reinsdorf and Einhorn did 
not want to own the old ballpark. It was too expensive to 
maintain and the tide of ownership nationwide had definitely 
shifted toward public rather than private construction and 
maintenance of stadiums. The White Sox were one of 6, out 
of 26 teams in the major leagues, which owned their own 
stadium (Bukowski, O'Connell and Aranza, 1987). 
Though the state decided to authorize its own study on 
the structural status of the old Comiskey Park, that report 
was made public on August 5, 1988, a month after a favorable 
lease agreement was passed by the Illinois legislature (June 
30, 1988). Though this engineering report supported the 
findings of the previous White Sox study, by that time, a 
new stadium agreement had been finalized and no group was 
able or even willing to challenge a done deal. 
The strategy of declaring the old Comiskey Park unsafe 
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enabled the franchise to gain the attention of the local and 
state governments. From then on, the stage was set for the 
team to present its demands for a new facility. 
Moving to the Suburbs 
Reinsdorf and Einhorn realized that the location of the 
old Comiskey Park was not suitable for generating the 
attendance which would result in high incomes from ticket 
prices, parking and concessions. Suburban Chicago, 
especially in the west and northwest, was a booming area. 
Those who could afford to pay the increased prices at the 
games were not frequenting the old Comiskey Park. In 
addition the black fans did not regularly attend White Sox 
games. A move to the suburbs would bring the team closer to 
its consumers. The ownership also viewed a suburban 
location as one with an opportunity for additional real 
estate development to augment the proposed stadium (Goozner, 
1986). 
Anti-Urbanism, Racism and the Loss of the Black Fans 
The presence of the White Sox fans in the suburbs can 
be extracted from a White Sox promotional brochure which 
posed the following question: "Who attends White Sox games?" 
The answer provided was: "Demographics of White Sox fans 
reveal they are the same people who comprise the majority of 
DuPage County. Approximately 50 percent of White Sox season 
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ticket holders and 75 percent of all fans who attend games 
at Comiskey Park live in the suburbs" (Cattau, 1992). 
The local press viewed the move to the suburbs 
consistent with the larger suburbanization movement of the 
1950's and 1960's. It was believed that, the White Sox's 
interest in moving was due to the large African American 
population living in the general area and the slumlike 
neighborhood around Comiskey Park (Wood, 1988). That fact 
made fans apprehensive about attending games in that area. 
According to a Chicago Tribune staff writer: 
Comiskey Park, you see, is also a tie to that bygone 
age when the ball and everything else about the game 
were white. Many of the people who would like to see 
the ballpark preserved--a noble sentiment, to be sure--
would also like to turn back the clock of urban change. 
So no matter how weighty the engineering surveys, no 
matter how costly the maintenance, no matter what 
rationalizations are used to cover the team's track to 
the northwest, another issue cannot be hidden. It 
could politely be called demographics. "If it [the 
move to Addison] happens, it would be part of white 
flight, but that isn't the reason for the move," 
Reinsdorf says. The fans moved away from the South 
Side. Why can't we?" ... It is one thing, of course, not 
to have blacks in the park. It is another to have them 
frighten away whites. A perception that the 
neighborhoods around Comiskey Park are dangerous began 
during the riots of the late 1960's ... many fans have 
probably never returned (Hersh, 1986) . 
And according to a Chicago Sun-Times staff writer: 
I think that Reinsdorf and Einhorn want to move the 
White Sox as far away from the black South Side as 
quickly and comfortably as possible. Reinsdorf came 
close to actually verbalizing this unspoken desire 
yesterday when he assured his new suburban pals that 
they needn't worry about a dangerous element following 
the White Sox into the suburbs. "We're not gonna bring 
bad people to the ballpark" he promised (Fitzpatrick, 
1986). 
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Finally, 
Given the dichotomy of black inner city, white suburbs 
found in many metro areas, the anti-urban bias of 
stadium relocation often projects an anti-black bias. 
The anti-urban, anti-black bias in no doubt related to 
the fact that white-middle class suburbanites make up 
the bulk of [professional sports] patrons (Devise, 
1986). 
It is interesting to note here that the neighborhood 
adjacent to the Suncoast Dome in St. Petersburg, also became 
an issue for the White Sox when they considered a move to 
Florida. Specifically, the White Sox were concerned about a 
public housing building near the dome. According to a 
Chicago Sun-Times staff writer: 
The St. Petersburg proposal, released under a court 
order, reveals the Sox demanded that a rundown public 
housing project near the Florida Suncoast Dome be 
demolished by July, 1991, to make way for 2,500 parking 
spaces. An estimated 168 black families living in the 
Laurel Park project would have been relocated to a new 
complex (Spielman, 1988). 
Apparently St. Petersburg was even willing to relocate these 
individuals if it meant that the White Sox would move to 
their city. 
Another factor regarding low attendance, is the lack of 
black fans at White Sox games and at Major League Baseball 
games in general. According to Sherwood Brewer, an all-star 
for the Negro League during the 1949 and 1950 seasons, the 
Major Leagues have been unable to draw the young blacks to 
play the game. That has isolated the black fans from 
baseball even more. He said: 
Black kids don't care about playing baseball especially 
in Chicago. Now they are playing basketball. Very few 
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of our [black] players come from urban areas ... If you 
go out on Sunday afternoon all across the city you 
might see two fields with black kids playing .... I 
grew up in Centralia, IL, St. Louis territory, all I 
heard growing up was; Baseball! Baseball! Baseball! 
(CLTV, 1995) . 
In the case of the White Sox, even though 69 percent of 
blacks in the metropolitan Chicago area live on the South 
Side of the City, according to the 1990 census data, market 
surveys have consistently shown that only 5 to 7 percent of 
blacks regularly attend major league baseball games (Cattau, 
1992) . An analysis of the ChiSox Club membership by zip 
code revealed that few club members are black. Of the 2,600 
club members in Illinois, 860, or 33 percent, live in 
Chicago zip codes. Of those Chicago members, only 10 
percent live in zip codes which are more than 50 percent 
black. From the predominantly black suburban zip codes of 
Maywood (60153) and Markham (60426), the club list did not 
indicate even one member. Sam Cannizaro, President of the 
ChiSox club, also echoed the results of this analysis: "Our 
Black membership is a lot lower than what I think it should 
be ... the racial composition of the club reflects the fans 
who go to the park" (Cattau, 1992). 
For some of the Negro League stars who played in the 
past, the White Sox have not made an effort to attract the 
black fans to Comiskey, a claim which the team has denied. 
Jimmie Crutchfield, who played for the Chicago Negro League 
team in the outfield during WWII, no longer visits Comiskey 
Park. After Veeck's death, the team has made no effort to 
invite him to any of the events which would showcase the 
history of baseball in Chicago to the new generations of 
baseball fans (Cattau, 1992) . 
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It was a combination of the potential revenue generated 
from the suburban market, fears of decreased revenue due to 
the location of Comiskey, and the inability to attract the 
black fans to baseball games, which drove the ownership to 
search for a suburban location. In this regard, anti-
urbanism and racism can be viewed as two factors which have 
contributed to the franchises' interest to look elsewhere. 
The Addison Location 
One of the sites sought after by the White Sox owners 
for the construction of a publicly owned stadium was in 
suburban Addison, IL, a village of 30,000. The franchise 
applied through CWS Development, a White Sox company, for 
$100 million in tax-free state bonds to finance a stadium 
with a retractable, shell-shaped domed roof, on a 140-acre 
site owned by the White Sox in Addison. The land was 
purchased by Reinsdorf in December of 1984 for $7 million. 
The early purchase indicates that, as early as 1984, the 
team was interested in moving out of the old Comiskey Park 
and to the suburbs. The application for the state bonds was 
approved by the Illinois Development Finance Authority and 
the proposed facility would seat 55,000 and have parking 
space available for 15,000 cars. 
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During this process, the ownership of the White Sox 
maintained that Chicago remained a serious contender for the 
team in case the plans fell through. This approach by the 
team ownership, is one which will repeat itself as the White 
Sox would later threaten to leave for the Tampa Bay area in 
Florida. Professional franchises increasingly showcase 
strong negotiating skills forcing cities to offer 
co~siderable incentives to attract or retain them. 
A report prepared for the White Sox by the accounting 
firm of Laventhol & Horwath of Chicago, noted that a 
possible domed stadium in that area would mean 1,321 new 
jobs for DuPage county and an additional annual income of 
$41.4 million for county. The economic benefits in the form 
of jobs for the area would be 224 full-time and 1,070 part-
time jobs. The annual wages and salaries, according to the 
report would result in $18.5 million. The construction of 
the facility would also generate 1,902 construction jobs in 
DuPage County and 1,516 construction jobs in Cook County. 
The report concluded that from the construction activities, 
$82.1 million would remain in DuPage County. Regarding the 
community of Addison, this report noted positive economic 
affects. Specifically, the construction of the facility 
would generate over $2.9 million for the village in sales 
taxes and the operation of the stadium would bring in $1.7 
million annually (Presecky and Fuentes, 1985) . 
The local Addison community opposed the move of the 
139 
White Sox to their suburb. The primary concerns were the 
traffic, alcohol, and the overall impact of night games on 
their community. The "Save Our Sox" group also worked with 
the residents opposing the move and according to O'Connell: 
"we built a coalition with that group and supported their 
effort to def eat the referendum, because we were most 
interested in keeping the Sox in Chicago." 
In the end, Addison did not become the new home of the 
White Sox, even though the local political leadership 
supported the concept. A vote by the residents would 
determine whether the community would approve the stadium 
development proposal and have the White Sox move to their 
area. Though the White Sox invested over $100,000 on a 
campaign to pass the referendum and the opposition spent 
only $3,000 to stop relocation, the team lost its battle in 
a narrow outcome, since 50.3 percent voted against the 
measure and 49.7 percent voted in favor of having the White 
Sox in Addison (Euchner, 1993:146). 
The Chicago Response 
The announcement by the White Sox that Addison was the 
preferred site, generated concern in Chicago. Mayor 
Washington worked hard to retain the White Sox in the City 
of Chicago, as he proposed numerous plans. He said: "We 
don't want to lose the team ... We will move as speedily as we 
can to provide what they need" (Presecky and Fuentes, 1985). 
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His initial proposal included the construction of a 
multipurpose facility for baseball and football. The 
facility would house both the White Sox and the Bears of the 
National Football League. The proposed location of this 
stadium was along the east bank of the Chicago River, south 
of Roosevelt Road in the South Loop area. 
This proposal proved unsatisfactory to the ownership of 
the White Sox. Though the franchise approved the city's 
efforts to retain the team and construct a new facility, the 
idea of sharing that facility with another team, especially 
a football team, was unacceptable. Reinsdorf criticized 
this part of the proposal noting that baseball fans would be 
removed from the action in a facility which would have to 
also meet the large dimensions of a football stadium. 
Fearing the loss of the team to the suburbs, Mayor 
Washington made the White Sox the priority and revisited the 
issue of the stadium proposal. He noted: "The pressing 
force right now is the White Sox ... They seem to have the 
greatest urgency" (Mccarron, 1985a) . This "urgency" 
provides for a unique insight into the role of professional 
sports teams in urban politics. Specifically, what would 
the potential implications for urban politics be if a mayor, 
and in this case an African-American mayor, failed to retain 
the White Sox in Chicago? Though this question, connecting 
political effectiveness and sports franchise behavior, have 
surfaced in cities across America, there is no evidence to 
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support such correlation. Specifically, between 1953 and 
1990, there is only one case where a mayor of a large city 
was re-elected because of that mayors' position on a stadium 
construction issue. 31 
Yet, a new stadium proposal came forth which also 
outlined the South Loop area as the location site. While 
the city remained sensitive to the financial concerns of the 
White Sox, they also took into consideration the previously 
expressed dissatisfaction with the multi-purpose facility 
proposal. As a result, the city outlined a plan for a 
baseball-only, open-air structure. 
This 50,000 spectator facility would cost $125 million 
to build; $25 million would come from the developers, and 
$100 million from the sale of city's tax-exempt industrial 
bonds. The city would also provide $54 million in 
infrastructure improvements. The 60-acre parcel required 
for the construction of the facility would be purchased from 
three railroads. The taxpayers would not be affected, since 
the $10 million annual debt service would come from the 
White Sox in the form of rent and other related payments. 
The proposal drafted by the city ensured that the team would 
31 The case is that of Thomas D'Alesandro who in 1955 
was re-elected mayor of Baltimore overcoming a number of 
family scandals and Baltimore's newspaper endorsements of 
his opponents. The D'Alesandro campaign was helped by his 
position and leadership in building a new stadium and 
bringing the Orioles to that city. Apart from this 
instance, voters typically perceive a stadium issue as one 
of many others to be considered when electing 
representatives (Baim, 1994:180-190). 
not lose financially if annual attendance fell below 1.5 
million a season (Mccarron, 1985b) . 
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The South Loop community did not approve the site for 
the construction of the proposed sports facility. The 
residents feared traffic, noise and the related effects of a 
stadium in their neighborhoods. For the South Loop 
residents, there was a strong possibility that other events 
such as concerts were to be held at the proposed facility, 
if playing baseball proved economically unsuccessful. This 
would create even more community problems. 
At the same time, the area was becoming gentrified as 
new developments such as River City, Dearborn Park and 
Printer's Row were added to this community. A stadium in 
the area would have posed serious limitations to further 
residential development. According to Ken Calvin, a 
spokesperson for Citizens Against the Stadium (CATS) : "The 
proposed South Loop location would stifle the development of 
a neighborhood that is in its infancy" (Devall and Sjostrom, 
1986) . 
In this regard, having two forms of development 
(residential and stadium) raises the issue of profitability. 
Which one of the two is more likely to return higher profit 
to its investors? In the long run, the economic benefits of 
residential development were to be much more extensive than 
those accruing from the construction of a sports facility. 
The potential profitability of residential development in 
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the South Loop can then be attributed to the decision not to 
utilize this area as the site for a White Sox stadium. 
The residents of this community were also vocal about 
the proposed plans. CATS, a local neighborhood 
organization, resisted these stadium development efforts. 
They politicized the issue by attacking the mayor who had 
received campaign contributions from developers of the 
stadium project. They signed petitions to enlist the 
support of Ald. Fred Roti (1st Ward) and attempted to ban 
the sale of alcohol in the area. Finally, they campaigned 
through demonstrations against the issue, ensuring that 
these stadium development plans were not to be pursued any 
further (Euchner, 1993). 
Economic Rationalizations and the Eventual Site 
Ira Elderson, an advisor to the Mayor on the stadium 
issue, responding to criticism that the White Sox might be 
using the Addison site as a way to get Chicago to propose 
the best deal possible, explained that the White Sox are 
worthy of the attention, since the team is a viable economic 
contributor to the city. He said: 
Loosing a major-league baseball team is no different 
than losing a Wisconsin Steel [the far Southeast 
Chicago steel plant] . The White Sox generate about 
$100 million a year in economic activity for the city, 
and the direct loss of sales and amusement tax revenues 
would alone amount to several million dollars 
(Mccarron, 1985a) . 
The implications of this statement are clear; the city would 
144 
do anything in its power to keep the team in Chicago, even 
if that meant providing these private interests with support 
that no other business can retain so openly from government 
officials. 
The White Sox commissioned a study which claimed they 
contributed to the economy of the city, the county and the 
state, $100.3 million annually (Laventhol and Horwath, 
1985). The study noted $30.6 million in direct and $69.8 
million in indirect economic benefits. The results of this 
study were confirmed by a study conducted a year later by 
the City of Chicago on the impact of major league baseball 
on the local economy (Department of Economic Development, 
1986). This study also linked new stadium development to 
additional economic incentives for local economies. A 
Department of Economic Development study (1986:8): 
... demonstrated that a baseball team has a substantial 
impact on the local economy, both through measurable 
effects and 'intangibles.' The Department has also 
shown how a team is a substantial source of revenue for 
the City, County and State. Finally, we have indicated 
that a new stadium will increase the cumulative 
economic impact of a Chicago baseball team, and sharply 
boost the revenues received by local government. 
The report, which was eventually employed to convince 
the lawmakers in Springfield, IL that an approval of funding 
for a new White Sox stadium was a rational act, provided 
some interesting comparisons between the economic 
contributions which an old vs. new stadium would have on the 
state of Illinois and the City of Chicago. The comparison 
(See Table 2) shows that a new stadium makes higher economic 
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contributions to the local and state economy than does an 
older one. 
TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF THE ANNUAL AVERAGE VS. PEAK 
TOTAL CONTRIBUTION OF A BASEBALL TEAM IN ILLINOIS & CHICAGO, 
AND TAXES PAID TO THE STATE, COUNTY AND THE CITY BETWEEN AN 
OLD AND A NEW STADIUM 
STATE OF ILLINOIS 
Average* Peak** Average*** Peak**** 
Old Stadium Old Stadium New Stadium New Stadium 
93.7 134.9 112.1 161.4 
CITY OF CHICAGO 
Average* Peak** Average*** Peak**** 
Old Stadium Old Stadium New Stadium New Stadium 
78.6 115.3 94.8 137.5 
STATE TAXES 
Average* Peak** Average*** Peak**** 
Old Stadium Old Stadium New Stadium New Stadium 
4.2 5.7 5.0 6.9 
COOK COUNTY TAXES {in thousands} 
Average* Peak** Average*** Peak**** 
Old Stadium Old Stadium New Stadium New Stadium 
103 133 752 788 
CITY OF CHICAGO TAXES 
Average* Peak** Average*** Peak**** 
Old Stadium Old Stadium New Stadium New Stadium 
2.6 3.5 8.6 9.7 
Source: Department of Economic Development, 1986:14, 18, 22. 
Based on annual attendance figures from 1982-1985. 
* Indicates an average attendance regular season year 
without post-season play. 
** Indicates 2.2 million in attendance, plus 300,000 
attendees in six-post season games. 
*** Indicates 2.2 million as an average attendance regular 
season year without post-season play. 
**** Indicates 2.7 million in attendance, plus 360,000 
attendees in six-post season games. 
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Even though a new stadium usually heightens fan interest and 
leads to increased attendance, viewing the new facility 
wears off and yearly attendance levels drop (Johnson, 1983), 
especially if the ballpark is an architectural bust, as 
proved by the new Comiskey Park. 
While negotiations persisted between the two sides, 
some challenged the strategy utilized by the ownership of 
the White Sox to receive financial gains. Simultaneously, 
these same critics undermined the supposedly, publicly 
provided economic benefits which the franchise and others 
claimed. A Crain's Chicago Business editorial (7/14/86, p. 
10), asserting the poor winning record of the team in recent 
years, noted that its economic distribution to the area has 
been less than impressive: 
And as for being a contributor to Chicago's gross 
metropolitan product, the Sox are strictly second 
division. In the course of an 80-game home season, the 
Sox, filled a few hotel rooms with visiting team 
players, sold a few hot dogs and plastic batting 
helmets at the park and stimulated the sale of a lot of 
beer at neighboring watering holes. Sears, Roebuck and 
Co. exerts a bigger impact each week when it brings in 
field personnel for education sessions at the [Sears] 
Tower. 
In addition, serious questions could be raised about 
the tax benefits which the White Sox supposedly contribute 
to the City. According to a comparison of the 1987 tax year 
assessment for White Sox properties and South Armour Square, 
some interesting observations can be made. The total 
assessed value of White Sox properties including the 
Comiskey Park was $2,672,917 and the taxes owed were 
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$488,418. On the other hand, the entire community of South 
Armour Square, excluding the White Sox properties which rest 
within the area, was $1,795,703 and the taxes owed were 
$328,126 (Staton, 1988). Thus, serious questions should be 
raised about these publicized economic benefits, since the 
economically devastated community of South Armour Square 
nearby contributed to Chicago's tax base as much as the 
White Sox. 
The clash between the city and the suburbs became 
interestingly exemplified by the position which the city of 
Chicago took in its efforts to ensure the financing options 
for a White Sox stadium in Chicago. Mayor Harold Washington 
attempted to stop suburban Addison from selling tax exempt 
bonds to finance a stadium for the White Sox. The Mayor, 
according a Crain's Chicago Business editorial, asked Rep. 
Dan Rostenkowski to "rewrite a grandfather provision in a 
tax reform bill protecting the city's right to issue tax-
exemptions to exclude anyone else hereabouts from using the 
clause" (8/4/86, p. 12). This "guerrilla warfare approach" 
would not prove to be the type which would allow the city 
and the suburbs to work together and cooperate for the well-
being of the metropolitan community. Another Crain's 
Chicago Business editorial advised the Mayor to make the 
deal which he offered to the Sox more competitive, rather 
than downplay and sabotage the attempts of the opposition 
(8/11/86, p. 10). 
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In the end of 1986, an agreement between the White Sox 
and political leaders was reached calling for a new stadium 
across from Comiskey Park in the community of South Armour 
Square. Construction cost would be financed by state-bonds 
through a city-state authority. This agreement proved to be 
less costly than the one discussed where the South Loop area 
was the proposed site. The estimated savings for the city 
were approximately $54 million. The cut in cost was due to 
the fact that the new ballpark at this new site would not 
require the infrastructural developments necessary at the 
South Loop location. Many city services which had supported 
Comiskey Park (transportation, sewage, etc), would be 
utilized to support the new stadium. In addition, land at 
this new location was more attractive to the stadium 
developers. Across from Comiskey Park, land was estimated 
at as little as $35,000 an acre. In comparison, the cost of 
land at Roosevelt Road was estimated at $261,000 per acre 
(Bayard, 1986). 
Finally, the status of this new proposed community was 
different from the one which successfully resisted the 
stadium plans in Addison and South Loop. The new community 
was comprised of predominantly African-American, low-income 
residents, many of which were senior citizens in public 
housing. This type of community, from the perspective of 
the stadium developers, could be more easily convinced of a 
new facility in their area, an assessment which would later 
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prove correct. 
Going to Florida or Staying in Chicago: The Media Push 
The city of St. Petersburg, Florida observed the 
developments in Chicago as the White Sox threatened to leave 
the city. In 1988, St. Petersburg attempted to attract the 
team to the Tampa Bay area. That city had begun, in the 
mid-80's, the construction of a domed stadium which was 
nearing completion. The White Sox, frustrated with the slow 
moving pace of events in Chicago and Springfield turned to 
Florida searching for the economic and political support 
which that state and city claimed to offer. 
This interest by the White Sox could be categorized as 
more directed at applying pressure on the political 
leadership in Chicago and Illinois, than representing a 
genuine intent to move to Florida (see discussion below on 
whether a move to Florida would have been financially sound 
for the team). Yet, those in the Tampa/St. Petersburg area 
viewed the possibility of a team in the area as a great 
opportunity and worked hard to lure the franchise. The 
Tampa Bay Baseball Group, a private group seeking to bring a 
team to Tampa, with the support of the Tampa Sports 
Authority, "blessed" the efforts of St. Petersburg to 
attract the White Sox, indicating they would not compete 
with the nearby city for the team. 
An editorial by the Chicago Tribune on May 11, 1988, 
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fearing loss of the White Sox to St. Petersburg, chastised 
the government for moving slowly and requested the franchise 
break talks with representatives from Florida until 
adjournment of the Illinois legislature. At the same time, 
the editorial admitted the possibility that the White Sox 
might be trying to set-up the best possible deal for 
themselves. According to the editorial: 
Their [state government] abrupt decision to break off 
discussions with White Sox owners raises doubts about 
either their sincerity or their judgment. 
Intentionally or not, this latest shift once again 
nudges the Sox toward St. Petersburg .... Maybe the Sox 
owners have no intention of staying in Chicago, and are 
only using these talks to win more goodies from St. 
Petersburg .... if the stadium authority persists in 
refusing to negotiate, it virtually guarantees that the 
Sox will move, and puts much of the blame on itself. 
In Chicago, the media pressured the government to move 
quickly and ensure that the White Sox stay in Chicago. Bob 
Verdi (1988), a columnist for the Chicago Tribune attacked 
the political leadership in Illinois and Chicago. He 
criticized them for acting slowly and not agreeing to meet 
the needs of the White Sox, thus allowing the team to ponder 
the possibility of moving to Florida: 
If meetings [with government representatives in 
Illinois and Chicago] were mortar and if promises were 
pipes, the White Sox presently would have a facility 
large enough to accommodate the entire population of 
Florida instead of every reason to move there . 
. .. Should Reinsdorf and Einhorn depart for clearly a 
better situation in St. Petersburg, they will be gone, 
out of sight, out of mind. But not forgotten will be 
those striped suits who helped arrange the going-away 
party. They are the ones who will have to stand up for 
a change and explain what happened. They are the ones 
who will have to answer questions from voters who put 
them in office. They are the ones who will beg for an 
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expansion franchise and be laughed at by major league 
baseball, because major league baseball understands 
that the White Sox are not doing the squeezing, but are 
the ones getting squeezed .... And a major league 
baseball franchise must be fairly special, because 
there are only 26 in existence. Does [Governor 
Thompson] want the St. Petersburg White Sox on his 
resume? 
Even though political representatives in Springfield 
agreed with this logic, they felt caught in the middle. On 
the one hand, political support would indicate the 
advancement of private interests, and, on the other hand, 
losing the White Sox could have direct re-election 
implications. According to Rep. Robert Churchill (R., Lake 
Villa) : 
It's a difficult thing for Democrats or anybody else to 
sell to voters-that you voted for Reinsdorf and Einhorn 
but not for schools. But this White Sox issue could 
generate some heat later. No leader or legislature 
wants to be collared with the mantle of loosing the 
Sox. That's not good politics either (Kass, 1988a). 
This type of reasoning, outlining the political implications 
for government officials involved in the negotiations, 
applied additional pressure to retain the White Sox in the 
City. In addition, other, economically driven rationales 
were utilized to retain the White Sox. According to some, 
keeping the White Sox in the city would allow Chicago to 
"retain an estimated $112 million to $162 million in annual 
local spending, taxes and economic activity" (Hornung, 
1988a) . What politician would want to be responsible for 
the loss of this revenue? 
The governor of Illinois attempted to def end his slow 
152 
action on the matter and noted that the White Sox should 
discontinue talks with St. Petersburg. According to Gov. 
Thompson: 
It's kind of hard to negotiate when you have given the 
other party everything they asked for. That's the 
astounding part of all of this, I mean, we said last 
night, 'Okay, we'll give you everything you've asked 
for, literally everything, every single thing.' Now 
what's left? (Kass and Franklin, 1988). 
The White Sox ownership responded with disagreement. 
According to a team representative: "They [government] 
wanted us to cut off one leg in exchange for a promise that 
Springfield would try and give us another. We said we 
wanted the deal. They wanted us to go along and kill other 
options on a promise. That's not good business" (Kass and 
Franklin, 1988). 
On the other hand, in St. Petersburg, the construction 
of the state funded Suncoast Dome, was nearing completion. 
Negotiations between the White Sox and the political 
representatives in Illinois and Florida persisted. The 
Florida legislature, in order to make its case more 
competitive, considered providing another $30 million to the 
construction project if that meant that the dome could have 
been completed by the opening of the 1989 season (117-0 vote 
on the passage of Florida's House appropriations bill which 
included support for the funding of the Suncoast Dome in St. 
Petersburg) . The delaying actions and uncertainty in 
Illinois was viewed with excitement in Florida. According 
to a state of Florida representative "They're [Illinois 
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government] pushing the Sox out the door and right into St. 
Pete." (Kass and Engler, 1988b). 
The ''Save Our Sox" group in Chicago also realized that 
losing Comiskey Park was not going to be as painful as 
losing the White Sox to Florida. O'Connell indicated to me: 
When Reinsdorf and Einhorn threatened to move the team 
to St. Petersburg much of the support to our group 
decreased. Many of our members dropped out fearing 
that their pressure on the ownership to save Comiskey 
could have an impact on driving the team out of town. 
All of a sudden we thought that our team would be 
gone ... I remember testifying at a hearing and I held an 
orange with an 'X' on it and told them that the 
Floridians would not take our team. 
In the end, the following five factors can be cited for 
the backing of a proposal in Springfield to retain the White 
Sox in Chicago, and finance the construction of an open-air, 
baseball-only stadium: (1) fan support as expressed by the 
"Save Our Sox" group, (2) the perceived negative political 
implications by state representatives, (3) the perceived 
economic loss for the city and the state, (4) pressing 
support by the media for keeping the White Sox, and, (5) the 
willingness of the franchise to remain, since in the long-
run, Chicago would continue to provide a larger market for 
the team. 
State Financial Support and Implications 
Representatives from the two sides (Illinois and 
Florida) began the development of financial packages which 
would be "most appropriate" for the White Sox. The proposal 
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which the city of Chicago and State of Illinois offered to 
the franchise, pending state legislature approval, was the 
one which kept the White Sox in Chicago. It included the 
following points: 
(1) $150 million in bonds would be authorized for the 
construction of the facility. 32 
(2) If the stadium is not available for the White Sox by 
1991, the ISFA will pay the team a penalty of $5 million. 33 
(3) The maintenance of the new stadium would be the 
responsibility of the White Sox. The ISFA would contribute, 
beyond the debt services, $2 million in annual subsidies 
toward that purpose and would assume any and all structural 
costs of the facility. 
(4) For the first ten years of the lease agreement, the 
White Sox will pay the ISFA $2.50 per ticket if yearly 
attendance is between 1.2 million and 2 million. If the 
attendance exceeds 2 million, the White Sox will pay the 
ISFA $1.50 per ticket. 34 
32 
from a 
Direct 
retire 
The bonds would be retired with revenue generated 
2 percent tax on hotel and motels room charge bills. 
city and state subsidies would also be required to 
the bonds. 
33 According to the agreement, this penalty would 
increase to $7.5 million in 1992 and continue to increase by 
$2.5 million every year after that time. 
34 During the second ten years of the lease agreement 
the ticket cost, which the White Sox will pay ISFA under the 
first scenario, will be $4.00 per ticket and the per ticket 
price will remain at $1.50 if attendance exceeds 2 million. 
During the second ten years of the agreement, if attendance 
falls below 1.5 million, the ISFA is responsible for 
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(5) The ISFA will pay $10 million for the design and 
construction of a scoreboard for the new stadium. The city 
of Chicago will receive no property taxes from the new 
sports facility, an estimated loss of approximately 
$800,000. 
(6) The City of Chicago will spend $19.6 million to move a 
garage facility for city vehicles, located on the site of 
the proposed stadium. ISFA will provide $3 million to 
defray that cost. 
(7) As reported in Bess and Decker (1989), the lease 
agreement provides the team with an "exclusive right ... to 
any and all proceeds from ... concession and vending machine 
rents or payments, sales of souvenirs, sales of food and 
beverage, including alcoholic beverages, club membership 
fees, parking revenues, and [skybox] Suites rents." 
(8) The stadium will be protected in case adjacent 
purchasing up to 300,000 tickets from the White Sox, 
bringing the estimated cost to the state at more than $2 
million a year (Kass and Engler, 1988a). Bess and Decker 
(1989:3), provided the following hypothetical: "This [part 
of the agreement] means that if the White Sox in a single 
year sell every seat for every game, ISFA will receive 
approximately $4.3 million; if the White Sox draw 2.0 
million, ISFA will receive $2 million; if the White Sox draw 
1.5 million during the first ten years, ISFA will receive 
$750,000; if the White Sox draw 1.5 million during the 
second 10 years, ISFA will receive nothing; and if the White 
Sox draw 1.2 million during the second 10 years, ISFA will 
pay the White Sox anywhere from $1.5 million to $2.5 
million, depending upon the average cost of a White Sox 
ticket. The White Sox have exceeded 2 million in attendance 
twice in their history, in 1983 and 1984; in 1987 they drew 
approximately 1.208 million fans, in 1988 approximately 
1.116 million." 
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neighborhoods attempt to ban the sell of beer inside the 
ballpark. 
(9) The ISFA will be responsible for the "clearing" of land, 
removing homeowners, renters and business owners, for the 
construction of the sports stadium. 35 
(10) The ISFA will receive 35 percent of all local radio and 
television broadcast revenues beyond $5.8 million and 35 
percent of stadium advertizing revenues that exceed $2 
million. 36 
(11) The White Sox will play rent-free during the two years 
prior to the old Comiskey Park's demolition (1989 and 1990 
seasons) . In the new stadium, the White Sox will not pay 
rent, as long as attendance remains under 1.2 million 
annually. 
The executive director of the ISFA Peter Bynoe 
described the proposed plan between the State of Illinois 
and the White Sox in a way which indicates that government 
involvement in this case directly assisted the profit 
oriented mode of this private enterprise. He noted: "The 
theory of this deal is to provide the Sox a cushion on the 
downside, while allowing us to participate on the upside on 
35 The estimated cost of this proved to be $12 
million. 
36 It was also agreed that The ISFA will not claim 
any of the revenue generated by the contract which the Major 
League Baseball and the White Sox had signed with ABC and 
NBC for national broadcasting. Under that particular 
contract the White Sox received in 1988 over $7.8 million 
(Hornung, 1988a). 
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a clearly defined basis" (Hornung, 1988a) . The ''upside" as 
described by Bynoe is not only difficult to predict in the 
competitive nature of sports, but also unlikely to occur 
when one considers that the White Sox have traditionally 
invested less money than the average team on player salaries 
(the ownership of the franchise, for example, has announced 
a trimmed players salary budget for the 1996-1997 season). 
In addition, if the state expected that through a 
winning team, (a promise made by the ownership of the White 
Sox after the approval of the lease agreement), they would 
share in the fortunes of the franchise, the events which 
took place during the 1993, 1994 and 1995 seasons should 
have made the state and Bynoe reconsider. During the 1993 
and 1994 seasons, the White Sox were very competitive, 
winning a division title. Yet, the fan support was as 
disappointing as it was during the 1995 season when the 
White Sox had a miserable on-field performance. 
The real implications of the lease agreement between 
the White Sox and the State of Illinois, are not going to be 
found on its "upside." Rather, they can be extracted from 
the significance of the "downside" as noted by Bynoe above. 
This lease agreement will have two direct, economically 
related implications, both favoring the White Sox. On the 
one hand, the deal will significantly increase the $21 
million dollar value of the team (its purchase price in 
1981) . On the other hand, this arrangement contributes 
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substantial capital to the business, ensuring that a 
downfall or "downside" does not occur, thus, continuing the 
maximization of its profits. 
The St. Petersburg package was also very attractive, 
even more attractive than the one put forth by the city of 
Chicago and the state of Illinois. It included a ten year 
rent-free agreement. The team would not have to pay 
maintenance costs for the life of the agreement and they 
would not have to share any income from their television 
contract and marketing revenues with the state. The 
franchise would also receive a $10 million, low interest 
loan from the state of Florida (Hornung, 1988a). 
Rationalizing Competition: Government Perceptions of Outcome 
Though the distribution of costs and benefits in this 
partnership between the public and private sectors was 
uneven, Governor Thompson strongly supported its passage. 
The following statements by the Governor indicate the 
urgency of this legislation and the importance of keeping 
the Sox in the city. He said: "Chicago deserves to keep the 
White Sox and the White Sox want to stay" and "But they 
[White Sox] can't stay at the price of financial abandon" 
and "Illinois and Chicago can't afford to lose anything at 
all" and " ... we [Illinois State legislature] support county 
fairs Downstate, the museums in Chicago, the arts. Why 
can't we support a state owned stadium?" (Kass and Engler, 
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1988a) . 
In the end, with the backing of the leadership in the 
House, the Senate, and City Hall, the governor asked the 
legislature to approve the proposal. The package was 
approved on June 30, 1988 by the Springfield legislature, 
largely due to the successful legislative lobbying of 
Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan (D., Chicago). 
Madigan was able to recruit 36 House Democrats to support 
the plan. These votes provided more than the 60 votes 
required to pass the measure. 
The Illinois Sports Facilities Authority Act (1988:#3) 
made the following declarations: 
As a result of deteriorating infrastructure and sports 
facilities in the metropolitan area of Chicago, there 
is a shortage of sports facilities suitable for use by 
professional sports teams. 
As a result of the costs to repair or replace such 
infrastructure and facilities, and as a result of 
current high financing costs, the private sector, 
without the assistance contemplated in this Act, is 
unable to construct feasibly adequate sports 
facilities . 
. .. the creation of modern sports facilities and the 
other results contemplated by this Act would stimulate 
economic activity in the State of Illinois, including 
the creation and maintenance of jobs, the creation of 
new and lasting infrastructure and other improvements, 
and the retention of sports and entertainment 
activities which generate economic activity . 
. . . professional sports facilities can be magnets for 
substantial interstate tourism resulting in increased 
retail sales, hotel and restaurant sales, and 
entertainment industry sales, all of which increase 
jobs and economic growth. 
These justifications above, communicate the value of a 
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professional sports franchise as perceived by the 
government, making the use of considerable public funds to 
build a new stadium a rational act. 
Governor Thompson, during a home plate ceremony at the 
old Comiskey Park in July of 1988, under mixed fan support 
from the stands, signed the White Sox deal. Afterwards, he 
reminded St. Petersburg that Chicago is a first class city 
and its will could never be undermined. He said: "I want to 
send a message that we don't give up anything in Chicago and 
that we don't let anybody take anything away from us" (Kass, 
1988b) . 
This type of response strongly describes the tension 
which existed between the two sides over the White Sox. It 
also allows for an interesting interpretation of the events 
which had precipitated between Chicago and St. Petersburg. 
Retaining the White Sox became a contest and a battle of 
willpower. The status and world-class position of the City 
of Chicago was at stake and retaining the team was a way to 
prove that its political leadership and ability to influence 
state legislation was superior to that of another city. 
City pride and a proof of Chicago's strong character were 
channeled through events surrounding a professional baseball 
team. In the meantime, the real issue (the fact that a for-
profit corporation received unbelievable financial support 
from the public, a situation that no other business in 
Chicago could probably ever be capable of attaining) , went 
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astray. 
The city of St. Petersburg felt that there were a 
number of positives which came out of its pursuit of the 
White Sox. According to Bill Bunker, executive director of 
the Pinellas County Sports Authority in St. Petersburg: 
The White Sox interest in this project is the best 
thing that happened to us as far as getting our story 
across to baseball and the country. We couldn't have 
accomplished more if we had hired a fancy New York PR 
firm (Sherman, 1989). 
Rick Dodge, Assistant City Manager who worked to attract the 
White Sox to Florida was also optimistic as he reflected on 
the turn of events: 
One way of looking at it is that the White Sox went 
through their own expansion review. The good news for 
us is that they determined that the best move for them 
would have been here, and their analysis of this area 
was communicated throughout baseball and elevated the 
Tampa Bay area. That was a very important and a 
significant assistance to us. What better endorsement 
than someone willing to bet their economic future on 
you? (Isaacson, 1991). 
The events also brought the two cities in the Tampa Bay 
area together as they continued their efforts to attract an 
existing or expansion baseball franchise. Finally, the City 
of Tampa was awarded an expansion baseball team which began 
play in 1996. Until that time, 7 years after its 
construction, the $138 million, 43,000 seat Florida Suncoast 
Dome remained empty at considerable tax payer cost. 
Was a Sox Move out of State a 
Financially Sound Possibility for the Team? 
The White Sox threatened to leave Chicago for another 
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city unless their demands for a new stadium were not 
satisfied by local and state political leaders. Did the 
White Sox use the possibility of their move as a way to 
pressure the political leadership in Chicago and Springfield 
to attain the best deal possible? How sincere was the 
ownership of the White Sox about leaving for another state? 
When considering the profitability of a professional 
franchise it is important to account for the implications 
which a stadium might have on raising revenue. The old 
Comiskey Park had 35 skyboxes, considerably less from the 
number of skyboxes available at newer baseball stadiums. 
Even though the White Sox estimated that $15 million was 
spent to keep that ballpark "in shape" since its purchase by 
Reinsdorf in 1981, continuous claims were made by the 
ownership that the team "would go bankrupt" if it were to 
stay at that facility. Yet, other factors should be taken 
into consideration when one attempts to determine team 
profitability. 
Professional sports franchises, regardless of the 
amenities which a new stadium can provide, would financially 
do much better in Chicago than in most other markets since 
mere attendance is not the largest source of revenue. Julie 
Taylor, Director of Guest Services of the Chicago White Sox 
told me: 
If we [White Sox] sold all the seats for the whole year 
we could not pay for the players salaries, but with the 
skyboxes and a good marketing of signs, television 
contracts etc., we can do that and more, maybe make 
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some profit. You see that Boston Market sign out there 
in the outfield. That is a new sign and it cost that 
company $500,000 for the year, plus they [Boston 
Market] have to sponsor a big firework show, that is 
about $80,000. On the other hand do you see that small 
Fontanini sign in the upper deck. It costs $30,000 for 
the year and the(y) [company] has to sponsor an event 
during the season. 
The success of television contracts and other 
agreements will be determined, to a large extent, by the 
size of the local market. Chicago has the third largest 
market in the nation and teams in the largest markets will 
be more successful in negotiating attractive broadcast-right 
deals with television stations. In 1986, the White Sox 
negotiated a deal with WFLD-TV/Channel 32 for the broadcast 
of 70 games. When compared to the previous broadcast 
arrangements, this agreement doubled their revenue. The 
1986 deal brought $8.3 million, which was up from $4 million 
in 1985. Market size will determine the television revenues 
generated by baseball franchises across the country. For 
example, the New York Yankees, who played in the nation's 
largest market that same year, received $15.5 million for 
broadcast rights. On the other hand, the Seattle Mariners 
who played in the twenty-second, largest metro area 
generated $2.1 million, the Kansas City Royals, who played 
in the twenty-ninth, largest market received $2 million and 
the Cleveland Indians, who ranked twelfth received $3 
million (Bremner, 1986). 
If playing at the old Comiskey Park was such a 
financial strain~ then why would the ownership take the team 
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to Tampa or Denver which ranked twenty-fourth and twenty-
f irst respectively in market size and settle for revenues 
between $1.5 to $2 million from television broadcast rights? 
In addition, though the White Sox could have attempted to 
leave the metropolitan area, under the shared revenue clause 
that exists in the league, the team owners of the American 
League would have to approve the move, something which would 
have cost them additional income in fees and penalties. 
Though owners have successfully challenged this clause in 
recent years (both the Raiders and the Rams of the NFL can 
be cited as examples) , moving the team against the will of 
the league would have been an additional hurdle. 
Revenue generated by the advertisement opportunities in 
a new market could not be guaranteed for the White Sox to 
the extent to which it was established in Chicago. 
Representatives of two cities which courted the White Sox, 
Denver and Tampa, noted that revenue could not have been as 
easily generated in their smaller markets. An executive of 
the Denver Baseball Commission noted "the TV deal in Chicago 
is significantly better than the one they could get in 
Denver" and according to a spokesman for the Tampa Bay 
Baseball Group involved in attracting the White Sox to that 
area: "it is difficult to move an [established] franchise." 
The officials in Florida proposed to call the team the 
"Florida White Sox", aiming to market the team at a wider 
state level. Yet, that would not necessarily generate 
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increased revenue. Bryan Burns, Director of Broadcasting in 
the Baseball Commissioners Off ice commented on the statewide 
broadcast offer that: "The regional sports networks don't 
have a great track record" (Bremner, 1986) . 
It seems that, from a financial point of view, when 
taking into consideration the above mentioned economic 
implications, it would have been most profitable for the 
White Sox to stay in the Chicago area and take advantage of 
the type and size of the existing market. The introduction 
of the relocation possibility to another state was a way to 
hold Chicago "hostage" and in the end pressure the local and 
state government into providing the franchise with a new 
stadium; a source of increased revenue. 
Contracting the Facility and the Actual Product 
The proposed construction of a new stadium brought a 
bidding war between politically powerful firms in the 
Chicago area. Some of the firms competing for the $90-100 
million, initially estimated cost award of the sports 
facility, included close supporters of Governor Thompson and 
House Speaker Madigan (D., Chicago). Owners of other firms 
competing for the contract, had previously served in various 
local and state government positions (Mccarron, 1988b) . 
The ISFA signed a no-strike agreement with the 26 
unions expected to participate in the construction project 
and approved six construction companies to present their 
bids. From the six, four companies submitted stadium 
construction costs. All four exceeded the expected cost. 
The lowest bid was at $129 million and the highest was at 
$139 million. 
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Bynoe described the proposed cost as a "serious 
problem." Added to the $150 million available in the form 
of construction bonds, there was approximately $33.5 million 
from the 2 percent hotel tax. This raised the total 
available money for the project to $183.5 million. Yet, $35 
million had already been spent for land acquisition and land 
clearance. The relocation costs of residents were also more 
than $6 million. Accepting the lowest bid at $130 million 
would make the overall project financially risky. In 
addition, according to the lease signed in 1988, in the case 
that the ISFA was unable to proceed with a contractor, the 
White Sox could break the agreement and search elsewhere for 
another deal (Mccarron, 1989a) . 
This developing scenario would seriously undermine the 
actions of those involved with the approval and 
administration of this project. Up to this point, (1) 
millions of taxpayers' dollars had been spent, (2) an 
extremely favorable agreement was given to the franchise and 
a neighborhood had been physically destroyed, (3) residents 
were to be relocated and others had been displaced, and (4) 
the culture and atmosphere surrounding the old Comiskey Park 
had been transformed. Yet, there was still a chance for the 
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White Sox to leave Chicago. 
The ISFA managed to bring the stadium cost down by $10 
million. The cuts included television sets and wet bars in 
some of the skyboxes, an amenity to be added in the 
following two to three years. The authority also received 
assurance from the White Sox that they would contribute $18 
million toward the construction of the new stadium. The $18 
million contributed by the White Sox would go back to the 
team in the form of rent subsidies. Reinsdorf responded, 
characterizing the entire agreement as "a bad deal": 
All we are doing is continuing a bad financial deal. 
But we didn't enter into this for financial purposes. 
We feel an obligation to remain in Chicago if it's at 
all possible (Mccarron, 1989b) . 
The Authority then awarded the contract to the lowest bidder 
at $120 million. 
As scheduled, the new Comiskey Park opened across the 
street from the old ballpark in 1991 at a final cost of $135 
million. The new Comiskey Park has no columns to obstruct 
the view, but a visit to the new facility and a seat 
assignment in the steep upper deck will convince anyone that 
intimacy is not its strongest point. The upper deck in this 
stadium begins where the upper deck ended at the old 
Comiskey Park. The measurement from home plate to the 
beginning of the upper deck in the new Comiskey is 160 feet. 
The distance to the end of the upper deck at the old 
Comiskey measured only 150 feet. 
The slope of the upper deck's design has allowed for 
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the construction of 103 luxury skyboxes, layed out beneath 
it in three different levels. Those skyboxes are leased for 
3 to 5 years ranging in price from $60,000 (10-12 persons) 
to $90, 000 (18 to 25 persons) (Sherman, 1991). 
After taking a private tour of the new Comiskey Park, I 
had a fir.st hand look at the amenities of a "new ballpark. " 
From the 16,000 square foot clubhouse which seats 340 
people, one has a direct view of the action on the field. 
In order to become a member and have the privilege of paying 
for a meal, you must be a season ticket holder and pay a 
$700 yearly membership fee. The White Sox rent the 
clubhouse for wedding receptions and other functions during 
the off season. 
The skyboxes provide a birds' eye-view and are wall-to-
wall carpeted, equipped with wetbars, seating areas, kitchen 
cabinets with sinks and large refrigerators. Suite 431 & 
432 are directly overlooking home plate, and are reserved 
for Reinsdorf and Einhorn. Square footage wise, each could 
easily qualify for a residential apartment. Between the two 
open suites, there is a smaller skybox which enables them to 
join as one. According to Julie Taylor: "That is were Mr. 
Einhorn and Mr. Reinsdorf would meet to discuss a financial 
deal." 
The reviews of the new stadium have become increasingly 
negative. The recent openings of Camden Yards in Baltimore 
and Jacobs Field in Cleveland, two ballparks that have made 
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great strides in going back to preserving the nature of the 
traditional ballpark, have proven the new Comiskey Park a 
failed attempt at an urban ballpark design. According to 
Gershman (1993:226-227): 
From both an architectural and a baseball point of 
view, Camden Yards has passed tests that have exposed 
the new Comiskey Park as a shallow pretender. The 
White So:x had buildings condemned and businesses moved 
so that they could surround their park with parking 
lots and souvenir stands owned by the team instead of 
independent shops and restaurants that would have added 
to the neighborhood feeling. It bears no relation to 
its surroundings and, at first glance it might be a 
municipal power station or similarly anonymous public 
building. It's also the kind of place that belies the 
White So:x blue-collar heritage, which Charles Comiskey 
respected and for which he made allowances. 
The new Comiskey Park seems to be a suburban style ballpark 
which has proved unable, from an architectural point of 
view, to communicate any of the mystique found in the 
"traditional ballpark." 
CHAPTER 6 
COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO STADIUM DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
IN SOUTH ARMOUR SQUARE 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of South Armour 
Square and addressees the relationship between the old 
Comiskey Park and the surrounding communities. The local 
political developments, the community responses to this 
stadium development plan and the physical and cultural 
effects of the new Comiskey Park on the community are 
discussed. The chapter concludes with an examination of 
viable alternative plans as well as recent attempts towards 
community redevelopment. 
The Community of South Armour Square 
The community of South Armour Square is located on the 
southern part of Comiskey Park, approximately four miles 
south from downtown Chicago. The first settlers to the area 
were Irish, German and Swedish laborers. The Chicago White 
Sox first built a ballpark at Pershing and Wentworth which 
was later used by the Negro League. Comiskey Park was built 
on 35th and Shields which extends from 35th to 33rd Street 
and was positioned in the middle of the Armour Square 
community. In the 1940's the population of Armour Square 
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increased due to the influx of African Americans moving to 
Chicago to work in the industries. In the 1960's, the 
community was racially split between the north and south 
part of Comiskey Park which served as a physical boundary. 
As the following table shows, the north was predominantly 
white and the south predominantly African American. 
TABLE 2 
POPULATION OF PRECINCTS BY RACE 
IN THE VICINITY OF WHITE SOX PARK 
Precinct Population %Black %White 
East 
Bridgeport 37 789 2.0 74.5 
39 930 0.0 82.0 
42 612 0.7 70.6 
3-precinct total 2,331 0.7 76.5 
Northwest 
Armour Square 53 787 22.7 71. 9 
Northeast 
Armour Square 34 681 18.2 76.9 
46 317 20.2 73.8 
2-precinct total 998 18.8 76.0 
South Armour 
Square 33 1,663 99.7 0.1 
54 629 99.5 0.0 
2-precinct total 2,292 99.7 0.1 
%Hispanic 
21. 9 
16.9 
28.9 
21. 8 
5.0 
4.7 
2.5 
4.0 
0.2 
0.5 
0.3 
Source: 1980 Census of Population and Housing: Block 
Statistics: Chicago, IL. Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area: PHC80-1-119. City of Chicago, Map of 11th Ward as of 
January 1986. 
Like many other urban communities in Chicago, South 
Armour Square was economically affected by the population 
movement to the suburbs. The number of jobs in the zip code 
area which encompassed the old Comiskey Park from the 70's 
to the mid 80's decreased by half. The community has been 
struggling to provide economic opportunities for its 
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residents (Strahler, 1986). According to a report by the 
Natalie P. Voorhees Neighborhood Center at the University of 
Illinois at Chicago, (1995:3) the South Armour Square is: 
... a small community of 1,500 residents, all African-
American, who either live in the Wentworth Gardens 
public housing development or the TE Brown Senior 
Citizen building. TE Brown is a federally subsidized 
202 development owned and operated by the Progressive 
Baptist Church. 
The same report noted that the 1989 median income was $7,000 
and that the majority of the households were headed by women 
(82 percent). Most of the households receive public aid or 
social security and 43 percent of the population is over the 
age of 55 years old. 
According to the U.S. census data, the percentage of 
families with income below poverty level in that area 
increased from 45.4 percent (1980) to 88.3 percent (1990). 
The percentage of high school graduates was 40.7 percent in 
1980 and 51.5 in 1990 (U.S. Census 1980, 1990). 
Yet, the residents perceive their community to be 
stable and established. At a community meeting a resident 
noted: "A lot of money has gone into improving conditions 
here. These people, mostly lower-income families, have sunk 
a lot of money into restoring their property ... " Another 
resident described the community as "an old, established 
neighborhood" (Jamison, 1987) . 
The Old Comiskey Park and the Local Community 
The old Comiskey Park opened in 1910 and was designed 
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by architect Zachary Taylor Davis at an estimated cost of 
$750,000. The so called, "Baseball Palace of the World" was 
constructed with a 420 foot centerf ield wall which proved to 
be favorable to pitchers. The seating arrangements made it 
a friendly ballpark where fans felt close to the action. 
According to a report (Bukowski, O'Connell and Aranza, 
1987:4), the ballpark, from its early years, was considered 
the preferred baseball entertainment of the South Side's 
working-class. It was positioned in the heart of many 
industries which employed blue-collar workers: 
Close to the [Comiskey] ballpark were the Union 
Stockyards and the International Harvester Plant, 
somewhat further the steel mills of South Chicago. 
These and other factories nurtured blue collar 
neighborhoods like Bridgeport, Canaryville, and 
Hegewisch. There, people worked hard and lived simply. 
By necessity, entertainment had to be close at hand or 
at least a bargain. Even if the White Sox lost 90 or 
more games a season, Comiskey Park always was 
accessible and affordable. It also offered real 
working-class heroes to cheer. 
The location of the ballpark made it the favorite of many 
generations of South Siders in Chicago. It was a place 
where the fans could identify with their heroes, since their 
hard work ethic in the factory was similar to the one 
exemplified by the Sox players on the field. According to 
that same report: "They [players] hustled on the field the 
same way their working-class fans hustled on the job" (p. 
5) . In that regard the old Comiskey Park was well 
integrated and strongly connected with the immediate 
community and the South Side of the city. 
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The local steel industry often advertized for openings 
at White Sox games. A 1953 White Sox scorebook contained an 
ad from the U.S. Steel, South Works. The ad read "Join a 
Major League Team: Work at United States Steel Corporation, 
South Works." Charles Comiskey's commitment to the White 
Sox blue-collar heritage was also evident by the allowance 
of a considerable 10,000 bleacher seats at the old Comiskey 
Park (Gershman, 1993). 
According to Douglas Bukowski, a White Sox historian, 
this ballpark was also a unique place in terms of racial and 
ethnic relations. The events hosted by the park included 
the boxing fight between Joe Louis and James Braddock in 
1937, when before an integrated crowd Louis became the first 
African American to win the crown. Minnie Minoso, a Cuban 
black player for the Sox from the early SO's and into the 
mid 60's was a Comiskey Park favorite. William Veeck, a 
colorful Chicago sports personality, a two-time owner of the 
Chicago White Sox and the founder of the exploding 
scoreboard, was very invested in bringing black players into 
the league. Many of the black players still communicate an 
enormous respect for Veeck, and according to Al Smith who 
was signed by Veeck in the late 1940's: "He [Veeck] was like 
a dog. He didn't know about color" (Cattau, 1992). 
The Chicago American Giants, a team of the Negro 
League, would regularly draw 10,000 to 20,000 black fans to 
their games on the South Side. The Negro League began in 
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1933 their annual East-West games at the old Comiskey Park, 
an occurrence which became the major black sports event in 
the country and continued for many years. For many blacks 
attending a White Sox game was an exciting form of 
entertainment. Many would write back to their families and 
friends in the South noting their attendance of a game at 
Comiskey. According to James Grossman, Newberry Library 
historian, "that [type of letter writing] was some heavy-
duty bragging" (Cattau, 1992). 
This integration between the White Sox and the 
community also included the residents of South Armour 
Square. But, in a new environment where profitability is 
intensely pursued by professional franchises, and a critical 
element of this search includes the construction of a new 
sports stadium, South Armour Square is now a hurdle in the 
path of increased revenues. It is from within this 
framework that local government support of private 
enterprise results in the eventual displacement of this 
community. 
Setting the Stage for the Takeover: Politicizing the Issue 
The political will of the state became illustrated 
through its negotiations with the White Sox and the final 
passage of the lease agreement, keeping the franchise from 
moving to Florida. The City government's support for the 
team was exemplified in its dealings with the community of 
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the South Armour Square. The community residents were split 
in their response to the takeover plans. The split was 
primarily due to city politics, specifically the upcoming 
Chicago mayoral elections, which influenced the residents' 
approach to the situation. 
The site chosen for the construction of the new stadium 
was on the side of the street immediately south from the old 
Comiskey Park. That area was occupied by residences and 
businesses. Many of the structures had to be removed so 
construction could begin. The proposal for property 
clearing did not include the nearby Wentworth Gardens public 
housing development and the TE Brown Senior Citizen 
building. 
The Wentworth Gardens was a public housing development 
built in 1945 located at the southeast corner of the South 
Armour Square community. It covers 16.34 acres of land and 
consists of 37 low-rise structures, of which 28 are two 
story and 9 are three story apartment buildings. But why 
did the stadium plan not include the demolition of this 
public housing development? Diane Kallenback of the Center 
for Economic Policy Analysis in Chicago speculated on this 
question: 
If Wentworth Gardens were destroyed by public action, 
city officials would have to relocate replacement 
housing for 1,246 low-income people. The paucity of 
units now available for low-income people and, coupled 
with the lack of federal government support for new 
low-income housing, would make the destruction of 422 
units of public housing a politically unfeasible option 
(Kallenback, 1988). 
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The ISFA, under the agreement with the White Sox, had 
to have residents removed and have taken control of the 
properties by October 15, 1988. If the ISFA was unable to 
retain the properties by that time, the White Sox could 
break their lease agreement and move to St. Petersburg. To 
ensure that the deadline was met, the ISFA was given legal 
power over these residential properties to be enforced on, 
or before September 15, 1988. 
Since the agreement between the government and the 
franchise was signed on July 1988, the deadline of October 
15 afforded the residents only 3 months to ponder the 
potential loss of their homes and a short period of time to 
reflect and develop a strategy that would benefit the 
community at a time of crisis. In reality, when one 
considers the September 15 court action threat by the ISFA, 
the residents had only two months to decide. Johnnie Tyler 
who owned a small restaurant and lived in the area for 25 
years noted: "How can I move all my staff by October. I 
don't know what to do. I can't go anywhere because I don't 
have anywhere to go" (Devall, 1988a). As it turned out it 
was in early August 1988 when the relocation agreement was 
reached and approved; it took the ISFA less than a month to 
remove 178 privately owned housing units, 12 neighborhood 
businesses, thus, wiping out an entire community. 
The political implications of the removal of these 
black residents were serious. At a time when mayoral 
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elections were a few months away, Mayor Sawyer did not want 
to be identified as the black mayoral candidate who 
orchestrated the displacement of black residents to benefit 
white business interests. As a result, Mayor Sawyer 
distanced himself by noting that he was only following the 
plans of the late Mayor Washington. In a meeting with 
residents from South Armour Square, immediately following 
the signing of the agreement, the Mayor criticized the 
actions of his enemies as politically motivated (Kass, 
1988b) : 
Most of the people [here] have legitimate concerns, but 
you could see some of Slim Coleman's people, some of 
Jacky Grimshaw's people, in here manipulating and 
trying to make me look bad ... I see my opponents had 
their people in there ready to criticize me for keeping 
the White Sox. But this is the Harold Washington's 
site. This is his legacy to keep the team and other 
people are picking and choosing on which of Mayor 
Washington's points they want to side with ... Anybody 
who knows politics could tell you what that means. 37 
Both Ald. Timothy Evans (4th Ward) and Ald. Danny Davis 
(29th Ward) became openly critical of the proposed 
relocation of black residents. As Evans was preparing to 
campaign against Sawyer in an upcoming mayoral primary 
election, politicizing the issue and presenting an 
37 Walter "Slim" Coleman was an organizer from the 
north side community of Uptown. Along with Jacky Grimshaw, 
Coleman served as political organizers for Mayor Washington. 
They were both supportive of Ald. Timoty C. Evans (4th) for 
mayor. Grimshaw and Coleman had organized a political rally 
for Evans and characterized it as a memorial for the late 
mayor. In addition, the two activists supported Evans who 
criticized Mayor Sawyer for supporting the displacement of a 
predominantly African-American community. 
insensitive, black Mayor who was willing to assist in the 
displacement of other blacks could prove helpful to his 
election efforts. 
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The ISFA attempted not to politicize the issue, since 
such a strategy would make the acquisition of land even more 
difficult. According to Bynoe of the ISFA, in reference to 
Evans and Coleman: "Our job was to keep those outside 
interest groups out of the discussions" (Kass, 1988e). But, 
the politicization of the issue brought a split within the 
community. Some viewed the relocation as an urban renewal 
program, while others viewed the relocation as a racist act. 
The Community Response 
It was in 1987, under the leadership of the South 
Armour Square Neighborhood Coalition, that the residents of 
South Armour Square, fearing the loss of their homes and 
businesses to a new stadium, organized to fight against 
relocation. This community organization, after a split 
within the community and the approval of the relocation 
package in 1988, became controlled by those who opposed that 
offer. 
The organization hired Mary Milano of the law firm 
Baker & McKenzie to assist in their efforts. The residents 
operated without information from the ISFA regarding their 
neighborhood, and were not part of the site decision making 
process. At a local meeting, confusion and complaints about 
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lack of information regarding plans by the government and/or 
the franchise owners were communicated. According to a 
resident: 
It's just as if we don't exist ... Area residents only 
know what they have read in the newspapers. No one has 
talked to us. No one has answered our calls or 
letters, and no one has responded to our petitions 
(Jamison, 1987) . 
As the signing of the agreement between the state and the 
White Sox was nearing a close, the residents began to loudly 
resist their possible relocation. A resident at a meeting 
noted: 
... We have a choice area and we do not want to give it 
up ... My roots are here. My family moved here when I 
was 6 months old [in 1946]. It's going to be hard to 
get me out of here" (Jamison, 1987) . 
Armed with $10 million for the relocation, the ISFA 
initiated its efforts to acquire the titles of the 
residential and industrial properties. A way for ISFA to 
speed up the process was to avoid confrontation with the 
community. Thus, $200,000 was offered to the residents for 
a consultant who would assist them with their relocation 
plans. In return, the residents promised that they would 
not sue the ISFA. 
The ISFA's position was that the residents had very 
little choice in the matter and at this point they should 
attempt to negotiate the best deal possible for themselves. 
According to Thomas Reynolds, chairman of the stadium 
authority: 
We want to let the neighborhood residents have input. 
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It would result in a more congenial relocation ... I 
think they [residents] realize that they will be 
displaced and that they ought to work on a plan that 
gives them as many options as they want and as many as 
we can afford (Camper and Davis, 1988). 
At this point the residents became divided. Some felt 
strongly about challenging the stadium developers, while 
others supported a settlement. George Marshall, president 
of the neighborhood coalition, fearing complete loss noted: 
"If we can stay in the area - namely, about two blocks south 
of here - and get some decent replacement housing built, 
that'll be a victory" (Devall, 1988a). Willie Jones, 
another resident, responding to talks of a lawsuit against 
the White Sox provided a similar response and urged for a 
compromise: "The White Sox are going to get this land, so we 
better make the best deal we can. And we are looking at a 
good deal. Let's not ruin it with a lawsuit" (Kass, 1988c). 
The lawsuit was advocated by Walter "Slim" Coleman, an 
Uptown community activist and supporter of Ald. Timothy 
Evans (4th Ward) . Coleman encouraged the community to stop 
negotiations with the ISFA and take the city, the state and 
the White Sox to court. A class-action law suit would 
charge the White Sox, the city and the state with racially 
motivated, discriminatory actions; specifically, that the 
ISFA and the White Sox did not exhaust their efforts to 
avoid displacement and, based on the racial composition of 
the South Armour Square community, continued to push their 
plans forward. Others called for a cautious decision making 
182 
process. According to a coalition board member: 
I don't think that people from outside the neighborhood 
should be talking anybody into a lawsuit. We reserve 
the right to sue, but we are also negotiating. Let's 
see how far negotiations will take us (Kass, 1988d) 
This division proved critical as the ISFA successfully 
removed the residents, making room for the stadium 
construction plans. 
The proposed relocation package which the ISFA offered 
the homeowners included the following options: (1) a cash 
payment for the market price of the homes, plus a $25,000 
"good will" payment, (2) move existing structures to a 
nearby site and provide a $2,500 cash settlement, (3) 
provide replacement housing in the form of new construction 
or from existing available houses, and (4) renters would 
receive a $4,500 settlement, assistance in locating a new 
apartment and a $500 moving allowance. Fearing that 
relocation would increase property taxes and thus rents, tax 
breaks were later requested by the residents (Kass, 1988d; 
Kass, 1988e). 
The agreement signed between the ISFA and the South 
Armour Square Neighborhood Coalition received mixed 
community response. Most residents accepted the relocation 
package proposed by the ISFA. Yet, residents from Wentworth 
Gardens and the TE Brown Senior Citizen building were 
dissatisfied and continued to fight the relocation of the 
stadium. 
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One Voice: Accept the Relocation Package 
For those who accepted the relocation package (98 
percent of all neighborhood residents in the area) , it was 
viewed as the best deal under the circumstances. The 
relocation sites which were presented to the residents by 
the ISFA included Bridgeport, Kenwood-Oakland, a site nearby 
South Armour Square, and the Gap, approximately eight blocks 
east of South Armour Square. The Gap was an upscale 
neighborhood which was rapidly becoming gentrified. Of the 
47 residential lots affected by the move, 27 of the owners 
elected to accept the option which called for a market value 
of their home plus a $25,000 cash settlement. The other 20 
families chose to receive a replacement home. The ISFA 
rejected an earlier request by the residents to be exempted 
from increased property taxes due to relocation (Davis, 
1988). 
From the 20 residents entitled to a replacement home, 
19 expressed interest in relocating to the Gap. Homes in 
the Gap were selling considerably higher that those in the 
South Armour Square neighborhood and the ISFA would have to 
provide additional subsidies. Those extra subsidies would 
come from the 2 percent hotel tax which would be used to 
repay the $150 million bonds. According to George Marshall, 
President of the Neighborhood Coalition: 
The Gap is a good neighborhood, close to shopping and 
close to our old neighborhood ... We didn't like the 
other sites the authority offered us (Kass, 1988f). 
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The Chicago Tribune in a series of articles entitled 
"Chicago on Hold: Politics of Poverty" praised the decision 
of these residents and chastised the claim of others to 
continue a "battle" with the stadium developers. An article 
from the series entitled "1 Community Finds Renewal Can Pay 
Off" by urban affairs writer Mccarron (1988a), referred to 
the approach of the residents in South Armour Square as 
"pioneering a community-based approach to urban renewal-an 
approach that could be used by families ... anywhere in the 
city where major redevelopment is contemplated." According 
to Mccarron, a move to the Gap would allow the 25 residents 
to "trade their tired by tidy cottages south of the existing 
Comiskey Park for new houses worth three times as much in a 
more fashionable neighborhood ... " At the same time, the 
article praised the decision of these residents to reject 
those promoting the "politics of displacement." 
Specifically, 
... a politics exploited by a handful of politicians and 
community organizers bent on enhancing their positions 
by stopping change in neighborhoods that needs change 
the most. 
Though the replacement homes at the Gap would be valued 
at $150,000 each, and the ISFA was investing a total of $3 
million in that area of the city, when community organizers 
from that area found out the plan of relocation they 
expressed concern. Phillip Jackson, President of the Gap 
Community Organization, in a community meeting, noted 
concern about the ability of the relocated residents to pay 
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the increased taxes. He indicated: 
... being in the Gap means you have to have certain 
consciousness ... There's a good chance that those people 
[coming from South Armour Square] may not understand 
our program for future development" (Seigel and 
Karwarth, 1988). 
Mary Milano, the lawyer for the coalition, was also 
supportive of the relocation agreement and according to her, 
as reported in Euchner (1993:154): ''I approached this 
project as I would approach a commercial real estate deal, 
which is my usual line of work. I tried to get the best 
deal possible for the people affected by the development." 
Even though the efforts to relocate and move the residents 
continued, concerns persisted for the 70 renters. These 
were mostly elderly residents who were to receive very 
little financial support in the form of a cash payment under 
the agreement. It was not until May 1990 that the homes at 
the Gap were completed, two years after the signing of the 
relocation agreement. 
Another Voice: Reject the Relocation Package 
Residents of the Wentworth Gardens, TE Brown and some 
renters were outraged with the arrangements. For Marcella 
Carter and others from Wentworth Gardens this was a really 
bad deal. These residents felt left behind to experience 
all the negative consequences of the new stadium. Increased 
traffic, littering, fans under the influence of alcohol 
following the games, noise from the exploding scoreboard and 
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even fireworks. According to Carter: "There's 300 of us 
here from Wentworth, and we are angry because we are getting 
nothing" and for Robert Robinson, a renter in the area: 
"[this] is worse than slavery ... We've been sold down the 
river, with no choice at all. 
put out" (Kass and Luft, 1988) 
group filed a federal lawsuit. 
It's either get out or get 
On February 9, 1989, this 
The suit has 49 plaintiffs 
charging the violation of the community members' civil 
rights. The case is still pending in the courts. 
Sheila Radford-Hill, a community activist in South 
Armour Square, representing the interests of the Wentworth 
Gardens, TE Brown Senior Citizen Building and of the general 
community of South Armour Square, outlined for me the 
various strategies utilized by these residents: 
(1) Grassroots Campaigning: For a two year period 
demonstrations were held at the games in the old Comiskey, 
City Hall, and the offices of ISFA. The residents, during a 
neighborhood meeting, also staged a mock funeral of their 
community. Many gathered around and told stories of their 
lives in the area, raising their children, interacting with 
one another, etc. The residents also engaged in a letter 
campaign, drawing support from other community organizations 
in the City of Chicago to protest displacement. 
(2) Coalition Building: The residents organized with other 
groups, such as the "Save Our Sox", a fan group which also 
advocated no displacement. Though the two groups, the 
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residents and the fans, had different agendas, saving the 
old Comiskey Park would have been welcomed by both. The 
fans would continue to attend games at the oldest park in 
the league, and the residents, who feared displacement 
resulting from a new stadium in the area, would save their 
homes. As a result, a coalition emerged between the two 
groups. O'Connell told me: 
We had a common interest with the residents. They were 
concerned with saving their homes and concerned about 
the impact of a new stadium on their community, 
parking, police protection, drinking, etc. We were 
concerned about saving the team and saving the park 
because we loved the White Sox. 
Though these two groups had similar interests, obvious 
divisions of race existed. According to O'Connell: 
The plan was for the two groups to meet at a tavern and 
discuss a plan of action. I walked in with Sheila 
[Radford-Hill, a community organizer for the residents] 
before the meeting, and we saw the whites sitting at 
one side, and a few tables away, at another corner, the 
blacks. Yet, the two groups worked together to the 
extent possible to challenge the government and the 
stadium developers. 
It was also because of racial tensions, that the 
community residents were unable to recruit support from the 
nearby white, middle-class community of Bridgeport whose 
long history of asserting power in city politics could have 
proved beneficial (Euchner, 1993). 
According to a Bridgeport resident the new stadium 
would be good for the area since it would "make the 
neighborhood look better." He noted: 
Sure you got lots of jobs at the park. That's 
important and we're gonna make the neighborhood look 
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better. We're gonna clear out that old neighborhood. 
It'll be a lot classier (McNamee, 1986). 
These statements outline the sharp divisions which existed 
between the residents in the larger area. An investigation 
of mayoral election results in the ward support the notion 
that race is a critical factor in determining voting 
behavior in that area (see TABLE 3). 
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TABLE 3 
1983 & 1987 PRIMARY AND GENERAL MAYORAL ELECTION RESULTS IN 
THE WARD SURROUNDING COMISKEY PARK* 
1983 Primary (February 22)-Ward Map dated December 16, 1981 
EST Bridgeport NW Armour NE Armour SO Armour 
Precincts 
Washington 
Burns 
Daley 
Others 
37 
0.83 
3.88 
91.97 
0.28 
39 
1. 02 
9.39 
87.96 
0.00 
42 
1. 06 
7.45 
87.23 
0.35 
53 
.54 
15.18 
79.40 
0.27 
34 
10.57 
10.34 
71.49 
1. 61 
46 
14.66 
10.42 
64.17 
0.98 
54 
56.08 
8.44 
22.58 
.74 
64 
67.22 
6.47 
19.87 
0.45 
1983 General (April 12)-Ward Map dated December 16, 1981 
EST Bridgeport NW Armour NE Armour SO Armour 
Precincts 37 39 42 53 34 46 54 64 
Washington 7.04 5.38 5.92 
Epton 88.86 93.58 92.33 
3.02 25.06 45.36 94.15 96.45 
95.60 68.62 47.50 0.98 0.55 
1987 Primary (February 24)-Ward Map dated January 8, 1986 
EST Bridgeport NW Armour NE Armour SO Armour 
Precincts 37 39 42 53 34 46 33 54 
Washington 5.56 3.42 3.70 3.05 20.05 41.80 90.99 90.08 
Burns 88.89 94.29 91.36 91.36 70.18 50.41 1.10 0.83 
1987 General (April 7)-Ward Map dated January 8, 1986 
EST Bridgeport NW Armour NE Armour SO Armour 
Precincts 37 39 42 53 34 46 33 54 
Washington 5.90 6.10 6.28 2.51 21.23 41.51 95.90 96.10 
Vrdolyak 87.50 90.14 84.94 93.04 74.42 41.51 0.37 0.00 
* Note that the 11th Ward Map changed between December 16, 
1981 and January 8, 1986 in South Armour Square. 
Specifically the precincts numbers in that area changed from 
54 and 64 to 33 and 54. This change did not have a 
significant change on the racial composition of those 
precincts. All figures in percentage points. 
Source: Center for Economic Policy Analysis, (1995), 
Chicago, IL. Arthur Lyons, Director. 
An additional observation from Table 4 can be made as to the 
voting behavior of the predominantly white precincts during 
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the general elections. Though these precincts have been 
historically democratic, when it came to voting, they chose 
not to support a black democratic candidate. Rather they 
supported a white republican candidate. Race, in this case, 
becomes a more important factor than party identification in 
terms of influencing voting behavior, a fact which further 
outlines the racial tensions in this area. 
(3) Negotiation of Benefits: The South Armour Square 
Neighborhood Coalition called for additional spending on the 
relocation of the residents. Eventually more than $10 
million was authorized by the ISFA to address this 
resettlement. 
(4) Civil Rights Class Action Suit: The suit charged that 
relocation of the stadium to the North of the existing old 
Comiskey was possible (see the discussion below in Second 
Alternative: The Armour Field Proposal). Yet, it would have 
resulted in the displacement of some white families. 
According to the suit, those involved in the construction of 
a new stadium: "in the course of their conspiracy ... have 
destroyed or are in the process of destroying approximately 
178 sound residential units which provided affordable 
housing for over 425 black residents" (Gorman, 1989). 
Though the law-suit was utilized by the residents to 
stop the destruction of their homes, after it became clear 
that the plan would move forward, the law-suit was about 
reparations. A secondary goal of the law suit, according to 
Radford-Hill, was to keep the community together and 
communicate the injustices to the rest of the city. 
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(5) Community Planning: Even though the loss of the homes 
seemed imminent, the residents attempted, through a 
redevelopment grant from the City of Chicago, to anticipate 
and address the physical changes of their community. The 
grant was used to plan for community business services taken 
away during the stadium development process. 
Radford-Hill also recommended ways to make similar 
cases more responsive to community needs. Specifically: 
(1) The government should be allowed to utilize its "quick 
take and imminent domain powers" only in projects which 
could clearly benefit the public. The case of a sports 
stadium, according to Radford-Hill, is not a public benefit. 
It advances the interests of a few and gives nothing back to 
the community affected, and, (2) If the government becomes 
involved in these cases, it should be responsible and 
accountable for the entire cost of displacement, extending 
beyond replacement housing. 
The city and the state were extremely satisfied with 
the turn of events. According to Mayor Sawyer: "[the 
agreement is] a noteworthy example of public-private 
partnership that works for the good of the entire city" and 
according to the executive director of the ISFA Peter Bynoe: 
"The relocation issue is the most critical one facing 
completion of this project, the one that was potentially the 
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most explosive, the one with the most down-side risk ... " 
(Kass and Luft, 1988). Finally, Crain's Chicago Business, 
credited Mary Milano, the coalition lawyer and the ISFA with 
the success of the relocation package (Hornung, 1988b). 
McCuddy's: The Loss of History and Local Culture 
McCuddy's, across from the old Comiskey park, was more 
than a neighborhood bar. It had been there since 1910, when 
Charles Comiskey opened the ballpark. The pub would do 
business only during the baseball season, approximately 80 
days a year. 
There was a special connection between the White Sox 
and the surrounding neighborhoods, and McCuddy's was the 
link. Most immediately associated McCuddy's with Comiskey 
Park, giving it landmark status. For White Sox fans the bar 
was imprinted in their memories. It was the place where the 
magic and fantasy of the sports world would meet the 
pragmatic nature of everyday life. 
McCuddy's was built across the ballpark in 1910 by John 
McCuddy, a friend of Charles Comiskey who had tipped him as 
to the position of the new stadium. Since then, thousands 
have visited the bar which has contributed to the aura and 
culture surrounding the area on game days. The true White 
Sox fan never achieved that status unless he/she visited 
McCuddy's; it had become a place of fan initiation. 
At McCuddy's fans listened to sports stories, 
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confirming the strong connection between the bar and the 
White Sox. One of the stories goes back to the New York 
Yankee dynasty and the Babe. When the Yankees came to town 
and the White Sox suffered defeats at the hands of Babe 
Ruth, it is said that the Babe himself, during the third 
inning, would go across the street to McCuddy's for a quick 
beer. He would then dash back to Comiskey and continue his 
"assault" on the White Sox. Frances McCuddy, granddaughter 
of the founder, noted how Ruth once destroyed the carpet in 
the bar with his baseball spikes as he rushed through the 
tables trying to finish four sandwiches and four beers, and 
make it on time back to Comiskey between innings (Kass, 
1988g) . 
Many Chicago Mayors and politicians would visit 
McCuddy's on White Sox Opening Day and it is said that the 
bar was a regular hang-out place for members of the Black 
Sox. Governor Thompson, immediately before signing the 
agreement which would keep the White Sox in Chicago, stopped 
by McCuddy's ·and high-fived the fans who viewed him as their 
"savior." 
Unfortunately, the development of the new stadium 
called for the destruction of McCuddy's. The bar, according 
to the plan, was located around third base. This was a 
disappointment to many since, a few months earlier, Thompson 
had promised the McCuddy's patrons that the bar would be 
saved and that it would be moved across the street from the 
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new stadium. Yet, the ISFA plans called for control of all 
properties by October 15. The ISFA, under its quick take 
power, filed lawsuits to obtain the commercial parcels 
before the deadline and planned to settle with their owners 
afterwards. One of the parcels was McCuddy's and the 
history and local culture generated by this neighborhood bar 
went down as fast as the one hour that it took, on March 
1989, when a wrecking ball demolished its structure (Davis, 
1989) . 
The authority eventually settled with Pat Senese, the 
owner of the bar for $235,000. Senese was extremely 
disappointed as he reflected on the proposed settlement: 
... I don't want the money. It's the place. It's the 
name that should remain across the street. Do you just 
break history off like a stick? Wash it away? I want 
my grandchildren to see that sign up there. That's 
what I want" (Kass, 1988g). 
The owners of McCuddy's attempted to re-open their pub 
in the winter of 1991, months before opening day of the new 
Comiskey Park. Their proposal called for a new McCuddy's 
right across the street from the new stadium or within the 
nearby vicinity of the site. The presence of this 
establishment would continue the long historical and 
cultural relationship between the neighborhood and the White 
Sox. The proposal was turned down by the ISFA. According 
to executive director Peter Bynoe: "[McCuddy's] cannot be 
relocated on the [stadium] site" because of state law and 
due to the fact that the White Sox have "the exclusive right 
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to sell food and liquor" within and surrounding the sports 
facility (Reardon, 1991a) . It is that same franchise right 
which took much of the culture and atmosphere which 
surrounded the ballpark as the local vendors sold their 
merchandise outside the ballpark. 
First Alternative: Restoring Old Comiskey Park 
Those in favor of renovating old Comiskey Park 
underscored the importance of the structure for the city by 
emphasizing the historic nature of the ballpark. The 
ballpark was the oldest in Major League Baseball, and 
according to a proposal by "Save Our Sox" (1987) landmark 
status should be granted to the ballpark. Specifically: 
" [the renovation of Comiskey Park would] celebrate the 
oldest ballpark in baseball [and] enhance the tourist appeal 
of the park and the surrounding areas of Bridgeport and 
Armour Square" (pg. 10). The group advocated Comiskey Park 
as a National Monument and upon its purchase by the ISFA, it 
should be donated to the National Park Service which would 
be responsible for its control and operation. 
The renovation proposal reintroduced the facility to 
its 1933 physical stature during baseball's "Golden Age." 
In addition, the proposal called for the construction of a 
nearby baseball museum where "its archives would focus on 
baseball as social history" (pg. 14). Exhibits of White Sox 
history and Chicago baseball would make the museum an 
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excellent addition to the proposed landmark plan. 
The report also proposed that the city take advantage 
of its unique position to have the oldest ballpark and 
called for a marketing of the facility as a place of tourist 
attraction. It described a renovated Comiskey Park as "a 
major tourist draw", a place for people from all over the 
country, to experience an era in American history gone by. 
In addition, according to this proposal, Comiskey Park 
could become the focal point from which the entire history 
of the South Side of the City of Chicago could be 
communicated to the rest of the nation. The nearby 
neighborhood of "the Gap", the distinct architecture of the 
Illinois Institute of Technology, the surrounding century-
old churches, Armour Square Park, the historic past of 
adjacent neighborhoods, blues and jazz, could all become 
part of an effort to showcase this section of the city. 
Under this general scenario, the local community could 
receive substantial economic benefits and could even be 
rescued from its current condition. 
The last rationale put forth by those attempting to 
convince the city and the White Sox that a renovation of the 
old Comiskey Park should be seriously considered was based 
on sentimental reasons. Over the years, the ballpark had 
gained a special place in the hearts of many Chicagoans. 
Drawing on emotional factors, the report described the 
ballpark as "an urban institution, an irreplaceable piece of 
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Chicago" (p. 20). A place where generations after 
generations of residents witnessed events which have 
remained in their memories forever. In the end, this 
proposal was never realized as the old Comiskey Park was 
pushed aside to become a parking lot for the new Comiskey 
Park. 
Second Alternative: The Armour Field Proposal 
When the Illinois Sports Facility Authority was created 
in 1986 by the Illinois General Assembly to oversee the 
construction of a new baseball facility for the White Sox, 
it was given both the land and the money necessary to 
accomplish this task. The ISFA was provided with over 90 
acres of land by the City of Chicago. 
Phillip Bess, an independent architect in Chicago saw 
this as an opportunity to propose a plan for a baseball park 
which would challenge the current trend in sports facilities 
architecture. Stadium construction in the 60's, 70's and 
the 80's, concentrated on circular, multi-purpose 
structures, high in volume, with maximum use of acreage, due 
to the fact that parking lot space was critical to this 
suburban style model. For Bess, this was a chance to 
propose "the urban baseball park'' since the site selected 
for this facility was in the core of a large urban center. 
According to Bess: 
I worked on the design of this plan for over four 
months. Contemporary ballpark construction poses no 
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physical constrains to the designer. The reason for 
that is because their [sports stadium] location has 
been primarily either in suburban communities or near 
railroad yards where acquiring space is not an issue. 
Here is an opportunity to attempt something different; 
building a stadium in the midst of a neighborhood. I 
was first interested [with my proposal] to address the 
nature of the urban ballpark, the building of the 
facility was of secondary interest. 
Bess proposed the construction of Armour Field. This urban 
ballpark proposal is one which deserves special attention 
since its implications extend beyond the play of baseball. 
Such structure can affect the fabric of the city itself. 
The Armour Field Proposal: The Ballpark 
Armour Field, was named after Armour Square Park, a 
park adjacent to the old Comiskey Park. The park on the 
north side of old Comiskey would be the site of the proposed 
stadium and it would occupy only 79 acres. The design 
projected for a $63 million, open air-ballpark. It would 
accommodate 42,250 seats and it would include 66 luxury 
boxes. The footprint of the ballpark itself would be 9 
acres. To place this figure into perspective, the footprint 
of Wrigley Field, arguably the most intimate ballpark in the 
majors, is just 8 acres. On the other hand the footprint of 
the new Comiskey Park is 12.1 acres (Bess, 1995). 
Approximately 7,560 spaces will be provided in the form of 
(1) surface parking, (2) designated parking lots within a 
mile of the ballpark, and (3) four, two-and-a-half story 
parking garages (Bess, 1989). 
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The proposal would also avoid displacement of 
residents. Specifically, Bess (1989:29) notes: 
The ISFA proposal [of the new Comiskey Park] requires 
the demolition of 78 privately-owned dwellings, and 
displaces approximately 220 families. Our Master Plan 
would require the demolition of about 25 buildings 
containing approximately 50 dwelling units to 
accommodate one of the parking garages; but no families 
would be displaced from the neighborhood because we 
propose that an equal number of replacement housing 
units be built right in the neighborhood, on the new 
east/west block south of 35th Street, and on currently 
vacant lots on Shields, Princeton, and Wells Streets. 
Some of the residents to be displaced by the construction of 
the sports facility south of the old Comiskey also offered 
the Armour Square Park site as a more appropriate location. 
According to a resident: 
I'm a sports fan, I'm an athlete. But why displace 
people? The team's owners could have moved the 
ballpark to the blocks now occupied by Armour Square 
Park ... That's more room than we have over here (Devall, 
1988a) . 
The loss of the Armour Square Park to the proposed 
ballpark was also addressed by Bess. He outlined the 
creation of two smaller parks on vacant land. The area 
which the old Comiskey Park covered, south of the proposed 
Armour Field facility, would also be transformed into a 
recreational area. That space would accommodate the 
activities of Armour Square Park, while being functional for 
the local community. 
Another interesting observation regards the proposed 
design of Armour Field. It takes us back to the golden era 
of baseball park construction between 1912 and 1914 when 
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Fenway Park, Ebbets Field and Wrigley Field were built. The 
distance from the top seat in the upper deck to the home 
plate at Wrigley Field is 210 feet. At the old Comiskey 
Park that same distance was 150 feet. The Armour Field 
proposal listed that distance at 225 feet. The baseball 
parks which have followed the architectural direction of the 
60's, 70's, and 80's present lengthier figures. 
Specifically, that same distance at the New Comiskey Park 
(250 feet), Riverfront Stadium (262 feet) and Royals Stadium 
(265 feet), indicates that viewing a game in those 
facilities is likely to generate a different feeling. 
The Armour Field Proposal: The Local Community 
In addition, this proposal attempted to accomplish 
something which recent stadium construction has been unable 
to; integrate the stadium structure into the existing 
environment of the local community. Bess indicated to me: 
One of the challenging aspects of stadium design is to 
integrate that facility into the city. Generating 
local development as a result of a project of this kind 
could be something which can be accomplished. Suburban 
style stadium developments need not respond to 
integration since they utilize superblocks. Here you 
have to take into consideration the existing 
boundaries. The physical layout of the community in 
the form of streets, blocks, parks ... should be 
preserved. 
Bess' plan called for nine acres of land around Armour 
Field to be designated for mix-use development. The 
development would produce retail stores, 480 condominium and 
rental units, studio housing, and other all-year round, 
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small-scale businesses and living quarters. On game days, 
the two and three story nature of these developments 
surrounding the ballpark, would allow the residents to 
escape the street traffic and enable them to view the game 
from their balconies. 
This urban structure would not impose itself on the 
physical environment. Rather it would blend and complement 
the local neighborhood. It would make the streets active 
and it would bring people closer together, providing 
opportunities for interaction. 38 
This proposed plan can be cited for its multiple 
positive contributions. The design of Armour Field can 
accommodate the construction of a new, single-purpose, 
contemporary ballpark with luxury boxes, while outlining the 
mystique of a classic ballpark. The proposal also ensures 
that displacement would not be the issue that it proved to 
be in the new Comiskey Park plan. The Armour Field proposal 
could have also assisted community development and could 
have served as a model for urban ballpark design. As Bess 
(1989:33) notes: "Our design of Armour Field itself was 
governed by a concern that it be a genuinely urban building, 
constrained by its block, with an architectural presence, 
scale, and monumentality befitting its status as a public 
38 This notion of mix-use development, emphasizing 
human interaction is similar to the ideas advocated by Jane 
Jacobs (1961), who was a strong critic of single-purpose 
urban design during the SO's. 
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building." 
The Armour Field Proposal: Its Defeat 
But if this proposal had so many positive implications 
for the city and the surrounding community, why did it not 
receive the attention it deserved? First the proposal 
received negative reviews from the architectural firm HOK of 
Kansas City, MO, which was retained by the franchise. 
According to HOK architects involved: "[speaking of the 
Armour Field proposal] it would be unwise to put stores and 
apartments so near a stadium" (Mccarron, 1987d) . Second, 
both the management of the White Sox and the City of 
Chicago, had an opportunity to review the Armour Field 
proposal, but they did not support the concept for different 
reasons. The White Sox were not interested in the urban 
ballpark concept, since they were sold on the revenue 
capabilities of the suburban model (Euchner 1993:158) On 
the other hand, the city did not want to address the 
multiple issues which the Armour Field proposal raised. The 
city, primarily interested in keeping the team in Chicago 
and fearing that the White Sox would move to St. Petersburg, 
FL, did not want to delay by debating the Bess proposal. 
With the change in administrations after the death of Mayor 
Washington, Mayor Sawyer worked to see the deal through as 
quickly as possible. 
Bess indicated to me that the close relationship 
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between the private and the public sectors in this case was 
the primary reason for the eventual defeat of his proposal. 
He noted: 
The assumption by the City was that whatever the White 
Sox wanted was good for Chicago residents. If one 
takes that approach then whatever the White Sox 
proposed was good for the public. The ownership of the 
White Sox, especially Reinsdorf, was fascinated with 
the Royals Stadium in Kansas City. Every team owner 
wanted one just like that. Why? Because it was the 
prototype at the time [being built in 1973) of not only 
the suburban-style stadium, but also the baseball-only 
facility. That's "big" and HOK had designed it. Well, 
the team recommended HOK and the City responded that 
HOK is good for Chicago. It is an interesting logic. 
Bess also felt that the implementation of his proposal 
would have been difficult, even if it had been supported by 
the management of the team and the city administration. 
Armour Square Park, the site of the proposed Armour Field, 
was a public park which served as a physical boundary 
between the white, middle-class Bridgeport neighborhood to 
the North and the African-American community to the South. 
According to the 1990 U.S. Census, the census track south of 
the old Comiskey was 99.9 percent African American (99.9 
percent in 1980) and the census track north of the ball park 
was 26.0 percent African American (20.6 percent in 1980). 
Bess told me: 
The proposal would have faced resistance from one of 
the neighborhoods to the North. We would probably be 
tied in court since that was public property and 
belonged to the Chicago Park District. 
The real threat to that community was not the loss of the 
park, since the proposal would replace the park with two 
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smaller parks in the area. Rather, it was the Armour Field 
location and the surrounding elements of that proposal 
(shops, adjacent residences, etc.). Armour Field could have 
been a catalyst, generating a lively neighborhood 
environment. The ballpark could have served as a "seam", 
between two racially distinct communities. Taking into 
consideration the long history of segregation in that 
general area, this proposal would have threatened the 
separation between these groups. 
It is unfortunate that the Armour Field proposal was 
never implemented since it will never be known what its 
implications for the community could have been. Once again, 
corporate interests prevailed at the expense of a plan which 
would have been responsive to both the interests of the 
franchise, as well as to the interests of those who live and 
work in the area. 
Attempting to Rebuild: Redevelopment After New Comiskey Park 
In 1988, South Armour Square residents began to 
investigate the effects of the physical reorganization 
resulting from the construction of the New Comiskey Park. 
The goal of the South Armour Neighborhood Coalition (SANC) , 
a community organization, was to consider these potential 
changes and create a plan aimed at rebuilding South Armour 
Square. One of the major community concerns was the loss of 
economic revenue, resulting from the removal of community 
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businesses. 
After applying for a City of Chicago community planning 
grant in 1988, the SANC completed a feasibility study in 
December of 1994 for the construction of a commercial 
shopping center in the area. The shopping center would 
replace the businesses destroyed by the stadium developers. 
The residents realized that with the removal of various 
small community goods stores, many dollars had left the 
local area. The goal of this plan was to reclaim that 
spending. 
The residents worked closely with The Natalie P. 
Voorhees Neighborhood Center at the University of Illinois 
at Chicago to advance their plans for community planning and 
community development. Upon completion of a market survey 
in South Armour Square, they concluded that a shopping 
center would generate the highest amount of income for the 
community. After reviewing four schematic design 
alternatives, they agreed on a shopping center which would 
include a convenient grocery store and a restaurant. Based 
on the market survey, the grocery store would be expected to 
generate $1.2 million in annual sales, whereas the 
restaurant could post $414,000 in annual sales. In 
addition, plans to add a video arcade to the shopping center 
as well as other retail space, is currently under review. 
The development would be located in the corner of Pershing 
Road and South Wentworth Avenue, south of the new stadium 
(South Armour Square Neighborhood Coalition Redevelopment 
Project, 1995) . 
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The community also agreed that this development would 
be owned and operated by the South Armour Square 
Neighborhood Coalition. This would be a consumer owned 
cooperative and according to the report, its goals would be 
to: (1) meet community needs for local goods and services, 
(2) employ community residents, (3) maintain local ownership 
and control, (3) ensure the quality of goods and services, 
and (4) capture community dollars. The coalition would rent 
space to entrepreneurs in the shopping center, ensuring that 
the economic benefits in spending remained in the 
neighborhood. According to the report, "the importance of 
community ownership of the development is key to the South 
Armour Neighborhood Coalition's efforts to rebuild 
community", and "this development would ensure the economic 
viability of the community" (p. 9). 
After observing the recent developments in South Armour 
Square, it becomes clear that out of the defeat which the 
community suffered in the form of displacement by the city, 
the state and the stadium developers, efforts to address 
various community concerns are currently underway. The 
question though remains as to the extent to which these 
efforts will be sustainable and whether the proposed 
benefits will materialize. 
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Conclusion 
Under the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority Act, 
according to a 1989 state audit, the taxpayers will pay $657 
million over the next 20 years to keep the White Sox in 
Chicago (Pearson and Mccarron, 1989). This study shows that 
this extraordinary amount of public spending is the outcome 
of a smooth functioning relationship between a professional 
franchise and the state. As a result, private, corporate 
interests become interconnected with public policy actions. 
At the same time, this case study reveals the vast 
inequalities, based on class and race, which exist in 
American society. A predominantly African-American, low-
income neighborhood becomes displaced in order for a stadium 
development to occur. The residents, excluded from the 
planning stages of this stadium project, are incapable of 
confronting, in a united manner, the powerful private 
interests as advanced by the state. In addition, other 
forms of societal inequalities become communicated. 
Specifically, the status and treatment of individuals who 
fall into different residential categories (homeowners, 
renters and public housing residents) varies. Thus, based 
on the relocation arrangements of this case, the homeowners 
received the best possible deal, followed by the renters, 
and as for the public housing residents, they were left 
behind to suffer the social consequences of the new stadium. 
The last conclusion which can be reached from this 
208 
analysis regards the increasing role and effect of sports in 
American society. As shown in this case study, stadium 
development plans proved influential in shaping the urban 
environment. The destruction of McCuddy's, a landmark area 
institution with a long history in the community; the 
removal of a tight knit neighborhood and the inability of 
small businessmen to sell their products outside the stadium 
due to the White Sox lease agreement, support the fact that 
life around the ballpark has been transformed. The 
rearrangement of the physical environment has implications 
which occur at the core of everyday, human experience. The 
reorganization of physical space then reshapes our social 
experiences. 
The stadium development plans of the White Sox extended 
beyond having merely political and economic implications. 
Their effect entered into the reorganization of the cultural 
fabric of the city. Thus sports are capable of 
reconstructing the urban terrain at the political, economic, 
as well as, at the cultural level. 
CHAPTER 7 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STADIUM DEVELOPMENT PLANS ON THE 
NORTH SIDE: THE LIGHTS INSTALLATION AT WRIGLEY FIELD 
Introduction 
The notion of symbolism and representation between 
professional franchises and cities is well exemplified in 
the case of the Chicago Cubs. Over the years, the Cubs have 
shown strong cultural connections with the city and the 
community surrounding Wrigley Field; Wrigleyville. 
According to Bart Giamatti, former National League 
President: "Most of our franchises, even the new ones, have 
sunk real roots ... the Cubs may have the deepest roots of 
all" (Holtzman, 1988). 
Wrigley Field has added to this long relationship 
between the City and the franchise. The continuation of 
daytime professional baseball at Wrigley Field was a 
connection to the past, something that no other professional 
baseball park in the country could offer. 
In the early 1980's, the Chicago Cubs expressed a 
strong interest in installing lights at Wrigley Field. The 
addition of lights, a stadium development plan, would 
provide for increased revenue in the form of television 
programming and increased attendance at the Cubs games. The 
franchise would have to convince the City Council to pass an 
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ordinance, making the conducting of night baseball games at 
Wrigley Field possible. The Cub's organization and the City 
would also have to persuade the residents surrounding the 
ballpark that night games would not threaten the existing 
status of their neighborhoods and would not deter from their 
lifestyles. 
The following two chapters comprise a case study which 
investigates this stadium development plan at Wrigley Field 
in Chicago. The first chapter provides an insight into the 
political economy surrounding this issue, while the second 
outlines the community response and community effects. It 
is important to note here that one cannot distinguish 
between politics, economics and community response. That in 
fact, political developments are interwoven with the 
community response. The segmentation of these areas into 
two sections is conducted for the purpose of organizing this 
project in a coherent manner and it is not intended to 
reflect a thematic split. 
While taking into consideration the above observation, 
the first chapter addresses: (1) the economic incentives for 
the Cubs, (2) the use of threats by the franchise to leave 
Chicago, (3) the use of economic impact studies to justify 
the importance of the Cubs for the local and state economies 
and rationalize state support, (4) the local politics 
surrounding this issue, and, (5) the role of the media. The 
media proves to be in a unique position. On the one hand it 
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part of the ownership of the Cubs, while on the other it is 
capable of influencing policy making. 
The second chapter investigates the community response 
and the long term implications for the community of Lake 
View. Specifically, some of the issues addressed in the 
second chapter of this case study include: (1) the strong 
community response to the lights issue and the community 
strategies utilized, (2) the ability of the community 
residents to maintain the city's commitment to 
improving/protecting the neighborhood after the installation 
of lights by applying continuous pressure, and (3) the 
effect(s) which this stadium development plan has had on the 
area surrounding the ballpark. Night games at Wrigley, the 
outcome of this stadium development project, have assisted 
in generating a cultural environment which has contributed 
to reshaping the local community area of Lake View. 
The case of the Chicago Cubs and the installation of 
lights at Wrigley Field extended for over a six year period. 
It is an example of a professional baseball team which, 
drawing from its perceived economic and social standing 
within a large metropolitan area, is able to enlist the 
support of Chicago politicians to achieve its goals. In 
addition, this case is an example of how stadium development 
plans, though aimed at advancing the corporate interests of 
its ownership, also assist in the creation of a culture 
which transforms the local urban environment. 
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Night Play in the Majors 
The introduction of playing baseball under the lights 
in Major League Baseball was primarily a response to reduced 
attendance at the ballpark during the Great Depression. The 
first night baseball game was played on May 24, 1935 in 
Crosley Field in Cincinnati. 39 The Reds experienced a 
sharp decrease in attendance during the early 1930's and in 
reaction to the small gate revenues, they were able to 
convince the league owners to permit baseball under the 
lights and reverse an existing rule passed by the National 
League which outlawed night baseball. 
The argument by the Reds concentrated on economics, 
noting that 70 percent of the income for the team during the 
1934 season derived from fifteen days-holidays, opening days 
and Sundays. Allowing lights would strengthen the 
attendance during the scheduled week day games, since such 
action would make the game available to more fans 
(Pietrusza, 1993). 
Even though a number of exhibition games followed, 
night baseball was perceived to be acceptable for the far 
39 Crosley Field was not the ballpark where the first 
night game in America was played. It was the minor and 
negro leagues which invented night baseball. E. Lee Keyser, 
president of the Class A Western League's Des Moines Demons 
installed permanent lights at a cost of $19,000 and the 
first game was played on May 2, 1930 between the Demons and 
the Wichita Aviators. The game was also nationally 
broadcast by NBC radio (Pietrusza, 1993). According to The 
New York Times: "In the opinion of many fans, the contest 
was viewed as clearly as a game played under daylight 
conditions" (Gershman, 1993:152). 
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away cities but not for the large metropolitan centers. In 
those large cities, the perception was that baseball was not 
the only form of entertainment and that night time should be 
reserved for the theater and other related, outing events. 
The issue of baseball under the lights became a unique event 
and spread throughout the league in the following years. 40 
Although night games eventually became fully accepted, 
related concerns persisted. Some felt that night games were 
not good for the future of the game. Playing at night 
limited the youngsters from corning to the ballpark, thus 
isolating the future supporters of the game. Others noted 
that the game would dramatically change since the players 
were becoming actors. Finally, others, such as Senators' 
owner, Clark Griffith responded in the early years of night 
baseball: "There is no chance of night baseball ever 
becoming popular in the biggest cities ... High-class baseball 
cannot be played at night under artificial light" and Phil 
Wrigley responded to Bill Veeck who attempted to convince 
the owner of the Cubs and Wrigley Field to install lights at 
the ballpark: "[lights are] just a fad. A passing fancy" 
(Gershman, 1993:155). 
The one thing clear about playing night baseball was 
its strong economic implications for the team owners. 
40 The Detroit Tigers were the last, before the Cubs, 
to play night baseball in 1948. The economics of night 
games was the primary reason for playing under the lights in 
Detroit (Atkins, 1988) . 
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During the first year of playing under the lights, the 
Cincinnati Reds brought 123,991 fans during 7 night games 
(17,713 avg. per game), while during the 69 other day games, 
324,256 (4,699 avg. per game) attended games at Crosley 
Field. At Ebbets Field, the Brooklyn Dodgers' first year of 
night games in 1938 averaged 30,000 spectators at night and 
only 4,000 during the day (Gershman, 1993) . 41 
In Search of Profits through Stadium Development Plans: 
The Installation of Lights 
After the death of Phil and Helen Wrigley in 1977, 
their son, Bill Wrigley took over the Cubs. In December of 
1980, the new owner discovered that he had to pay $40 
million in family estate and inheritance taxes to the 
federal government, and the states of Illinois, California, 
and Wisconsin. On June 17, 1981, the Tribune Company 
purchased the Cubs for $20.5 million. The Tribunes' 
holdings in Chicago included the influential Chicago 
Tribune, and the WGN broadcast station (WGN-Radio and 
WGN-TV). WGN-TV at the time, was broadcasting nationally, 
televised programming. In addition, the Tribune Co. owned 
many other smaller radio and television stations nation-
41 In later years, Phil Wrigley ordered lights for 
Wrigley Field, but after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, he 
changed his mind and donated the lights to the U.S. 
government. President Roosevelt later gave a boost to night 
baseball when he asked Commissioner Landis to extend night 
games because it provided an opportunity to the army day 
shift to view games (Jauss, 1988). 
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wide. 
The new ownership, from the very beginning, considered 
the Cubs an excellent addition to their other media 
holdings. In their view, the baseball franchise would 
complement WGN-TV and WGN radio. In the early 1980's, 
baseball franchises were reaching national markets through 
exclusive contracts with nationally broadcasting cable 
stations. Television stations like WOR-TV in New Jersey and 
the Superstation WTBS in Atlanta, were exclusively 
transmitting games of the New York Mets and the Atlanta 
Braves to audiences across America. The only limitation to 
those arrangements was the Major League television contract 
itself which had broadcasting priority over these cable 
stations. Because of these cable stations, the above 
mentioned baseball franchises, did not have to rely 
exclusively on the MLB contract with the big networks (ABC, 
CBS and NBC) as their only source of live television 
coverage. 
As a cable station that broadcasted nationally, WGN-TV 
viewed the Cubs as an excellent addition to their televised 
schedule. According to John Madigan, executive vice 
president of the Tribune Co., the Cubs were a "good 
programming" opportunity. In responding to the motivation 
behind the purchasing of the Cubs, Madigan noted: 
It was the opportunity to control live programming 
which is the most important thing to a television and 
radio station- live programming, good programming 
(Gershman, 1993:218). 
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The goal of Tribune Co., was to make the Cubs a 
nation-wide entertainment product. In order for that to be 
accomplished, the Cubs would have to play at night, enabling 
the team to reach a wider national market. As a result, the 
Chicago Cubs became part of the corporatization of American 
sports. 
According to a survey conducted by Market Facts, Inc., 
for the Chicago Cubs in the Chicago metropolitan area during 
the month of September in 1985, lights at Wrigley Field 
would allow for more games to be broadcast on television 
during the evenings, thus capturing a bigger market. Of 
those surveyed, 38% indicated that night baseball at Wrigley 
Field would provide them with an opportunity to view more 
Cubs games on television. Only 11.6% noted that, under 
these circumstances, they would view less Cubs games on 
television and for 48.7%, lights at Wrigley wouldn't make 
much difference in their television game viewing habits 
(Chicago Cubs, 1985a) . 
Wrigley Field: Chicago's Favorite 
The possibility of lights at Wrigley Field became of 
interest to many in the Chicagoland area. The franchise 
conducted a general public survey in the Fall of 1985 to 
find out how the general public in the 6-county area felt 
about the lights issue, Wrigley Field and the Cubs (Chicago 
Cubs, 1985a). This study was eventually employed to support 
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the Cubs' request for lights at Wrigley. 
According to the survey which was prepared by Market 
Facts, Inc., the Cubs were Chicago's favorite professional 
baseball team (51.4%). Among those who considered 
themselves to be baseball fans, 77.4% noted the Cubs as 
their favorite baseball team. 
The survey also investigated how the general public 
felt about lights at Wrigley. Among those who considered 
themselves to be baseball fans, 31.7% felt that lights 
should not be installed at Wrigley or be available for 
post-season play only. For those who fell in this same 
category of opposing lights/restricted use of lights, 15.5% 
did not want to see lights at the ballpark under any 
circumstances. The majority of the respondents though 
(64.6%), were willing to accept either unrestricted use of 
lights, or lights at 18 to 20 games during the season. 
Among them, 43.6% were willing to have only unrestricted use 
of lights. When fan respondents were asked to choose 
between having some night baseball at Wrigley Field vs. a 
new stadium for the Cubs, 59.8% chose baseball under the 
lights and 35.6% responded that they would accept a new Cubs 
stadium. 
This last finding is surprising since one would expect 
that a much smaller number of respondents would be willing 
to see the Cubs play at a ballpark other than Wrigley Field. 
That acceptance of a new stadium for the Cubs was even more 
unexpected when one takes into consideration the strong 
rating which Wrigley Field received amongst fans in that 
same survey. 
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When asked to rate the ballpark, the majority of the 
fans viewed Wrigley as an 'excellent' or 'very good' 
ballpark, 31% and 28.6% respectively. Only 10% rated 
Wrigley as 'fair', and an unsubstantial percentage of 1.9% 
rated Wrigley as 'poor'. The mean of the responses in 
regards to rating was 3.79 (5=excellent, 4=very good, 
3=good, 2=fair and l=poor), certainly a favorable rating. 
In further investigating what makes Wrigley Field an 
'excellent' ballpark, fans noted the traditional aspect and 
history of the park (19.3%-net), the friendliness and 
comfort, including the type of neighborhood in which it is 
located (24.3%-net), the traditional characteristics which 
the ballpark exemplifies, such as the ivy (28.9%-ne~) and 
the good seating/layout of the ballpark making every seat a 
good seat for viewing the game (28.4%-net). Based upon the 
information provided by this survey it becomes clear that 
fans in the Chicago metropolitan area have a great sense of 
appreciation for the Cubs and Wrigley Field. 
Another study conducted by the Chicago Cubs on the 
neighborhood residents (Chicago Cubs, 1985b), showed that 
the majority of those living close to Wrigley Field viewed 
the presence of the Cubs as an asset to the area. 
Specifically, 77.6 percent of those residing zero to half a 
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mile from the ballpark, and 91.0 percent of those residing a 
half a mile to one mile from the ballpark agreed with the 
statement that the ttCubs are an asset to the neighborhood.tt 
All this data was used by the Cubs in their efforts to 
convince the City of Chicago that they were worthy of lights 
at Wrigley and that their presence in Chicago was positive 
for Chicagoland and local residents. Yet, this approach was 
challenged by the local community. They charged that the 
Cubs' indication of overwhelming support by the local 
residents toward the Cubs and Wrigley Field was inaccurate. 
The Issue of the Lights 
It was just a few months after the Cubs were bought by 
the Tribune Co., on March 10, 1982, that, under the 
leadership of General Manager, Dallas Green the franchise 
announced publicly its intent to install lights at Wrigley 
Field. According to Green, if the lights are not allowed: 
ttwe'll have to think about playing in another ballparktt 
(Wrigley Lights Chronology, 1988:6). 
A few months later, the Illinois House of 
Representatives passed a bill that would make night-time 
sporting events a violation of the Illinois noise pollution 
law. The law would apply to sporting facilities where night 
sports had not been played before July 1, 1982. The 
amendment noted: 
Baseball, football, or soccer sporting events played 
during nighttime hours, by professional athletes, in a 
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city with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants, in a stadium 
at which such nighttime events were not played prior to 
July 1, 1982, shall be subject to nighttime noise 
emission regulations promulgated by the Illinois 
Pollution Control Board (Note, 1987: 372). 
Governor Thompson supported the legislation which 
banned night baseball in Wrigley Field. Thompson noted 
after signing the legislature on August 23, 1982: "Wrigley 
Field is located in an old, established neighborhood ... 
[night baseball] would impose an undue hardship on nearly 
60,000 residents who live within a four-block area of the 
stadium (Wrigley Lights Chronology, 1988:6). 
A year later on August 25, 1983, the alderman of the 
Wrigley Field neighborhood, in response to the Cubs' 
request, proposed and eventually convinced the City Council 
to pass an ordinance (42-2 vote) to the Municipal Code of 
Chicago. The ordinance made illegal, night sporting events 
in a facility with more than 15,000 seats which is within 
500 feet of residences of 100 or more units (Elie, 1986) 
In 1984 the Chicago Cubs advanced at the National 
League's playoffs. Peter Ueberroth, Commissioner of Major 
League Baseball announced that post-season play should be 
played under a night atmosphere and he threatened to move 
future Cubs' postseason games to St. Louis. The franchise 
filed a suit in late 1984, in hopes to reverse the city and 
state anti-lights legislation on the grounds of being 
unconstitutional. The community around Wrigley Field was 
represented by the Lake View Citizens Council (LVCC) and 
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challenged the Cubs' suit. Both the Cook County Circuit 
Court and the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the 
franchises' request to allow the installation of lights 
(Elie, 1986) . 
Judge Richard Curry of the Cook County Circuit Court 
wrote in his ruling: 
On the basis of an alleged necessity to play 
championship games at night, they ask for a reversal of 
the status quo which has existed at this ballpark for 
70 years (Wrigley Lights Chronology, 1988:6). 
And, 
Tinkering with the quality-of-life aspirations of 
countless households so that television royalties might 
more easily flow into the coffers of twenty-five 
distant sports moguls is ... repugnant to common decency 
(Gershman, 1993:220). 
The quality of life argument put forth by this judge was 
similar to the position taken by the community residents. 
The Economic Development Commission in Chicago was 
interested in finding out how the public in Lake View and in 
the city of Chicago perceived the issue of lights at Wrigley 
Field. The commission retained Elrick and Lavidge, Inc. 
which in the Fall of 1987 prepared a report (Economic 
Development Commission of the City of Chicago, 1987). The 
study identified three different groups to question: (1) 
those who lived within one half mile of Wrigley Field 
(Close-in Lake View) bounded by 1600 W. Ashland, 3200 N. 
Belmont, Lake Shore Drive and 4200 N. Berteau; (2) those who 
lived between half a mile and one mile from Wrigley Field 
(Expanded Lake View) bounded by 2000 W. Darnen, 2600 N. 
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Wrightwood, Lake Michigan and 4600 N. Wilson, and (3) those 
who lived over one mile from Wrigley Field but still resided 
within the city limits (Greater Chicago) . 
The overall reaction to the installation of lights in 
Wrigley Field by location showed that those who lived closer 
to the ballpark were more likely to oppose the installation 
of lights than those who resided further away from the 
sports facility. Specifically, of those who lived within 
one half mile from the facility, 32% favored, 52% opposed 
and 16% had no opinion on the installation of lights. 
Amongst those who lived between one half mile and a mile 
from the ballpark, 33% favored lights, 36% opposed lights 
and 31% had no opinion on the issue. Finally, amongst those 
in the Greater Chicago group, 49% indicated support for the 
lights, 22% opposed and 29% had no opinion on the subject. 
It is important to note here that the differences in the 
percentages between the Close-in, Lake View respondents and 
the responses of those in the Expanded Lake View group were, 
according to the report, statistically significant. From 
these findings it becomes clear that the lights were a 
neighborhood issue since the residents in that area felt 
that they would be directly affected by their installation. 
This report by the Economic Development Commission of 
the City of Chicago (1987) provided additional findings 
between the three groups regarding the issue of lights. 
Specifically, all three groups equally agreed that the city 
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of Chicago would suffer if the Cubs were to move to the 
suburbs. Yet, respondents from the close-in Lake View 
sample were more likely than the other two groups to agree 
that the installation of lights would negatively impact the 
atmosphere at the ballpark. Respondents from all three 
groups also agreed that the neighborhood would not be better 
off if the Cubs moved elsewhere and that the franchise 
should not move to a new stadium with lights. 
Regarding the Cubs' threat of leaving Wrigley Field if 
they could not install lights, amongst those who opposed the 
lights, 22% in the close-Lake View category, fearing the 
loss of the Cubs, would now approve their installation 
compared to 40% (Expanded Lake View) and 42% (Greater 
Chicago). On the other hand, regardless of the threats, 72% 
(close-in Lake View) continued to oppose the lights, as did 
53% of the respondents from the "Expanded Lake View" sample 
and 46% of the respondents from the "Greater Chicago" 
sample. 
Amongst those favoring lights at Wrigley Field, the 
three most frequently mentioned reasons for that support 
included: (1) increasing attendance, (2) keeping the Cubs in 
Wrigley Field, and (3) the team being good for Chicago. 
Other, less frequently mentioned reasons for favoring the 
lights included: (1) being that other teams have lights and 
play night games, there is no reason why the Cubs should not 
play night games too, (2) lights would provide increased 
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revenue for the city and the team, and (3) lights would 
enable post-season play at Wrigley. 
On the other hand, among those who opposed lights, the 
most frequently mentioned reason was the effect which the 
lights would have on the neighborhood resulting in the 
deterioration of the community, including the general 
disruption in the form of increased traffic, trash, fan 
rowdiness and noise. A much smaller group opposed the 
lights because they felt that the tradition and the 
uniqueness of day-only-play at the ballpark would be 
jeopardized. 
The Threat of Moving Out of Wrigley Field: 
Its Implications for Chicago 
With the Chicago Cubs receiving heated opposition from 
the residents around Wrigley Field, discussions of the Cubs 
moving out of the "friendly confines" surfaced. The threats 
became even more serious after the failure of legal efforts 
by the Cubs to get lights at Wrigley. A spokesman for the 
team on June 30, 1985 indicated that "the lights issue is 
dead" making the consideration of moving out of Wrigley 
Field a strong possibility (Wrigley Lights Chronology, 
1988:6). A number of different scenarios were speculated. 
One scenario saw the Cubs move into a new, multi-purpose, 
domed stadium with the Chicago Bears. Another viewed an 
attempt by the Cubs to move out of Chicago to the nearby 
suburbs, specifically to Schaumburg, Illinois (Cappo, 1985). 
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A Cubs move under either of the above mentioned 
scenarios would have meant that Wrigley Field would become 
the possible victim of a wrecking ball. Along with that, 
the history of the ballpark would also disappear. According 
to Donald Grenesko, the Cubs vice president for operations: 
"Lights is still our first choice and without them we cannot 
stay at Wrigley" (Mccarron and Burton, 1986) . That was a 
frightening thought for many in Chicago. According to an 
editorial in the Crain's Chicago Business (6/24/85, p. 10) 
the loss of Wrigley would be the loss of a Chicago 
trademark: 
A domed stadium may be a good deal for the Bears and 
the White Sox. And we can't recall anyone praising the 
delights of watching games at Soldiers Field, Comiskey 
Park or the Chicago Stadium. But Wrigley Field is one 
of Chicago's greatest treasures - right up there with 
the Chicago Theater and the rest of the 
preservantionists' causes. As Cubs General Manager 
Dallas Green recently gushed to Chicago Tribune 
columnist Jerome Holtzman: "I'm not the same guy I was 
in '81 and '82 ... Wrigley Field is a landmark. It's 
Chicago." 
That same editorial, fearing that the Tribune Co., 
would pull the Cubs out to the suburbs called for a 
settlement between the two sides. Specifically, since the 
owners were willing to be satisfied with 20 night games 
during the season, the residents should give in a little and 
meet them half way, thus allowing lights at Wrigley and 
ensuring the presence of Wrigley Field for the years to 
come: 
Tribune Co. made it clear that the Cubs will play night 
baseball sooner or later-at Wrigley Field or elsewhere. 
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The company's compromise offer-no more than 20 night 
games a year and expanded seating in the upper 
decks-sounds reasonable to us. If the company can be 
held to those terms, we'll back it. The Wrigley 
neighbors should do likewise. 
At this point the Chicago Cubs began to pressure the 
city, documenting the positive economic effects which the 
franchise generated for Chicago. First, they commissioned a 
neighborhood survey and then they prepared a detailed 
economic impact study. The ownership of the Cubs publicized 
the results of the survey and the impact study, outlining 
the need for serious consideration of their request. 
The survey conducted by the Cubs showed that an 
overwhelming majority of those living close to Wrigley Field 
indicated that their neighborhood would be negatively 
affected if the Cubs were to move out of the area. 
Specifically, 61.2 percent of those living zero to half a 
mile from Wrigley Field and 73.9 percent of those who lived 
half a mile to a mile from the ballpark indicated a negative 
effect on the community if the Cubs were to move. The 
majority of the respondents cited negative economic/business 
effects on the local community (Chicago Cubs, 1985b). This 
data, was intended to motivate the City of Chicago rethink 
its position. The report was also meant to communicate the 
possibility that if the city of Chicago did not take into 
consideration the positive economic benefits which the Cubs 
generate, it is certain that another community would grant 
the franchises' wishes. What strengthened the position of 
the Cubs even more was the results of their commissioned 
economic impact study. 
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In 1986, the franchise employed the consulting services 
of Melaniphy and Associates, to prepare an economic analysis 
report. The study, outlining the economic impact, concluded 
that $90.7 million are contributed annually by the Cubs to 
the Chicago's economy. Of that contribution, $37 million 
came from direct economic benefits, while $31.4 million came 
from "indirect benefits." That second figure was arrived at 
by considering the $12.2 million spent on concessions, $8.1 
million on restaurants and bars, $3.5 million on business 
which the Cubs organization provided to local suppliers, 
licensed and unlicensed parking from the games accounted for 
an additional $3.6 million, $2.5 million from the use of 
hotels and CTA services, $600,000 from taxi, bus charter and 
gasoline, $600,000 was added from fan expenditures at retail 
stores and from street vending, and $300,000 from towing and 
parking fines (Melaniphy and Associates, 1986) . 
The report also added another $22.3 million in Cubs 
related spending to the Chicago economy through the use of a 
multiplier effect contribution using a 3.2 percent 
multiplier figure. This income is accrued to neighborhood 
residents and others in the city of Chicago as a result of 
the presence and activities of the Cubs in the economy 
(Melaniphy and Associates, 1986). The 3.2 figure is 
considerably higher from those employed by other studies 
which also aim at estimating the economic impact of 
professional franchises on local economies. 
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This same study also identified the revenue, in the 
form of taxes, which the Chicago Cubs contribute to the 
State of Illinois and Cook County. According to this 
report, an estimated $2.9 million in State of Illinois taxes 
and $26,000 in Cook County property taxes resulted from the 
spending generated by the presence of the Chicago Cubs. Of 
the state generated taxes, approximately $1.4 million were 
in the form of income taxes, $620,000 was from concession 
related activities, $400,000 from restaurant/bar spending, 
$134,000 from hotel related uses, while service stations and 
overall gas taxes added another $41,000. The report 
outlined an additional $30,000 in taxes resulting from 
retail and vendor sales and $10,000 in utility taxes in the 
forms of phone, electricity and natural gas usage (Melaniphy 
and Associates, 1986). 
Finally this study reported the direct and indirect tax 
revenue contributed to the City of Chicago as a result of 
the Cubs' presence. The overall amount was estimated at 
$2.8 million annually. The taxes paid to the City as a 
result of direct economic activities due to the Cubs were 
identified at $1.2 million; $649,000 from amusement taxes; 
$223,000 from property taxes, $122,000 from concession 
taxes; $46,000 from parking; $36,000 from utility taxes; 
$18,000 from employment and direct sales taxes and $60,000 
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from miscellaneous taxes. The city taxes generated by 
indirect activities were estimated at $131,000; $43,000 from 
hotel sales, bus fares and parking tickets; $80,000 from 
restaurant and bar spending; and $8,000 from vendor, service 
station and retail spending. Other indirect revenue in the 
form of taxes included the amounts generated by CTA and 
parking tickets, totaling $1.5 million (Melaniphy and 
Associates, 1986). 
If the franchise had not made its point to the city 
officials that loosing the Cubs to another city would have 
serious economic implications for Chicago with this report, 
another report prepared by the City's Department Economic 
Development in 1986, strengthened the economic importance of 
the Cubs even more. This three month study not only 
accepted the findings of the Chicago Cubs' economic impact 
study, but concluded that the overall economic contribution 
of a baseball team to the city of Chicago was even higher, 
at approximately $100 million annually. The study stated 
that: "It is interesting to note that the consulting reports 
prepared [for the two baseball teams in Chicago] come to 
remarkably similar conclusions about the total impact of a 
baseball team on the local economy--about $100 million" 
(Department of Economic Development, 1986:2). 
The city commissioned study also proposed that the 
Cubs' previous economic impact report did not consider 
additional revenue for the City of Chicago in the form of 
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taxes which would result from multiplier economic 
activities. Specifically: 
The Department added two other sources of tax revenues 
to the list identified by the [Cubs] consultant. About 
2.5 percent of state income taxes are returned to the 
city of Chicago; thus, a baseball team will generate at 
least $23,000 for the city coffers. More 
significantly, the consultants [for the White Sox and 
the Cubs] did not consider the fact that the multiplier 
activity generated by a baseball team will lead to 
added tax revenues. Using rough ratios of City, County 
and State revenues to economic activity, we made a very 
crude estimate of how much revenue this added activity 
produces (Department of Economic Development, 1986:7). 
As a result of these multiplier activities, the added 
revenue in taxes for the State of Illinois was estimated by 
this city sponsored study to be between $1.8 and $2.5 
million. For Cook County, it was estimated to be between 
$77,000 and $107,000 (pp. 22). For the City of Chicago 
these additional tax revenues were estimated to be between 
$230,000 and $319,000 (pp. 24). 
The information provided by these reports helped the 
Cubs with their demands for lights. Robert Mier, 
commissioner of Economic Development during the Washington 
and Sawyer administrations, and mayoral advisor on stadium 
issues, warned at a 1988 city council committee meeting that 
the issue of the lights might become the reason for the Cubs 
leaving Wrigley Field and possibly Chicago. Mier also noted 
that his experience would support such possibility. He 
said: 
I have always taken business seriously when they say 
they have problems and are going to move. I've seen 
too many say that, and when there is no solution, they 
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move (Strong, 1988a). 
Accounting for the importance of the Cubs in the local and 
state economic spheres, in ways that very few other 
businesses can demonstrate, made the political leadership 
more attentive and eager to resolve any of their concerns, 
and to ensure that the city did not lose a viable economic 
and social partner. 
The Politics of the Lights at Wrigley Field 
Advancing the lights proposal within the political 
arena and convincing the City Council to pass a related 
ordinance proved to be a process which included various 
components. Threats, the media, mayoral politics, and 
political power, all played a role in a process which ended 
with an approval of night games at Wrigley Field by the 
Chicago City Council. 
The Lights Issue During Mayor Washington 
Mayor Harold Washington, fearing the loss of the Cubs 
and the perceived economic benefits that the team provided 
Chicago, attempted in October of 1986 to bring together 
local community leaders and representatives from the 
franchise to resolve the lights issue. He sponsored 
numerous, close door discussions and two open summits 
between the two sides and the city. However, his efforts 
did not bring success since opposition by the community 
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persisted. 
What pushed Mayor Washington to take a stronger stance 
on the issue was a threat made by the Cubs in May of 1987. 
Specifically, if the franchise was not allowed to install 
lights at Wrigley by the following year, they would move to 
St. Louis .and play their post-season games on the astroturf 
of Busch Memorial Stadium. 42 
In July of 1987, Mayor Washington, pressured by the 
turn of events, took an approach which he felt would be fair 
to both the Cubs and the neighborhood residents; he openly 
supported a limited number of regular season games to be 
played under the lights at Wrigley Field. This compromising 
approach to the issue also received the support of the City 
Council, since Washington's political stature allowed him to 
easily recruit the necessary votes. In early November of 
1987, the passage of an ordinance by the Council seemed just 
weeks away. The ordinance would allow the Cubs to play 8 
night games during the 1988 season and 18 night games every 
season thereafter. But with the death of the mayor two 
weeks after, the lights issue lost political direction and 
the endorsed plan lost momentum. 
42 St. Louis and the Cardinals had been long 
archrivals and the possibility of a playoff game being 
played there would surely be not accepted or forgiven by 
Chicagoans. 
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The Loss of Political Direction After Washington 
Early in 1988, the incoming Mayor Sawyer announced his 
support for the Washington plan. Yet, the new mayor had 
lost some of the support of the City Council which his 
predecessor had so easily enlisted in the past. The 
repealing of a noise ordinance, which stood in the way of 
lights at Wrigley Field, under the Washington administration 
was almost surely to occur. Yet, now under the Sawyer 
leadership it seemed impossible. 43 
The situation became even more complicated when Ald. 
Bobby Rush (2nd Ward), chair of the Energy, Environmental 
Protection and Public Utilities committee, held a public 
hearing on the issue in January 1988. Though Rush openly 
advocated the 18 regular game night proposal, his action not 
only delayed the possible repeal, but also fueled the hope 
of the residents to, if not eliminate the lights plan at 
Wrigley, at least slow down its process. At that hearing, 
both city officials and representatives of the Tribune Co. 
urged for a city approval of the installation of lights at 
Wrigley Field (Mccarron and Devall, 1988). 
Increasingly, because of the time delay to revisit the 
43 One way to advance the idea of lights at Wrigley 
was to limit the plan for seat expansion proposed by the 
Cubs and provide additional parking. The Cubs would also 
limit the 3:05 p.m. game starts to 7 from the usual 29. It 
was believed that this proposal would be more attractive to 
the residents around the ballpark. Yet, even with these 
concessions the anti-lights activists with the support of 
Ald. Bernard Hansen (44th Ward), continued their strong 
opposition (Devall and Mccarron, 1988). 
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issue, Ald. Hansen (44th Ward) began to generate support 
from colleagues in the City Council to stop the installation 
of lights in his ward. For example, although Ald. William 
Banks (36th Ward) on the far west side of the city had no 
directive from his constituency on the issue, supported 
Hansen. Other aldermen showed similar support, since in the 
absence of Mayor Washington, to advocate for an elected 
official who represented the interests of his constituency 
seemed most collegial (Strong, 1988a). 
The Passage of the Lights Ordinance 
Mayor Sawyer pushed for the passage of an ordinance by 
lobbying the support of other aldermen on the issue. Along 
with the Cubs, the mayor underscored the importance of the 
lights issue since the franchise was ready to submit a 
proposal for the 1990 All-Star Baseball Game to be played at 
Wrigley Field. 44 
Ald. Rush (2nd ward) criticized the mayor for his 
political maneuvering and charged that Sawyer wanted to 
"pass a barebones ordinance granting lights without adequate 
neighborhood protections or city wide benefits." Fearing 
that the mayor's move to rally aldermanic support would mean 
a soon to be released mayoral proposal, Rush, prematurely 
44 The Cubs strongly advocated the importance of an 
All-Star game in Chicago, since, according to the 
management, it would mean an additional $15 to $35 million 
to the local economy (Solomon, 1988). 
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offered a new ordinance which would allow night baseball 
under conditions which would be responsive to the community 
demands (Strong and Sly, 1988). 
The Rush ordinance failed. A Sawyer proposal then 
offered to repeal the existing law and allow the 
installation of lights at Wrigley Field. The terms of the 
mayor's proposal could be characterized as "pro-Cubs" since 
the desired economic outcomes from lights at Wrigley Field 
would come from national television programming and its 
related advertising revenue. After the proposal received 
the support of the Environment and Energy Committee (7-2 
committee vote), Mayor Sawyer responded: 
Thanks to the input of the residents of the community 
and the responsiveness of the Chicago Cubs, I'm 
confident that we have come up with a compromise 
proposal which will ensure that one of America's most 
loved baseball teams stays in Chicago for all of us to 
enjoy (Strong, 1988c). 
Ald. Hansen (44th) viewed the proposal as insensitive 
to the feelings and concerns which the residents of his ward 
repeatedly expressed. Hansen unsuccessfully attempted to 
delay a full city council vote after a March 15 scheduled 
referendum on the issue by voters in 21 precincts of the 
44th and 46th wards (the area surrounding Wrigley Field) 
(Strong, 1988c) . 
On February 25, 1988, the mayoral proposal was approved 
by the city council (29 for-19 against-2 absent) . An effort 
to delay the vote until after the March 15 referendum by 
Ald. Luis Gutierrez (26th Ward) was defeated by a 28-19 
236 
council vote, as was an effort by Ald. Lawrence Bloom (5th 
ward) who proposed to (1) provide the city with the right to 
repeal the lights vote if the neighborhood improvement plan 
was not implemented, and, (2) commit the Cubs to play all 
home games in Chicago until 2002 (Solomon, 1988). 
The Role of the Media 
The role of the media in this case proved to be 
significant. Specifically, the media served as a link 
between economic development and cultural representation. 
The Cubs utilized social/cultural and economic rationales to 
convince the city and its political leadership that the 
passage of a city ordinance to allow lights at Wrigley Field 
was necessary. In terms of social/cultural reasoning, the 
Cubs publicized opinion survey results which showed the 
strong connection between the residents and the team. 
Similarly, the franchise argued its economic contributions 
at the state, county, city and even neighborhood level by 
promoting the findings of its economic impact studies. In 
this regard, the team utilized the media to advance its 
stadium development plans. 
The Chicago Tribune became a corporate tool as the 
Tribune Co. attempted to advance its business interests. 
The newspaper took strong positions against politicians and 
anti-lights advocates when the momentum seemed to shift away 
from the passing of a lights ordinance. In this regard, the 
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media played a dual role in both owning the Cubs and in 
having the ability to influence public policy making. 
For example, a 1988 editorial by the Chicago Tribune 
(1988a) referred to those aldermen who once supported the 
lights installation, and now were having second thoughts on 
the subject as "boneheads." Specifically, the editorial 
read: 
Suddenly, some old Washington supporters who were for 
the lights compromise now are against it. Maybe it is 
just coincidence that they are the same boneheads who 
keep trying to thwart commercial and residential growth 
in the city and get criticized by the newspaper for it. 
But not likely. The only change from the 
Vrdolyak-Madigan days is that it is a different set of 
political manipulators who think they can silence or 
negate Tribune editorial criticism and undercut a mayor 
at the same time (pp. 22). 
At the same time the Chicago Tribune editorial reminded 
the city that it was not charged to support the Tribune Co. 
and influence the installation of lights at Wrigley Field: 
And in case that anyone still thinks that Cub decision-
making and editorial position-taKing have any 
connection, consider this: if the Tribune editorial 
board had any say in Cubs policy, the team would long 
since have had enough of political rebuffs and 
runarounds, and be ready to move into a new Wrigley 
Field replica in the suburbs. And the opponents of the 
lights would be trying to figure out whether to pave 
over the hole in the ground left at Clark and Addison 
(pp. 22) . 
The editorial angered many city politicians who saw it 
as an attack on their political integrity. Ald. Rush (2nd 
ward) who had been an advocate of the lights at Wrigley 
responded: 
If the vote were right now, I feel as a result of this 
editorial this [ordinance] would fail 50 to O ... I think 
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they [Cubs] are obviously impatient with the democratic 
process. Maybe they want a back-room deal to be signed 
by a rubber stamp council. That's not going to happen 
(Strong, 1988b). 
For others, the editorial was viewed as an effort by 
the Tribune Co. to move the Cubs to the suburbs and place 
the blame on the city council (Dellios, 1988) . Regardless 
of the intent, the editorial brought the issue once again to 
the forefront of the city's agenda. For the Cubs this was 
especially important at a time when, after the death of 
Mayor Washington, the passing of an ordinance was clearly 
off-track as politicians began to view the lights issue as 
an opportunity to test their own political power. 
The Chicago Tribune also charged the anti-lights 
activists as self-serving and insincere. Columnist Mike 
Royko, for example, attacked Ald. Hansen (44th ward), 
identifying the adlerman's attempts to stop the Cubs from 
installing lights at Wrigley Field as inconsistent with 
other community issues. Because of night games at the 
ballpark, Hansen contended that late evening drinking by the 
fans would negatively affect the community and cause serious 
problems for the residents. According to Royko, the 
alderman should also attempt to control the late drinking of 
the 200 or so bars in his precinct. Royko wrote: 
Hansen seems to be perfectly content to have a million 
people getting drunk in his ward year in and year out. 
He just wants to prevent Cubs fans from having a few 
beers before the 7th inning, 18 evenings a year ... With 
200 bars in his [Hansen's] ward ... that probably 
explains how he gets elected (Royko, 1988). 
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Even at the end, after the passage of the lights 
ordinance, a Chicago Tribune editorial (1988b) charged that 
the anti-lights community activists were "still determined 
to make the Cubs play only day baseball game or leave town." 
The editorial once again blamed the Chicago politicians as 
being responsible for sacrificing economic development and 
the strengthening of Chicago's neighborhoods by acting in 
ways which advanced their personal political agendas over 
the good of the public. It described the lights issue to 
"have served best as a diversion of attention from more 
critical urban problems that are paralyzing Chicago, its 
neighborhoods and its political leadership." The editorial 
concluded by congratulating the Cubs' civic actions of 
bringing an All-Star game to Chicago. 
The role of the media proved extremely influential in 
advancing the interests of the franchise. The Chicago 
Tribune worked to support the installation of lights at 
Wrigley Field by communicating the social/cultural and 
economic value of the team to Chicagoland residents. At the 
same time, the newspaper engaged in agenda building, a 
political function of the media. Specifically, through its 
editorials, the newspaper ensured that the installation of 
lights at Wrigley Field remained an issue of concern for 
Chicago's government. Yet, the inherent conflict of 
interest in the relationship between the newspaper and the 
issue of the lights proved to be an advantage for the Cubs 
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as they searched for approval of their stadium development 
plans. 
Conclusion 
The process through which the installation of lights at 
Wrigley Field occurred is a good example of how a 
professional franchise is capable of advancing its business 
interests through stadium development plans. The ownership 
of the franchise was successful, regardless of the strong 
opposition by the residents, in convincing the City Council 
that lights at Wrigley Field were more important than the 
potential negative quality of life effects of the 
surrounding residents. 
The process of advancing these stadium development 
plans can be categorized into four general areas: (1) 
economic rationales, (2) social/cultural factors, (3) 
political developments, and (4) media effects. The 
franchise successfully outlined, through its own studies, 
the economic contributions which it makes to the City, the 
County and the State. At the same time, the city itself 
supported these projections. In the process, legitimate 
questions related to the method and utilization of these 
analyses never surfaced. Similarly, the franchise also 
convinced the public and the elected officials that the Cubs 
are an important element of the social fabric of the city, 
making the team worthy of special attention. 
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The issue of the installation of lights at Wrigley 
Field also became an issue of political will after Mayor 
Washington's death. Political opponents of Mayor Sawyer saw 
the installation of lights as an opportunity to showcase or 
test their political power. Though most Chicago aldermen 
supported an even more "pro Cubs" lights proposal advanced 
by late Mayor Washington than the one proposed by Mayor 
Sawyer, many became populists and supported the neighborhood 
anti-lights campaign. In reality, with mayoral elections in 
the near future, the lights issue became an opportunity for 
these politicians to put forth an early challenge to Mayor 
Sawyer. In the end, not even a referendum proved capable of 
changing the will of the city in passing a lights ordinance. 
The media also played an important role. The Tribune 
Co., utilized the Chicago Tribune to advance its interests 
by shaping public perceptions. In the process, the 
arguments favoring the franchises' position were furthered. 
The following chapter continues the investigation of 
this stadium development plan by addressing the community 
response and community effects. In this regard, the chapter 
also discusses the ability of the community to maintain the 
support of the city in its efforts to address the 
implications of the lights installation at Wrigley Field. 
Finally, the chapter outlines the community effects of this 
stadium development plan in Chicago, including how lights at 
Wrigley, a stadium development plan, have contributed in 
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reshaping this part of the city. 
CHAPTER 8 
TURNING THE LIGHTS ON AN URBAN COMMUNITY: THE IMPACT OF 
WRIGLEY FIELD ON LAKE VIEW IN CHICAGO 
Introduction 
After a brief profile of the community of Lake View, 
this chapter is divided into two sections. The first 
section investigates the community response to this stadium 
development plan, the community strategies utilized by the 
residents, and the creation of the "Neighborhood Protection 
and Improvement Plan." This plan showcases the success of 
this community in ensuring that Lake View remains a focal 
point for both the city government and the Cubs after the 
installation of lights at Wrigley Field. 
The second section concentrates on the community 
effects of this stadium development plan. The installation 
of lights contributed in reshaping the culture of this area. 
In this regard, this stadium development plan can be viewed 
to have effected this community in two ways. On the one 
hand, lights at Wrigley assisted in producing a vibrant 
night life within the community and contributed to 
gentrification. On the other hand, the long term effects of 
this plan could include a much different type of coexistence 
between Wrigley Field and Lake View. The presence of this 
. .. 
ballpark within a residential community might cease to 
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describe the future relationship between Wrigley Field and 
Lake View. Thus, stadium development plans can directly and 
indirectly affect the urban environment. 
The Community of Lake View 
Lake View is an old established community located on 
the north side of downtown Chicago, along the lakefront. 
During its early years, the area was occupied by German 
immigrants and according to the U.S. Census, like many other 
urban communities in Chicago, Lake View went through 
population increases until the 1950's. In 1950, over 
125,000 made their homes in Lake View. Since then, the area 
has experienced considerable population decline. During the 
1960's, housing along the lakefront became high priced, and 
today, Lake View is predominantly a white residential 
community. 
Over the years, the southwest corner of the community 
has remained a strong retail center (Belmont, Lincoln and 
Ashland Avenue) . In addition, other commercial developments 
can be found along Clark Street, between Belmont and Addison 
and along Broadway Avenue (Diversy and Belmont), on the east 
part of its boundaries. 
Wrigley Field is located in North Lake View. The 
ballpark was built for the Whalers and in 1916, after a 
league merge, the sports facility was taken over by the 
Cubs. Originally called Weeghman Park, it was renamed 
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Wrigley Field after the Wrigley family purchased the stadium 
and the team following WWI. 
Community Response to the Lights 
Upon announcement of the Cubs' interest in installing 
lights at Wrigley Field in 1982, the local community, under 
the leadership of the Citizens United for Baseball in the 
Sunshine (C.U.B.S.), protested and contested the stadium 
development proposal. Since then, the community became 
involved in a battle over the Cubs' stadium plans which 
spanned over a decade. 
The residents organized to stop the Cubs from 
installing lights at Wrigley Field. The Lake View Citizens 
Council (LVCC) and the C.U.B.S., along with the strong 
support of the local alderman, engaged in an anti-lights 
campaign representing the community interests. For them, 
night games at the ballpark would mean increased traffic, 
noise, vandalism, rowdiness, and related negative community 
consequences (Crimmins, 1988) . 
The residents testified at city hearings indicating 
that lights at the ballpark would generate intolerable 
conditions for the surrounding neighborhoods. At a public 
hearing in February of 1988, for example, 350 community 
residents reiterated to a city committee their strong 
concerns about litter, traffic, crowd rowdiness, drunkenness 
and an overall state of neighborhood decline due to night 
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games. The introduction of lights would also negatively 
affect the property values in the surrounding area and 
evening street parking would be impossible. Some of the 
resident reactions at that hearing included: "We're going to 
be prisoners in our own homes" and "We can barely tolerate 
what we have now, and please don't ask us to tolerate more 
than that." Wayne Krauss, president of the Lake View 
Citizens Council, reflected on the proposed repeal of the 
existing ordinance by saying: "We worked hard to get those 
laws. We feel angry" (Seigel, 1988a). 
As the Cubs received political support for their cause 
after they threatened to leave Chicago and move out of 
Wrigley Field, the residents lobbied against the efforts of 
Mayor Washington who supported a compromise on the issue. 
After the death of Washington, the community residents and 
their elected representative to the City Council began an 
effort to reverse the previously outlined support for the 
lights. Yet, Mayor Sawyer's ability to advance a similar 
compromising proposal and eventually pass a lights ordinance 
made night games at Wrigley Field possible. 
As the residents saw their battle being lost and noted 
that the Sawyer proposal did not even include an 11:00 p.m. 
curfew during night games, they responded angrily with 
threats. Paul Kendall, president for C.U.B.S. a community 
organization which led the opposition against the Cubs 
noted: 
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I can't believe this is happening to Lake View. If you 
go through with this [lights ordinance], there will be 
hell to pay. We're getting screwed; it's not 
fair ... [if the lights are installed, Wrigley Field] 
will not be known as the friendly confines anymore 
(Strong, 1988c:l). 
The eventual passage of the lights ordinance at Wrigley 
Field generated concern and fear amongst residents in the 
surrounding neighborhoods. According to a local resident: 
"Sometimes [during day games] I have to park seven blocks 
from [home] ... I have a sick mother, and with all the traffic 
we'll have at night, I'm afraid the ambulance would take 10 
minutes to go a couple of blocks." A local store owner 
noted: "I'm here [at my store] during the day games and I 
see them bang my windows when they walk by ... Now I'll have 
to stay here until the games are over for self defense." A 
police officer predicted increased illegal activity with 
night games. He indicated: "Under cover of darkness, I 
think we'll see more cars broken into ... More scam operations 
will go on. Also, when you get a large crowd that has been 
drinking, eventually they'll get rowdy. I'm sure we'll have 
our hands full'' (Casuso and Montana, 1988). 
Regardless of these concerns, the lights at Wrigley 
Field became a reality. Since then, community 
representatives have attempted to monitor its implications 
and ensure that the city and the Cubs continue to respond to 
their promises, making the play of night games at Wrigley as 
orderly for the neighborhood as possible. 
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The Non-Binding Referendum 
Since lights at Wrigley were to become a reality, the 
non-binding referendum became the last opportunity for the 
residents to express community dissatisfaction. The results 
of the non-binding referendum could also have an influence 
on the upcoming Chicago mayoral elections. 
As the after-the-fact referendum in the 21 precincts 
around Wrigley Field (44th and 46th wards) was nearing a 
close, the future political implications of its outcome for 
Mayor Sawyer became clear. Late Mayor Washington's two-term 
electoral success was largely due to his effectiveness in 
receiving the vote of the north side lakefront. A strong 
anti-light sentiment expressed by these 11,647 residents at 
the referendum would signal the unlikely support which Mayor 
Sawyer should expect in the mayoral election. Mark 
Atkinson, former president of C.U.B.S. noted on the 
political implications of the nonbinding referendum for 
Sawyer: 
A solid rejection of lights also would send a message 
to Mayor Eugene Sawyer who supported the ordinance. 
Mayor Sawyer has never been elected mayor. If he 
thinks he can ignore a substantial portion of the North 
Side, the lakefront, he could have a hard time being 
elected (Devall, 1988b). 
What might become even more troublesome for the 
election efforts of Mayor Sawyer is how his political 
opponents might employ a strong anti-light referendum vote. 
Mayoral opponents Ald. Timothy Evans (4th ward), Ald. Edmund 
Burke (14th Ward) and Ald. Danny Davis (29th Ward), voted 
249 
against the lights ordinance. They could easily utilize the 
referendum results to politically attack Sawyer (Casuso, 
1988). 
The non-binding referendum results in the 21 North Side 
precincts, overwhelmingly supporting the position of the 
anti-lights community organizers. From the total votes at 
that referendum, 4,007 opposed and 1,292 favored lights at 
Wrigley Field. The importance of the lights issue for the 
community can be extracted from the fact that the voter 
turnout in those 21 precincts was higher than those in the 
surrounding precincts. Yet, total voter registration in 
both of these wards dropped during the November election 
(Devall, 1988c). 
Strategies Utilized by the Lake View Community Residents 
A number of different strategies were utilized by the 
residents during their battle with the city and the Cubs 
over the installation of lights at Wrigley Field. 
Specifically: 
(1) Early advocacy on traffic concerns: It was years before 
the 1988 decision to install lights at Wrigley Field, that 
the community of Lake View became involved in addressing 
concerns over traffic congestion due to baseball games. A 
Wrigley Field transportation study conducted by the Bureau 
of Traffic Engineering was requested by the community in 
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1980. 45 In 1984, the community lobbied the Department of 
Streets and Sanitation to address traffic related 
concerns . 46 
These early advocacy efforts by the community served as 
an existing base around which the residents could organize 
as the Cubs kept their pressure on the city government to 
pass an ordinance which would allow for the installation of 
lights. 
(2) Legal Action: The community threatened to sue the 
Tribune Co., the Cubs, the City and Major League Baseball 
for a conspiracy to generate aggravation in the neighborhood 
surrounding Wrigley Field. They charged that in addition to 
the aggravation, the lights would generate increased 
traffic, crime, noise and decreased property values. The 
community also planned to investigate Wrigley Field itself 
for being in violation of zoning restrictions since the 
45 On April 16th and April 17th, 1980 (season opening 
day), the study compared the arriving traffic volume between 
11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. and departure traffic volume 3:00 
p.m. to 6:00 p.m. The study showed that most of the traffic 
volume occurred at Belmont and Lake Shore Drive 
(arriving=61% of total/ departing=37% of total) . Based on 
these findings, this study recommended that the public 
should be encouraged through the installation of appropriate 
directive signs to use the Irving Park and Lake Shore Drive 
exits (current use at arriving= 10% of total/ current use at 
departing=27% of total) (Memorandum, 1980) . 
46 In 1984, the Lake View Citizens Council expressed 
concerns over parking in the area during afternoon Cubs 
games. A communication by this group to the City of Chicago 
and the Department of Streets and Sanitation requested that 
additional towing trucks should patrol the area since the 
cars illegally parked "endanger our homes and families" 
(Memorandum, 1985). 
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ballpark is zoned for commercial use and not as a sports 
stadium (Devall, 1988b). 
(3) Non-binding referendum: The residents placed on the 
March 1988 ballot a non-binding referendum on the issue of 
lights at Wrigley Field. The voting results showed an 
overwhelming expression of anti-lights sentiment and were 
received as a great victory by the community. Viewed as a 
source of hope for overturning the City Council approved 
ordinance, the results became a threat to Mayor Sawyer who 
supported the installation of lights. According to 
Charlotte Newfeld, coordinator of the referendum efforts for 
the C. U. B . S . : 
I believe that it will have a great effect. This 
referendum push has provided a political army of 
trained people who know the political process-and there 
will be other elections in Chicago (Casuso, 1988) . 
(4) Local Political Support: The community worked within the 
confines of the political system, an approach which proved 
somewhat successful. Alderman Bernard Hansen (44th ward) 
effectively advanced the interests of the residents and 
attempted to generate political support when possible. 
During the "battle", Ald. Hansen was concerned if he was 
truly representing the voice of his ward, since the Tribune 
Co. often claimed that the anti-lights sentiment was 
concentrated amongst few individuals. However, the 
overwhelming support of the 1988 non-binding referendum 
strengthened his position. 
Hansen also utilized the results of traffic volume 
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studies showing the effect which day baseball exerted on the 
local community. He requested that the Bureau of Traffic 
Engineering conduct additional studies on this subject. One 
of the studies requested by Hansen was completed in 1984. 
It showed that, when compared to normal traffic volume, one 
hour before each of the Cubs' games (June 14, 15 and August 
3, 1994) the traffic in the area increased by 1625 cars, and 
one hour after each of these games the traffic increased by 
1319 (Memorandum, 1985) . 
(5) Strong Community-wide Involvement: The residents engaged 
in strong grassroots campaign activities to protest the 
installation of lights. As early as 1982 and 1983 they 
lobbied the court system to turn down the Cubs' request to 
repeal the anti-lights legislation. In later years they 
sustained pressure on the Chicago City Council by strong 
participation at public hearings. 
(6) Strong Internal Community Organization: A critical 
factor contributing to the constant public pressure applied 
by the community, can be extracted from the fact that the 
"cause" did not experience internal divisions. Former 
presidents of the local community organizations involved in 
this multi-year issue, continued to provide support, thus 
creating a long-lasting united front. Also, prior to the 
March 1988 referendum, the community organizations were 
successful in registering additional voters who would resist 
the lights ordinance. That effort was well orchestrated 
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since one can consider that the C.U.B.S. organization had 
assigned specific individuals to spearhead these efforts. 
Even during the first night game, the community 
organizers enlisted over 200 residents to participate in a 
review of the surrounding events. Some participated as 
"watchers." They sat in the front of their homes and took 
notes on any occurrences on their street. Others were 
responsible for monitoring events taking place at the block 
level, and finally, a group of others were involved in 
assessing the neighborhood effect at a three to five block 
radius (Temkin, 1988). 
(7) Wrigley Field Traffic Operations Committee: The Wrigley 
Field Traffic Operations Committee, a group of elected 
officials and community representatives, served as a link 
between the Lake View residents and the city. The purpose 
of the group was to assist with the implementation of a plan 
which would be responsive to the related community concerns. 
In this regard, the primary functions of this group were to 
conduct community advocacy at the city level. 47 
(8) Efforts to Eliminate Alcohol Consumption: The residents 
attempted to use the anti-lights results from the area 
referendum to, in a latter referendum, vote both the Wrigley 
47 A review of committee meeting minutes in 1991 and 
1992 showed that community residents/business owners were 
able, through these meetings, to either address or solve 
other legitimate community issues and concerns. Some of 
these concerns were unrelated to the scope of the February 
25, 1988 city ordinance (i.e, sidewalk replacement) (Wrigley 
Field Traffic Operations Committee, 1992b). 
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Field and the surrounding are "dry." The community would 
take advantage of a state law enacted in 1934, after the 
repeal of the Prohibition, which allowed residents of 
precincts in Chicago to vote their areas "dry", thus, 
canceling all alcohol licenses and making the sale of 
alcohol in that area illegal. This strategy was aimed at 
ensuring that the strong anti-lights sentiment expressed in 
the referendum was carried through, thus, showcasing 
continuous community strength on this issue. One of the 
concerns which emerged from this community planning effort 
was the impact which such a "dry" referendum would have on 
local businesses. According to Jimmy Jones, a tavern owner 
in the area: 
I'm upset. [The referendum] would hurt me when they're 
[community organizers] trying to hurt Wrigley Field. 
The biggest tavern owner, the ones that get most of the 
people from the games, aren't in the precinct, so they 
won't be affected. They should take the small tavern 
owner into consideration (Casuso, 1988) . 
A few months later, Mayor Sawyer and Governor Thompson 
included a repeal of that state law in a legislation 
proposal which was approved in June 1988. This made it 
impossible for the residents to carry out their threats of 
placing such a referendum on the November 1988 ballot. 
(9) Continuous pressure after the installation of lights: 
The community groups continued their involvement in the 
process of implementing an effective protection and 
improvement plan after the installation of lights. 
Showcasing such a strong level of involvement ensured that 
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the city and the Cubs sustained their commitment to minimize 
the negative neighborhood effects. 
Community and City Relations After The Lights: 
The Neighborhood Protection and Improvement Plan 
Since the issue of the lights at Wrigley was heavily 
contested among the city, the Cubs and the local community, 
the residents were successful in sustaining the interest of 
the city by ensuring that their concerns were to be 
continuously monitored and addressed. The ordinance passed 
by the Chicago City Council on February 25, 1988, noted that 
the city would "ensure that the interests and concerns of 
the residential neighborhoods which surround Wrigley Field 
are adequately protected" as a result of the installation of 
lights at Wrigley Field (City of Chicago, 1988a) . 
Based on the city ordinance, a task force under the 
direction of the Department of Planning was formed to 
develop a plan which would most adequately respond to the 
community concerns. The task force worked closely with 
community representatives and Chicago Cubs officials to meet 
its objectives. As a result, yearly plans were developed to 
address the community concerns. The creation of the 
"Neighborhood Protection and Improvement Plan" shows that 
the community proved successful in engaging the city and the 
franchise to address the effects of this stadium development 
plan on its residents. 
This plan, from its inception, recognized the effect of 
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night baseball and outlined its development assumptions: 
A major premise used to develop the plan is that the 
most "extraordinary" impact to the residential 
community which surrounds Wrigley Field presently 
occurs during the baseball games on weekends and major 
holidays and on days when baseball games begin at 
3:05p.m. These are the days and times during which 
residents normally need access to their community and 
to the available but limited on-street parking. The 
community will similarly be impacted by night baseball. 
The plan developed is applicable to all weekend, major 
holiday, and night baseball games, becoming effective 
with the first night baseball game ... A second premise 
underlying this plan, is that the primary means for 
ameliorating traffic congestion, limited neighborhood 
parking, and related community concerns, is the 
creation of remote parking opportunities that will 
reduce the number of vehicles and persons using Lake 
View and Uptown streets in the immediate Wrigley Field 
area. An essential element of the remote parking 
operation will be a Resident Permit Parking program. 
However, the permit parking component of the plan, as 
per the ordinance, will be effective only on days which 
night baseball games are played (eight games in 1988) 
(City of Chicago, 1988b, pp. 1-2). 
This plan would add to another plan already in 
existence that was advanced in 1984 by community Alderman 
Bernard Hansen (44th Ward) . Alderman Hansen had attempted, 
under the 'Wrigley Field Traffic Operations Committee', a 
committee with local elected official and community resident 
representation, to address existing neighborhood concerns. 
Under that particular plan, a litter pick-up program was 
implemented by the City and the Cubs, and police services 
during Cubs' games were successfully expanded. 
At the end of the first year, a residential parking 
permit program and a police hotline was added, service bus 
service was expanded, police presence to assist with area 
traffic and to address fan related disorderly conduct was 
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increased, a new litter control program which required the 
participation of the Cubs was instituted, and the Cubs would 
restrict the sale of beer during the games. Finally, the 
franchise would advance the entire plan through public 
relations. The task force also concluded that the plan 
would be continuously updated based on the input of the 
community (City of Chicago, 1988b) . 
After the first year, a review of the previous plan and 
recommendations for the 1989 baseball season at Wrigley, 
would assist in developing a smoother and better 
neighborhood improvement plan. This report acknowledged the 
importance of community involvement in the project and 
expressed its interest in continuing the improvement of the 
plan. According to the report: 
Community involvement has played a major role in the 
development of the plan, both before and after the 
first night game. Modifications to the plan have 
occurred with community participation and input. This 
report will serve as an outline for a continuing 
dialogue between City agencies and Lake View/Uptown 
community and business representatives (City of 
Chicago, 1988c, pp. 2). 
The overall assessment of the 1988 community plan was 
characterized as successful, yet changes would be needed. 
Based upon the 1988 plan assessment, some of the 
recommendations provided by the task force to be considered 
for the 1989 revised plan included: (1) the reducing the 
length of permit parking hours from 4:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., 
to 5:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. This would provide for street 
parking access to local business employees, (2) possible 
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expansion of the residential parking permit zone to 
encompass additional streets, (3) a public relations program 
to communicate these changes to the residents would be 
enacted, (4) expanded parking arrangements and bus services 
would be renewed, (5) a publicity effort will be undertaken 
by the City of Chicago to inform the public of the parking 
regulations and encourage the ridership of public 
transportation, (6) a reevaluation and improvements of 
traffic flow will be conducted, (7) the Chicago Cubs will 
increase its communication with local religious and cultural 
organizations to ensure that events which would potentially 
generate increased congestion are limited, (8) signs will be 
installed by the city at areas designated by the community, 
prohibiting charter bus parking and engine running, (9) 
continuation of the litter program, (10) the Cubs would 
expand their involvement by communicating through their 
media, numerous aspects of this phase of the "Neighborhood 
Protection and Improvement Plan." 
A 1990 city report evaluated the effectiveness of the 
1989 plan and made recommendations for the upcoming season. 
This report outlined two major problems from the previous 
year. These problems were "people problems on the public 
way associated with the consumption of alcohol" and 
"residential on-street parking problems in the immediate 
Wrigley Field area during night ball games" (City of 
Chicago, 1990a, pp. 1). 
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Continuous efforts, according to this report, will take 
place by the police department to address the "peoples'" 
problems. The use of the police hotline which will 
specifically operate for the night baseball games out of the 
Department of Streets and Sanitation Command Post should 
prove helpful in these efforts. 
The 1990 plan proposed that the city work with the 
community to develop a plan which would address these 
traffic concerns. The city would also work with the 
community on charter bus operations and continue to promote 
the permit parking program for night baseball through 
various means of communication, thus, making the residents 
aware of its logistics (City of Chicago, 1990b) . 
Finally, the city would expand the availability of 
remote parking. Efforts to secure additional parking for 
night games by the city were spearheaded by a Cubs' proposal 
to turn city-owned vacant land east of Graceland Cemetery, 
north of the ballpark, into a remote parking facility. The 
proposal would be taken into consideration by the city, the 
CTA, the park district and the community. This proposal was 
approved by the residents neighboring the vacant land 
(206-118 vote) in early 1990 (Kendall, 1990). 
It becomes clear from the developments presented above 
that the city responded with great diligence to the concerns 
of the Lake View residents. Due to the effect of night 
baseball on the community, resident representation has been 
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a part of the plan development process to improve and 
protect the neighborhood. The 1990 report, also outlined 
community input on the proposed plans. The report noted: 
The 1990 Lake View/Uptown Neighborhood Protection and 
Improvement Plan was developed with community input and 
participation primarily through the Wrigley Field 
Traffic Operations Committee (City of Chicago, 1990a, 
pp. 5). 
The community of Lake View has been very effective in 
addressing the multiple concerns which arose from night 
baseball. Yet, the greatest success of the community has 
been its ability to ensure that the city of Chicago respond 
to these community issues with great support. In addition, 
the organization of the Chicago Cubs has also been 
responsive to the various community apprehensions and has 
attempted to address the need to make night baseball an 
event with limited negative effects for the surrounding 
neighborhood. This ability of the community to engage and 
sustain city support has been largely due to successful 
advocacy strategies. 
Reshaping Lake View 
The community area of Lake View saw the installation of 
lights at Wrigley Field in 1988. What were the implications 
of this stadium development plan on the surrounding 
neighborhoods? Did the lights and the implementation of the 
area parking permit program, as a result of this stadium 
project, assist in transforming this community? What type 
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of population has been occupying this northside community in 
recent years and how could the socioeconomic characteristics 
of this population complement the environment created by the 
lights at Wrigley Field? These are some of the questions 
which can provide us with an insight into whether stadium 
development can reshape the urban environment. 
Angela Fadragas (1980:17), when considering the future 
of Lake View, noted the importance of the relationship 
between business and residential interests as a result of 
night games played at Wrigley Field: 
The latest threat to the equilibrium between businesses 
and residential use centers around Wrigley Field, where 
the Cubs' organization, no longer managed by the 
Wrigley Family, has indicated an interest in staging 
night baseball games. A large number of residents in 
the central area of Lake View believe that this would 
create many problems - parking, noise, vandalism, crime 
- that would lower the quality of life. However, some 
say baseball contributes to many businesses in the 
vicinity, and the introduction of night games would 
create more opportunities. Development of Lake View 
seems likely to be determined by further variants of 
this continuing conflict between businesses and 
residential interests (pp. 17). 
The development of businesses serving the night games 
clientele could have a direct effect on the future of this 
community area. 
Though many factors can be accounted for when 
considering community change (real estate interests, 
government, business interests, transportation, etc.), the 
goal here is to address the relationship between the stadium 
development plans at Wrigley Field and their possible 
implications for the local community. In that regard, an 
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assessment of both the introduction of night baseball and 
the parking program could serve as additional factors in the 
overall physical and social reorganization of that area. 
In addition to the factors mentioned above, demographic 
changes should be taken into consideration, such as the 
possible movement of population in communities which 
surround Lake View. For example, recent increases in 
property values within the community of Lincoln Park, 
immediately to the south, could have pushed to the north, a 
young, professional, single population, now priced out of 
that market. 
By taking these issues into consideration, I will 
address (1) how the introduction of a parking permit 
program, a response to the stadium development plan, and 
night games negatively affected some businesses over others, 
contributing to the creation of an entertainment area around 
Wrigley Field, and (2) how, as a result of these changes, an 
increased movement of population characterized as 
"cosmopolites" and "unmarried and childless" emerged in this 
area (Gans, 1962). 
Boosting a Night Life Atmosphere 
The stadium development plan at Wrigley Field had a 
direct effect on the economic organization of the community. 
In order to understand the relationship between the 
installation of lights at the ballpark and the 
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reorganization of the business establishments in the area, 
two factors must be taken into consideration. The first is 
the growing parking problem and the second is the imbalance 
in the businesses benef itting from this stadium development 
plan. At the same time, it should be noted that parking 
problems contributed to this imbalance. 
At a community meeting, representatives recognized the 
need for a plan to address a growing parking issue. The 
area problem, according to committee members, resulted from 
the increased activities of commercial establishments. It 
is interesting to note here that the community 
representatives at that meeting described these "problems" 
as being "unrelated to sporting events." The meeting 
minutes read: 
It was the consensus of the attendees that there was a 
growing need to develop a strategy to deal with the 
significant increase in commercial bar, restaurant, and 
entertainment activity along Clark Street, Sheffield 
and Belmont Avenues in the program area. This growth 
has resulted in traffic control and parking problems, 
totally unrelated to sporting events, which aggravate 
those experienced during night baseball games (Wrigley 
Field Traffic Operations Committee, 1992a, pp. 3). 
This community concern, three years after the 
installation of lights, though initially viewed as 
independent of the games at Wrigley Field, can be related to 
the newly enforced parking permit program. The parking 
program has had negative economic implications on certain 
local businesses since these establishments cannot derive 
income from the night games played at the ballpark. 
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Specifically, a video store, a cleaners, a salon, etc., 
will not experience increased business activities from the 
crowds brought into the area to watch night games. On the 
other hand, restaurants, bars, clubs, and related commercial 
activities will benefit from the atmosphere generated by 
night games. The parking permit program then, instituted by 
the residents and the city to alleviate the negative affects 
of the crowds, has had different effects on the local 
businesses. 
During the initial stages of the Permit Parking Program 
many business owners felt that the introduction of lights at 
Wrigley Field and the measures aimed at addressing parking 
concerns had negative implications for their operations. 
According to Barbara Orre, owner of a salon in the area, the 
permit program has hurt her business: "Its unfair. My 
customers have no place to park. If you have a license and 
can buy a city sticker, you should be able to park 
anywhere." And, according to Richard Friedman, general 
manager of a nonprofit theater in the area: "People will 
drive around, get frustrated and go home. This could be 
dangerous for business in the area." Finally, Mike Quigley, 
aid to Ald. Hansen (44th ward), agreed that not enough 
consideration was given to the effect which the permit 
parking program will have on the local businesses. 
According to Quigley, the plan is "basically saying they 
[local business] are going to be closed that evening. 
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Let's face facts: No one is going to come to this area 
during games if there is nowhere to park" (Burnside, 1988) 
Fearing towing and parking tickets, many potential 
customers for these business chose not to make any purchases 
when night games were played at Wrigley Field. Some store 
owners estimated a drop of business during night games as 
high as 75 percent and others blamed Mayor Sawyer for 
discouraging non-parking sticker owners from visiting the 
area. Sam Toia, president of the Lake View Central Business 
Association, noted: "Even the mayor is saying don't go to 
Wrigleyville if you don't have a sticker. They are scaring 
business away" (Seigel, 1988b). 
A new expanded parking plan instituted for 1989 was 
meant to take away the pressure from the local businesses. 
But according to local businesses it did not help. The 
parking plan continued to negatively impact the small 
businesses which did not sell alcohol. Bob Reschke owner of 
a used books and records in the area commented: 
I think what happens is that you do get some new people 
coming in to the neighborhood that wouldn't otherwise 
be around. But with the night games, it's horrible. I 
think that everyone around here will agree it's killed 
businesses for them, except for the bars, maybe. 
People won't come to the neighborhood at noon, even, if 
they know they know there's a night game, because they 
feel like they won't find a parking space. It's a 20 
to 30 percent drop in business for us" (McCracken, 
1989). 
On the other hand, sports bars in the area like 
"Sluggers" and the "Cubby Bear" know that when the Cubs are 
in town their business will skyrocket. Mike Vasilevich, 
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manager of "Sluggers" outlined his business plan: 
What we want is to generate some business when the Cubs 
are on the road, because we know we're going to get 
them when the Cubs are at home (McCracken, 1989). 
Eventually a renewed parking program was instituted 
which prohibited parking in the LV-Zone designated areas 
from 5:00pm to lO:OOpm during night ballgames. The effect 
of that new parking program has remained the same. The 
owner of a small grocery store in the corner of Darnen and 
Addison told me when asked about his perceptions of night 
games and business growth: 
... right here where I am (about a mile from the 
ballpark) they [night games] do not affect me. 
Business has not been better here because of the 
lights. But I tell you what, my buddy who is further 
closer to Wrigley and runs a small bar has seen better 
business because of the lights. The people come at 
night and they stay outside longer. At night people 
will drink, eat ... These businesses benefit from the 
night games. 
Clark Street between Sheffield and Grace has become a 
viable night district. The overwhelming majority of the 
businesses are restaurants and bars. Though many of these 
establishments are sports oriented, trendy Japanese, 
Ethiopian and Chinese restaurants, along with noodle shops 
and an oyster bar, do well in that area. The "Wrigley 
Side", a few feet away from the ballpark advertises "Live 
blues after the game" hoping to attract some of the 
thousands who pour out of Wrigley following night games. 
The other non-alcohol businesses which have remained, 
acknowledge that they might be in the wrong type of 
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businesses. Joe Pinter owner of the Pinters' Violin Shop on 
Clark, north of the ballpark told me: 
I have been here for 28 years and things in recent 
years have changed tremendously. Parking has helped 
around here for the better, I mean for the residents. 
There have been more bars and restaurants in the area 
than ever before. My business has not gotten any help 
from all this. The bar and restaurant business is the 
type of business you want to get in here. That's where 
the money is now. 
Jeffrey Frisone has been working for the last two years at 
the "Bookworks", on Clark and Sheffield, a store that buys 
and sells books and records. He told me about the business 
activity in that store: 
There has been definitely an increase in trendy stuff 
around here. Many young people are bar hopping. Often 
you have long lines outside these bars as people wait 
to get in. The lights have been good for those 
businesses but they have not helped ours. The crowds 
tend to be loaded [with alcohol] and some of them are 
even dangerous. It can get crazy around here 
sometimes. 
Frisone also told me about the reasons for the late evening 
store hours, while commenting on the type of customers that 
frequent the store: 
Our hours go from noon to 10 p.m. and noon to 11:00 
p.m. Some of the people who come here to go to the 
game might stop by and pick up a baseball book. But 
you cannot rely on that. Many of the local residents 
are our customers. The long evening hours are mostly 
for them since you cannot rely on the crowds after the 
night games for business. 
An investigation of indicators of economic change 
support the above assertions. The data on the number of 
employees by sector in the 60613 zip code (Lake View-Wrigley 
Field is in that code) shows a decrease in the number of 
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manufacturing and retail employees and a sharp increase in 
the "other" category which would include restaurants, bars 
and similar types of commercial establishments. This trend 
is not observed in the Lake View zip code (60657), nor in 
the zip codes which encompass the New Comiskey Park (60616) 
and the United Center (60612) . 
Specifically, in 1986, two years before the 
introduction of night games at Wrigley Field, 6,100 were 
employed in the 60613 zip code. Of those, 3800 (62%) were 
employed in the non-manufacturing/non-retail sector. In 
1988, the year that night games were introduced at Wrigley 
Field, in that same zip code, approximately 6,900 employees 
worked in the area. Of those, 4300 (62%) worked in the 
non-manufacturing/non-retail sector. In 1990, two years 
after night games, the overall number of employees increased 
to approximately 8,100. Of those, 6,100 (75%) worked in 
non-manufacturing and non-retail sectors (Woodstock 
Institute, 1994). 
A New Type of Wrigleyyille Resident 
The creation of a night life atmosphere in Lake View 
has attracted a specific resident to this community. 
According to Herbert Gans (1962), the quality of life in the 
urban environment varies since its residents do not assume a 
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common lifestyle. 48 Gans described five different 
population groups found within the city, of which the first 
three live in the city by choice and are protected from the 
negative consequences of urban life as described by Wirth 
(1938). Those five different groups are: (1) the 
cosmopolites, who are individuals with high levels of 
education and incomes and who are attracted to the urban 
environment due to the cultural advantages which the city 
can offer them, (2) the unmarried and childless, who usually 
grew up in the surrounding suburban areas and live in the 
city because of its proximity to the jobs, the available 
entertaining opportunities and the opportunities to meet 
others. This group is likely to leave the city once they 
marry, (4) the ethnic villagers, are a group which relies on 
their ethnic ties with other members of similar background. 
They have a strong sense of ethnic identity and the 
community within which they reside provides them with the 
support and intimacy usually needed to "make it" in a 
different country, (5) the trapped, are those who are 
elderly and might receive small pensions or public 
assistance. Though they are concerned about the changes in 
their neighborhood, they cannot leave the city, and, (5) the 
deprived, who are the poor minorities, the physically, 
psychologically and economically handicapped who are most 
48 Others, including Wirth (1938), Fischer (1982; 
1984), Kadushin (1983), and Creekmore (1985), have viewed 
urbanism in either positive or negative ways. 
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negatively affected by life in the city. 
In considering Gans' typology, Lake View has seen in 
recent years an increase in 'cosmopolites' and 'unmarried 
and childless.' According to Ann Ralston, a real estate 
agent for Burton Realty in the area: "There are a lot of 
young people around here because of the ballpark ... and that 
gives the area a youthful, vivacious feel" (Buursma, 1990b). 
It is also interesting to note how the area which was once 
called North Lake View, now has received a strong identity 
from Wrigley Field and is called Wrigleyville. 
Advertisements by real estate agents sometimes use the word 
"Wrigleyview" to describe a listing, a fact which also 
denotes the influence of the ballpark on the identification 
of the area. 
A 1985 survey showed that 36 percent of the residents 
within a mile distance from Wrigley Field (31.3 percent of 
those living between zero and half a mile from the ballpark 
and 40.7 percent of those living between half a mile and a 
mile from the ballpark) outlined the presence of Wrigley 
Field as a positive factor in their decision to live in the 
area. Only 9.3 percent (11.9 percent of those living 
between zero and half a mile from the ballpark and 6.5 
percent of those living between half a mile and a mile from 
the ballpark) indicated that Wrigley Field was a negative 
factor. The rest, 54.8 percent, described the ballpark as 
neither a positive nor a negative influence in their 
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decision-making (Chicago Cubs, 1985b). 
Bob Murphy moved in the area in the late 1980's. Bob 
grew up in the Chicago suburbs, went to college, and when he 
completed his degree, found a job in the Loop. He was not 
married at the time and the Wrigley area was exactly what he 
was looking for. He told me: 
Wrigleyville was exactly what I was looking for. I had 
just finished college and I was able to take public 
transportation to work. I got an apartment a few 
blocks away from the ballpark which was owned by an 
older couple. It was a great place because there are 
many people there like me. I went to Wrigley, but most 
of the fans are not there for the games. It is the 
atmosphere, its an event, the history and tradition of 
the park ... there is a lot of things to do there 
[Wrigley area] . There are a lot of bars and that type 
of an environment. 
Bob married a few years later to someone whom he met in the 
area and moved to a suburban home. Now he takes the 
suburban train to the Loop. He indicated to me his 
reasoning: 
After you marry, it is difficult to stay in that 
environment. I don't know how people do it. For us 
who are planning a family, moving to the suburbs seemed 
to be the right choice. 
Nora Weston provided a similar logic to the fact that 
she currently resides in that area. She indicated to me: 
I came here after I completed college. This is the 
place to be. There are many people who live here and 
are of similar age. I work in human resources for a 
large accounting firm downtown. Transportation is 
great and in the evenings there are so many places to 
visit and things to do, nearby. It is great .... After 
I get married though, a suburban lifestyle is going to 
be much better for me since it is more slow paced. 
Residential lending has also increased dramatically in 
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Lake View between 1988 and 1992. The overall number of 
loans (including conventional, home improvement, FHA/VA, and 
multifamily types) was 1,600 in 1988. In 1992 that number 
skyrocketed to near 3,300. Of those loans, most were 
conventional. Specifically the number of conventional loans 
increased from approximately 1,400 in 1988 to 3,000 in 1992. 
Their amount also increased from $150 million in 1988 to 
$400 million (Woodstock Institute, 1994) . 
Mark Abbey, moved to the area, hoping to share the 
economic growth which Wrigleyville has experienced in recent 
years. He noted: 
I wanted to be in a trend-setting group, to get here 
before the pack ... Now that the Cubs are staying in the 
neighborhood it's a positive sign and an indicator that 
more Yuppies will move in. There is a tide that has 
come into Wrigleyville in terms of money and growth 
potential ... My feeling is that if the Cubs didn't win 
[in 1984 and 1989] and they didn't have lights at the 
park, I'm doubtful that you would have had the growth 
or rise in real estate values we've seen (Buursma, 
1990a) . 
The proximity to the lake, the numerous cultural and 
social amenities, have drawn young upscale professionals. 
Housing costs in the area has increased dramatically. On 
Wayne and Addison one has to pay over $250,000 to purchase a 
newly renovated unit in a three flat building with a two car 
garage and a fireplace. At 1118 West Addison, fifty feet 
from the ballpark, a two bedroom, one bathroom apartment 
rents for $1,000 a month. Ann Ralston, a real estate agent 
in Wrigleyville indicated how many are priced out of the 
housing market in Wrigleyville: 
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Right now, houses are going for $175,000 to $400,000, 
and the 175,000 home would need a lot of work. So all 
the people who are looking for a home in the $150,000 
to $175,000 range are now buying condos" (Buursma, 
1990b) . 
Along Southport Avenue, two blocks west of Wrigley Field one 
can observe home rehabilitation as well as the emergence of 
shops and stores that serve a population which might be 
characterized as "trendy." 
Redevelopment has also taken place around the ballpark 
in recent years. Many old apartment buildings and small 
industrial plants have been converted to upscale residential 
condominium and single home properties. These developments 
have taken advantage of the cafes, bars, restaurants and 
taverns, transforming Wrigleyville into an entertainment 
center for those with high, disposable incomes. During one 
of my walks through the residential area around the 
ballpark, I identified 14 homes being rehabbed by 
construction crews. 
Some residential redevelopment, directly associated 
with the opportunity to view a game from the rooftop of 
buildings surrounding Wrigley Field, has recently taken 
place. In 1990, for example, real estate investors 
purchased a victorian overlooking the ballpark. With an 
excellent viewing opportunity from the roof top, one stands 
460 feet from home plate along the right side line. The 
purchasing price was $425,000 in cash, a few thousand 
dollars more from the asking price of $419,000. The 
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investors described the deal as an "idiot-proof" investment. 
After rehabbing the building and adding a roof top deck for 
allowing up to 50 people to view the game, the expected sale 
of the newly created four unit building is $240,000 for the 
basement condo and $300,000 for each of the three units 
above. A total resale value of $1.14 million (Buursma, 
1990c) . 
Changes Around the Ballpark 
An investigation of census track data from 1980 and 
1990 supports the claims made above. Specifically, after 
identifying the tracks which surround Wrigley Field within 
half a mile from the ballpark, selected data was compared. 
The boundaries utilized for this analysis are Ashland 
(West), Irving Park (North), Belmont (South) and Halsted 
(East) . The census tracks which fell within these 
boundaries are: #604, #605, #606, #607, #610, #611, #612, 
#614, #615, #616, #617, #621, #622, #623, #624. The total 
population of these tracks in 1980 was 27,896 and dropped to 
24,853 in 1990. 
The data (APPENDIX A) shows that the population around 
that area of the city changed significantly between 1980 and 
1990. Specifically, there was a decrease in the older 
population (3.1%) and a considerable increase in residents 
aged between 25 and 34 (11.3%). Those residing in this area 
of the city are also more likely to live alone (6.6%) or 
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live with non-relatives (8.0%), when compared to the 
population which resided in the area during 1980. Another 
observation relates to the increased transiency as shown by 
the "Lived in same house 5 years ago" category. The 
decrease by 8.3 percent from 1980, shows that this area of 
the Lake View community is less stable now than it was 10 
years before. Other considerable changes can be viewed in 
marital status, occupation, level of education, income and 
housing value (See APPENDIX A) . 
These characteristics support the fact that a younger, 
single, better educated with higher disposable incomes 
population has occupied the area in recent years. The 
lights at Wrigley Field and the introduction of night games 
contributed to the creation of a nightlife atmosphere, 
making their co-existence possible. The development of this 
type of environment attracts individuals who would depict 
the characteristics exemplified by the data above. 
In examining the census tract data (APPENDIX B) within 
the half mile radius around Wrigley Field it becomes evident 
that the tracts which are closer to Wrigley, specifically 
#610, #611, #616, #617, #621 and #622, bounded by Grace, 
Racine, Belmont and Halsted Avenue, support the above 
assertions even more than the expanded census tract data. 
Specifically, this second group of tract data (closer 
to Wrigley Field) shows that the educational level of its 
residents, in 1990, was higher (56.3% had a Bachelor's 
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degree or higher) than the overall average of the tracts 
within half a mile radius around Wrigley Field (49.7% had a 
Bachelor's degree or higher). In addition, the percent 
change between 1980 and 1990, regarding the 20-24 year olds, 
is higher in this second, closer zone (+ 3.6%) than in the 
first more expanded zone (+ 1.2%). Similarly, the 25-34 
year olds percentage change is also higher in this closer 
zone (14.4% versus 11.3%). Also, the percentage change of 
males who never married in this closer zone, between 1980 
and 1990, is 16.5% compared to the 13.7% change in the more 
expanded zone. Finally, in this closer zone, the percent 
change between 1980 and 1990 of females that have never been 
married is 23.3% compared to the expanded zone which is 
17.7% (See APPENDIX B). 
Though the lights were installed in 1988, the extensive 
six year coverage of the issue generated considerable 
attention to the mystique and historical tradition of 
Wrigley Field. Such overwhelming coverage made Wrigley 
Field an even greater landmark for Chicago, spotlighting the 
community area surrounding the ballpark. 
The Long Term Effect of Lights on the Community 
The long term implications of the lights installation 
on the community of Lake View might be more difficult to 
assess. As indicated above, night games have generated a 
culture which has transformed the surrounding area into an 
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entertainment hub, attractive to young professionals. But 
is it possible to hypothesize on the status of the community 
twenty to thirty years from now? 
Night games in stadiums always began in limited 
numbers, yet, in later years, the number of night games 
increased to eventually become the norm. If night games at 
Wrigley Field become the norm, then, the effect which 
transportation might have on the surrounding community 
should be considered. 
With the increase of night games, the automobile will 
become the primary source of transportation. If that is the 
case, street or surface parking will not be adequate to 
support the demand. The question then would be whether 
buildings in the area remain more profitable than surface 
parking. In responding to this question Bess and Decker 
(1988:71) wrote: 
A typical six-flat in Wrigleyville has a current market 
value of $400,000-500,000, and generates a minimum 
gross income of approximately $36,000 a year. A 
typical Chicago six-flat lot is 50 by 125 feet. 
Adjacent to Wrigley Field, and cleared for surfaced 
parking, such a lot might now generate about $25,000 
per year in gross income (assuming 200 square feet per 
car, valet parking, $10 per car in parking fees, and 81 
games per year), but with fewer maintenance costs and 
much lower taxes assessed to the "unimproved" real 
estate ... Assuming that night baseball does generate 
more automobile traffic, how much of this traffic can a 
neighborhood tolerate before prices escalate to $20-25 
per space making surf ace parking too economically 
attractive to resist (pp. 70). 
If this assessment is accurate, then it is possible 
that in the pursuit of profit, residential properties will 
278 
give way to potential revenue generated by parking. That 
would mean the end of a coexistence between Wrigley Field 
and the surrounding community. 49 
When examining current parking practices in the area 
around Wrigley Field, one can arrive at the development 
scenario discussed above by Bess. Specifically, on game 
days, businesses along Clark and Addison streets become 
transformed into parking garages for the automobile traffic. 
'Krystals Hand Car Wash' on Clark Street, stops washing cars 
on game days and charges $10 for parking, promising a quick 
and easy exit out of the area after the game. One of the 
attendants who was flagging cars in the car wash/garage told 
me: 
On game days there is demand for parking around here. 
We have a business that can be a garage. Why not use 
it. You can make some good bucks from that ... The 
competition [for parking] is rough around here but we 
do well. See from here you get on Clark and then you 
go south and you are out of the congestion. That is 
why this is a good place to park when you come to the 
game. 
Local gas stations and even the parking lots of adjacent 
49 An example which could be considered to support 
this hypothesis is the case of Crosley Field in Cincinnati. 
It was there that the first night baseball game was played 
in 1935. Crosley Field just like Wrigley Field was an urban 
ballpark. It rested within a residential community and was 
well connected to the surrounding neighborhoods. A 
comparison of aerial pictures depicting Crosley Field in the 
early 1930's, during the 1953 All-Star game and in the 
1960's, prior to its demolition, revel some interesting 
findings. In the early 1950's, many of the residential 
properties began to deteriorate and by the 1960's, there was 
nothing left around the ballpark but large parking lots, 
similar to those found in the recently constructed suburban 
style ballparks. 
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fast food restaurants also become transformed into game day 
parking garages. 
Clearly, the future stability of Wrigleyville depends 
on the ability of the local community organizations to 
consider the long term implications which an increased night 
game schedule could have on Lake View. Though noise, 
drunkenness, rowdiness are all concerns that affect the 
daily life of the immediate residents, the reorganization of 
space due to economic rationales could have wider 
implications and threaten the stability of this community. 
Conclusion 
The installation of lights at Wrigley Field by the Cubs 
in 1988 is an example of how professional franchises through 
stadium development plans attempt to generate increased 
revenues. The sale of the Cubs to a corporation in 1981 
adds to the dynamics of the lights issue. The derived 
income from expected, nationally broadcasted night games 
makes the installation of lights a "necessity" for the new 
ownership. 
Wrigley Field is also positioned in a predominantly 
white residential community and its strong, sustainable 
response to the lights issue made the installation of lights 
a difficult task for the franchise. Concerns about 
increased community problems and decreased property values, 
allowed the residents to enlist the support of the local 
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political leadership in the "battle." 
Yet, the fear of losing the historic franchise becomes 
an unthinkable possibility to most including the local 
government. The perceived economic implications take center 
stage and are utilized as a rationale to apply pressure on 
the anti-lights organizers. The city becomes involved in 
supporting the needs of the franchise by passing an 
ordinance which allows night games at the ballpark. 
In response to citizen concerns, a permit parking 
program for the surrounding neighborhoods, during nights 
games is approved. Yet, that decision has helped some 
businesses over others and in the process impacted the 
existing economic balance within the community. The area 
around Wrigley Field becomes an entertainment center, 
providing a great opportunity for restaurants, bars, clubs 
and related businesses to succeed. On the other hand, other 
small businesses found that the parking permit program 
discouraged many customers from visiting their shops due to 
fear of parking tickets and towing. 
This general culture which the lights fostered, 
contributed to attracting many young professionals to the 
area, since the presence of a night life atmosphere 
complements their lifestyle. The introduction of night 
baseball has assisted in reorganizing this area and has 
transformed life in this community. As economic rationales 
have driven the current status of this urban community, it 
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is going to be the evolution of these same economies, which, 
in the long term, will shape its future. As Bess (1988:74) 
indicates: " ... the character of Wrigley Field depends on the 
health and well being of Wrigleyville." 
The issue of the installation of lights at Wrigley 
Field also became an issue of political will after Mayor 
Washington's death. Political opponents of Mayor Sawyer saw 
the installation of lights as an opportunity to showcase or 
test their political power. Though most Chicago aldermen 
supported an even more "pro Cubs" lights proposal advanced 
by late Mayor Washington than the one proposed later by 
Mayor Sawyer, many became populists and supported the 
neighborhood anti-lights campaign. In reality, with mayoral 
elections in the near future, the lights issue became an 
opportunity for these politicians to place forth an early 
challenge to Mayor Sawyer. In the end, not even a 
referendum proved capable of changing the will of the city 
in passing a lights ordinance. 
CHAPTER 9 
COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO SPORTS-DRIVEN URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE NEAR WEST SIDE 
Introduction 
This chapter examines two recent attempts to construct 
professional sports stadiums in Chicago's disadvantaged Near 
West Side during the 1980's and into the 1990's. The first 
attempt was initiated by the Chicago Bears who proposed to 
build a 75,000 seated, open-air, spectator facility. The 
second effort led to the construction of the United Center 
which was completed in 1994 to host the Chicago Bulls of the 
NBA and the Chicago Blackhawks of the NHL. The United 
Center is also the site of the upcoming, 1996 National 
Democratic Convention. 
This chapter investigates these stadium development 
projects within the context of urban redevelopment. 
Specifically, proponents of these stadiums perceive the 
construction of these facilities as leading to the 
improvement of a low-income community. As a result, the 
stadium becomes viewed as a vehicle of urban regeneration. 
In this regard, this analysis outlines the political economy 
of these stadium development plans while concentrating on 
the response of the local community. Specifically, (1) 
driven by increased profit possibilities, the ownership of 
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these franchises identifies numerous stadium construction 
proposals, (2) community activists show themselves to be 
surprisingly effective in extracting substantial, short-term 
benefits in negotiations with sports team owners, (3) the 
only long term beneficiaries of these negotiations, however, 
are the team owners, whose voices predominate in the 
financial, political and media arenas wherein negotiation 
outcomes are determined, and (4) the advancement of these 
corporate interests, as expressed through sports and stadium 
construction, also result in the reorganization of city 
space at the physical, economic and cultural level. 
The Community of the Near West Side 
Like many other urban communities, the Near West Side 
in Chicago has experienced the great white flight to the 
suburbs. The U.S. Census reports a decrease in local area 
population since the 30's. In addition, the sharp increase 
of the African-American population, combined with the sharp 
decrease of the white population, has made this area 
predominately African-American. Housing vacancies, 
exacerbated by the urban renewal projects of the 1960's and 
1970's, have also increased over the years. 
Prior to the 1960's, land had become available for the 
construction of the Henry Horner Homes, a high-rise public 
housing development. Later, major developments such as the 
University of Illinois at Chicago, Malcolm X College and the 
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expansion of the nearby Medical Center also proved to impact 
the Near West Side. The construction of the University of 
Illinois at Chicago in the 1960's displaced many residents, 
and more recently, the elimination of historic Maxwell 
Street transformed part of this community area. 
In describing its own community, a publication by The 
Interfaith Organizing Project (IOP) (1992:1), a local 
community organization, notes: 
Like many inner-city neighborhoods, [the Near West 
Side] is short on resources, but long on talent and 
potential ... Chicago's West side experienced a massive 
flight of capital and resources in the late 1960s and 
1970s; the main shopping district had been tortured in 
the 1968 uprisings following the death of Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and high-paying factory jobs soon 
relocated to the suburbs or Sun Belt. 
The same publication addresses the economic impact of 
these changes on the community: "Much of the surrounding 
areas suffered from chronic dis-investment--banks refused to 
lend money, insurers stopped underwriting properties and 
"slumlords" were more common than not" (pp. 20) . 
Often, a socially, politically, economically and 
physically disorganized community will be viewed by 
developers as an easy place to assert their agenda. Thus, a 
community like the Near West Side which experiences these 
problems becomes an open target of urban development 
programs driven by corporate interests. Though, in this 
case, government officials, stadium developers and local 
community representatives all agree that some form of 
revitalization is needed, the implementation method of any 
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proposed stadium development plans, as well as the economic 
and social outcomes of these plans, are topics of contention 
among these groups. 
Though it was in 1989 that the ownership of the Chicago 
Stadium, Bulls and Blackhawks officially expressed their 
interest in the construction of a new arena in the area, 
this was not the first time that this community had been 
exposed to such plans. A few years earlier, the Chicago 
Bears viewed the Near West Side as the "natural choice" for 
a large football stadium. 
The Near West Side and the Chicago Bears 
After winning the Superbowl in 1986, the Chicago Bears 
of the NFL expressed interest in moving to a new sports 
facility. This interest in a new stadium was tied to the 
lack of an "appropriate number" of skyboxes at Soldier Field 
and to the fact that 20 percent of the revenues raised by 
the 60 skyboxes in that facility went to its owner and 
operator, the Chicago Park District. The Bears estimated 
that 240 skyboxes at a new stadium would generate 
substantial income for the team. These economic rationales 
served as the driving force behind the search for a new 
site. 
The First Football Stadium Proposal on the Near West Side 
The University of Illinois at Chicago and Rush-
286 
Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center, both major 
landowners on the Near West Side, responding to the Bears' 
quest for a stadium site, began to investigate the 
possibility of bringing the team to the area. In January of 
1987, then Governor James Thompson, announced his support 
for the west side site over a lakefront site (the lakefront 
site had received wide opposition from environmental groups) 
(Bayard, 1987) . Other sites under consideration by the 
stadium committee of the Metropolitan Planning Council 
included the West Loop area, the railroad yard area south of 
Roosevelt Road, suburban Arlington Heights, McCormick West 
and the Illinois Central Railyards west of Soldier Field. 
Mayor Washington also appointed a Stadium Review Committee 
to make site recommendations. William Wirtz, owner of the 
Chicago Stadium on the Near West Side and of the Chicago 
Blackhawks, expressed an interest in the proposed site. In 
the end, the plan called for the hospital, the university, 
the Bears and Wirtz to develop a larger complex which would 
include linking an "Olympic-class" sports medicine and 
education facility to a new football field and a refurbished 
Chicago Stadium. The Chicago Bears also required the plan 
include the construction of 15,000 parking spaces, 72,000-
78,000 stadium seats and 240 skyboxes. 
Promoters of the Near West Side site contended it would 
"yield far more benefits to the city in terms of jobs and 
urban redevelopment than would any of the others under 
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consideration for the new football stadium" (Mccarron, 
1987a) and "it would be hard to find a neighborhood more in 
need of such help" (Reardon, 1987) . The promoters also 
predicted that the plan would receive the support of local 
political representatives. 
Other observers were not so optimistic. A report by 
The Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and 
Community Development (Steinhoff, 1988), identified four 
types of economic benefits as a result of a new Near West 
Side stadium: construction, operating, real estate and 
taxes. Though this report concluded that over the first ten 
years the new stadium would attract $364.9 million to the 
city of Chicago, a net increase of $217.8 million from the 
economic benefits generated by Soldier Field, it also noted 
that: 
and 
.. for the stadium to act as a catalyst, the money that 
it generates must be made available for neighborhood 
development (Steinhoff, 1988:24). 
... unfortunately, very little of the net increases in 
benefits are easily accessible for the purpose of 
neighborhood development. Less than a tenth of the 
benefits would flow to the public sector, the 
traditional agents for revitalizing depressed 
neighborhoods ... furthermore, Chicago taxpayers could 
loose up to $23 million if the Chicago Park District 
lets the Bears out of their lease at Soldier Field 
(Steinhoff, 1988:24-25). 
Speaking more favorably for this plan, The Metropolitan 
Planning Council, a civic group, noted in its preliminary 
report that a Near West Side sports complex has "the 
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potential for numerous neighborhood and citywide benefits" 
(Mccarron, 1987b) . Even though 300 housing units would be 
demolished, the possibility for replacements made it an 
attractive option amongst sponsors of the proposal. The 
Near West Side site became more and more attractive because 
of the limited infrastructural costs (less than $10 million) 
and was the final recommendation of the Stadium Site 
Selection Committee (Goff, 1987). 
Community Response to the First Football Stadium Plans 
As local newspapers began to print front page articles 
supporting the appropriateness of this plan, Mayor 
Washington became increasingly concerned about the eventual 
fate of the local community. Would the proposed plans serve 
as a way to expand the downtown area, thus pushing the local 
community further west? Would the residents have a voice in 
the negotiations? 
The local community, led by the Interfaith Organizing 
Project (!OP), a coalition of clergy and lay-persons founded 
in November of 1985, questioned this form of urban 
redevelopment. They viewed the stadium proposal as a "land 
grab" by white developers, and as a case where the poor 
would lose out to the wealthy downtown interests. 
The goal of this community organization was to 
redevelop these neighborhoods on the west side of the city 
independent of a sports stadium construction. Specifically, 
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the IOP plan included the construction of 2,000 housing 
units over a 10 year period. These units would fill in the 
void created by vacant lots. They could be apartment 
buildings, townhouse developments and/or single family 
structures. Redevelopment of the commercial establishments 
along Madison Street was also included in the plan, as was 
the introduction of community parks. These parks ranged 
from small parks aimed at eliminating current vacancies, to 
larger, centrally located developments (Mccarron and 
Thornton, 1987) . 
The IOP also claimed that the proposed stadium plans 
would displace 328 families and approximately 1,000-1,500 
low income and elderly residents. Rev. Arthur Griffin, a 
leader of the group, called the stadium a "playground for 
the wealthy in the suburbs" (Wilson, 1987) . Pastors of 
numerous churches in the area attempted, in Sunday sermons, 
to engage the local residents in the proposed developments, 
outlining their potential effect on the local community. 
Some even claimed that these plans would include the 
destruction of the local churches which have been there for 
years. Since a large portion of the membership of these 
churches resided outside this community, game traffic on 
Sundays could pose a direct threat on the viability of these 
congregations. At the same time, local pastors saw no 
"real" economic development arising from these plans. Rev. 
Griffin noted: "· .. we want this neighborhood developed in a 
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way that it is in conjunction with the aspirations and the 
dreams and hopes of the people of this community" and "we 
want some jobs that will have some significance, some jobs 
that will allow someone to feed a family" (Wilson, 1987) 
Others echoed these concerns, and according to Trimina 
O'Connor, a member of the IOP: "We don't want members of the 
neighborhood's churches and schools displaced so we can 
become a service heaven for the rich" (Wilson, 1987) . 
The media responded to the position of the local 
community as short sighted. Front page headlines appeared 
in the Chicago Tribune during early September of 1988 
entitled: "Chicago on Hold: The New Politics of Poverty." 
The articles criticized Mayor Washington's "open door" 
policy to neighborhoods which resulted in the emergence of 
community leaders like the IOP's Gates and Griffin. The 
series viewed these developments as "part of a growing 
political movement ... maintaining political and social 
control not by improving the lot of the poor, but by 
posturing against development" (IOP, 1992). The Chicago 
Tribune also reported in those same articles that the 
stadium would help revitalize the community. 
Mike Royko (1987), a newspaper columnist wrote about 
the community response in the Near West Side: 
At most, about 330 families would be moved [as a result 
of the stadium plans in the Near West Side] And the 
homes they'd be leaving are, for the most part, a bunch 
of dumps. Under the new plan, new housing in the same 
general area would be built, and they'd move into it. 
There would be new parks, playlots and shopping 
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clusters. It appears, then, that they're angry because 
they will be asked to leave beat-out old buildings and 
move into superior modern housing in an upgraded 
community. The solution to that problem appears 
obvious ... just build some new dumps and maybe they'll 
be happy. 
The Midwest Community Council, the oldest community 
organization on the Near West Side was more positive about 
the proposal than the IOP. Directed by its longtime leader 
Nancy Jefferson, a strong supporter of Mayor Washington 
during his election, this organization advocated for a 
stadium development plan only if the local community were to 
be involved in its planning. According to Jefferson (Thomas 
and Johnson, 1987) : 
I am excited about this prospect. It could mean a 
redevelopment of the area that has not happened in 40 
years. It means the creation of an economic base for 
jobs. The spillout from the stadium could create a 
safe, attractive and good community. 
And (Wilson and Mccarron, 1987) : 
It [stadium] has to be carefully planned so that it 
does not impose on the community and so that it does 
not replace the community. 
The community found itself divided on the issue and 
newly elected alderman Seneather Butler of the 27th Ward 
summed up community opinion on the proposed stadium as 
follows: 
One group says they don't want the stadium. Another 
group is saying 'tear the projects down-it's the only 
way we will get out of poverty,' and another group is 
saying that it wants the stadium, but not on the Near 
West Side (Wilson and Mccarron, 1987) . 
A report investigating the potential link between 
economic benefits and the residents of the Near West Side 
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supported the position taken by the !OP (Steinhoff, 1987). 
This report concluded that (1) only 2 percent of the 
temporary jobs created by the construction of the facility 
(30 jobs) would go to the residents and those hired from 
within the community would be likely to earn less due to 
discrimination in the construction industry, (2) one-third 
of the permanent jobs created (330 jobs), would go to local 
residents but they would also be low paying, (3) no evidence 
supports the notion that a sports center would increase the 
pace or scope of community development, (4) increased 
spending on the Near West Side will not benefit the local 
residents since, due to the fact that 84 percent of the 
property and 86 percent of the privately owned rental units 
are owned by individuals residing outside the local zip 
code, new money will leave the area, (5) displacement is a 
serious threat since it is often likely to follow large 
capital investments and physical improvements, especially 
when the majority of local residents are for the most part 
unable to finance a home and cannot afford to rent an 
apartment. Specifically, according to a report prepared by 
the Architectural Firm of Perkins and Will (1987), 
commissioned by Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center, 
only 1.5 percent of the existing households on the Near West 
Side could afford to finance a home and only 11.2 percent of 
existing rental households could afford to rent an 
apartment, (6) since the strength of the local economy is in 
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manufacturing, marketing local strengths and tying them to 
job training programs could prove far more beneficial than 
investment into a sports center, and (7) efforts to 
revitalize the community should be made at the micro level 
(Steinhoff, 1987). 
The proposed sports complex never materialized. 
Community dissatisfaction and difficulties with the finance 
of this large project, redirected the Bears' attention to a 
new stadium development proposal. 
The Second Football Stadium Proposal on the Near West Side 
In the Fall of 1987, the City and Mccaskey agreed to 
work together in building the stadium for the Chicago Bears, 
independent of any association with the previously proposed 
"complex plan." The agreement came after the city allowed 
new skyboxes at Soldier Field, a plan which, according to 
Robert Mier, assistant to the mayor for development and 
planning, "decompresses the intense time pressure of the 
construction schedule ... And it helps the Bears develop their 
skybox market" (Mccarron, 1987c). 
Eventually, two possible stadium plans were introduced 
within the same site area on the Near West Side. The first 
alternative would displace 475 families and provide 6,200 
parking spaces, while the second would displace 400 families 
and yield 5,400 spaces for parking (Mccarron, 1988c). 
The Bears sought $90 million in city and state funds to 
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help finance their privately held stadium. It was during 
this time that the Chicago White Sox threatened to leave 
Chicago unless the city and the state provided the franchise 
with a new stadium. Congressman Dan Rostenkowski introduced 
a bill in Washington that would grant the City of Chicago 
$250 million in bonding authority on behalf of stadium 
development for the Bears and the White Sox on the Near West 
Side. The city also sought to generate additional funding 
for these projects and requested approximately $30 million 
from the state. 
In May of 1988, Governor Thompson proposed the 
construction of a new ballpark for the White Sox on the Near 
West Side to take advantage of the infrastructural 
development offered to the Chicago Bears. This plan was 
supported by State Senator William Marovitz (D-Chicago) 
whose proposal claimed to save $50 million in infrastructure 
costs and it would account for no additional displacement. 
However, according to the IOP, this twin-stadium plan would 
displace half the area community. Though this plan received 
the support of the local papers, the IOP continued to 
challenge its assumptions. The residents participated in 
numerous marches and protests. They attended community 
meetings with city officials and held mock-funerals of their 
community. Their goal was to communicate to the city that 
these stadium development proposals would only displace the 
poor so that the wealthy could increase their profits. 
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Aaron Freeman (1988), a political satirist in Chicago, 
suggested in a commentary that locals should be allowed to 
stay in the skyboxes during the week and make them available 
for the wealthy on Sundays. He wrote: 
The city and the stadium developers should let the poor 
people who will be made homeless by the stadium live in 
its skyboxes six days a week. Of course on Sunday 
afternoons they'd have to get the hell out so that the 
bankers and commodities traders and such can have the 
boxes to drink, cheer and vomit in. . .. If you've ever 
been in one of these skyboxes you know there are far 
worse places to live. Skyboxes have color TV's, 
refrigerators, wet bars, even balconies so that fans 
can tan in nice weather. With a Murphy bed thrown in, 
a lot of them could rent as studio apartments or at 
least luxury housing projects. 
In the end, the construction of a Bears' stadium in the 
Near West Side did not occur. The following reasons can be 
cited: (1) the city was unable to silence the IOP and the 
concerns of the local community. Convincing the local 
constituency of the positive economic outcomes which the 
stadium development could provide would have made the 
approval of the site quicker and easier, (2) higher interest 
rates threatened the Bears financing agreement, (3) Chicago 
Stadium owner Wirtz, tried to sabotage the proposal. Even 
though an editorial by the Crain's Chicago Business (October 
17, 1988c, p. 10) urged Wirtz to cooperate with Mccaskey 
since a collaboration "would help stabilize West Side 
residential neighborhoods and prime the pump of economic 
development", the two failed to reach an agreement over 
parking revenues on Wirtz-owned land, and (4) the lack of 
community-wide support for the stadium development plan and 
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the uncertainty of the Rostenkowski efforts in Washington to 
raise money, made the state legislators indifferent to 
advancing the proposal and approving the $30 million funding 
requested by the city. 
The Near West Side and the United Center 
As part of an intense, profit-oriented era by 
professional teams, many sport organizations have attempted 
to reconstruct their facilities in order to maximize 
profits. Many owners recognize that the old facilities are 
not adequate in a new era of increased player salaries and 
potential income which can be generated from luxury seating, 
restaurants, concessions, increased ticket prices, etc. 
Moving the team into a new facility would increase general 
revenue, thus, increasing profit (Quirk and Fort, 1992). 
Because it lacked skyboxes, the Chicago Stadium, which 
opened in 1929, had a limited capability to generate 
additional revenue. As early as 1988, Bill Wirtz described 
that facility as "economically obsolete" and according to a 
source close to the owner: "There comes a point when you 
realize that you could hurt the health of the franchise by 
not making a move. The numbers right now don't favor 
keeping things the way they are" (Kass, 1988h). Steve 
Scanwald, marketing head for the Chicago Bulls explains the 
reasons that courtside seats at the Chicago Stadium, though 
originally priced at $35 were going for $300: "It's supply 
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and demand, the most simple and basic law of economics. 
It's the primary economic principle upon which this country 
was founded. And, of course, there are increased costs." 
The escalating player salaries, according to Scanwald, have 
been critical to the building of the new stadium: 
It's one of the things [paying the high salaries to 
compete for a championship] that motivated us to build 
the United Center, to be sure we can compete 
economically with the other 26 teams ... The first 
objective is to win the championship. The second 
objective is if we can at the same time break even or 
even make some money. No bones about it that we want 
to operate at a profit" (Markus, 1994). 
Unmistakably, it was the search for new profit sources that 
prompted the owners of the Bulls and Blackhawks to build a 
new stadium (Klein, 1994). 
In August of 1988, a few months after the second 
proposal for a Bears' stadium had fallen through, Wirtz 
investigated the possibility of a new basketball and hockey 
arena across the street from the Chicago Stadium. This 
facility would be privately financed from revenue generated 
by the luxury skyboxes and advertising sources. The 
proposed 180 skyboxes in that facility would range in price 
from $50,000 to $120,000 a year. Though financing for the 
facility would come from private sources, city and state 
assistance for public works improvements would be needed. 
Community and stadium developers relations 
After observing the conflict between the local 
community and Mccaskey on the proposed construction of a 
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football stadium for the Chicago Bears, Jerry Reinsdorf, 
owner of the Bulls, said regarding his approach to the 
building of the indoor arena (!OP, 1992:3): 
... we were determined not to do battle with the 
community. That is what Mike Mccaskey did, and he 
lost. One person can never win these battles-everyone 
has to get something. Years ago, it was common for 
developers to come into a neighborhood with plans and 
blueprints, but times have changed. We wanted to get 
this project moving and be a good neighbor; it's just 
good business. 
The community also took a different approach to the proposed 
basketball and hockey facility. According to a community 
organizer: "This second time around we wanted to use the 
opportunity to get something out of it" (Schmich, 1992). 
This new approach by the developers, however, did not 
mean that they would be willing to readily provide community 
development funds and off er fair compensation to those 
displaced by this project. The Stadium Joint Venture, 
organized by Wirtz and Reinsdorf, repeatedly attempted in 
January and May of 1990, to buy the homes standing in the 
way of their development at low cost ($35,000 - considerably 
lower than the value of redevelopment) . 
Mayor Daley's position also proved to be different from 
the stance which politicians had previously taken. His 
approach gave more leverage to the local community since 
according to Daley: "What this community needs most is jobs 
and economic development, but not at the expense of homes 
and neighborhoods" (Reardon, 199lb). In the end, 40 homes 
were torn down to make room for the new sports facility 
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(Frank, 1992). 
For the stadium developers this project allowed for 
local economic and social growth. As Gates noted to me: 
In one of our meetings, a representative from the 
Stadium Joint Venture organization said: If you want to 
make money (referring to the community) you stand in 
the way of progress. I was outraged. This is 
ridiculous. They were undermining our intelligence. 
Like we do not know what is best for our community. 
See, there comes an outsider to tell you what to do. 
These were some of the things we had to deal with. 
Ignorance and being viewed as inferior ... You see that 
is the problem. Others want to tell you what is best 
for you. Our approach was that we wanted, the 
community that is, to define our own destiny. We want 
to make the decisions as to what is best for us. Why? 
Because we live here, we are the ones to be impacted by 
the new construction, the traffic and all that. That's 
why. 
Though the Stadium Joint Venture and the community 
representatives had different perspectives on the way "real" 
development should occur on the Near West Side, the two 
groups attempted to work out their differences. As part of 
these negotiations, the community residents proved capable 
of asserting their commitment to the well-being of those 
directly affected by displacement, while extracting from the 
developers short-term community benefits. 
Community Response to the United Center Development Plans 
Members of the !OP involved in representing the local 
community, identified the case of the New Comiskey Park 
development as one where the developers did not consider the 
well-being of the South Armour Square community. For them, 
the Comiskey Park case served as an example of a situation 
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to be avoided. It was noted to me by an IOP member: 
We looked at what had happened on the south side. When 
they wanted to build that stadium they told the 
residents who were to be dislocated that they would 
place them into temporary housing, and then move them 
into their newly constructed homes. In the meantime, 
the developers began the demolition of their homes, and 
went along with the development of the ballpark. This 
temporary replacement housing proved to be more than 
temporary, since the people stayed there for .. hm .. , I 
think over a year (thinking) ... well it was actually 
more than a year, about a year and a half. And, after 
all that, their so called "new housing" was not what 
you would have expected. The reason why is because 
they (the residents) were taken over by the developers. 
This is not what we wanted to happen here. 
Jill, a member of the !OP also remarked: 
Those being moved from their homes wanted to stay 
together in their new neighborhood. They had lived 
next to each other for years. They raised their 
children together, they had developed close ties, which 
did not want to break because of the stadium 
construction. Some of the people to be moved had lived 
there for 30 and 40 years. 
Reinsdorf was also surprised by the strong commitment 
of the local residents to stay in their neighborhood. In a 
newspaper account, he responded about those who asked for 
new homes in the neighborhood: 
I was suspicious at first that they were trying to line 
their pockets. . .. I learned that people there are 
proud of their community and want to stay there. I 
thought most of the people whose houses would be taken 
would want cash. I was surprised how many just wanted 
new homes in their neighborhoods (Schmich, 1992) . 
During the negotiations with the Stadium Joint Venture, 
the press continued to depict the efforts of the community 
and those in leadership positions as counter-productive to 
the well-being of the general area. Both Gates and Griffin 
were criticized by the media. Yet, for the community 
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leaders negotiations with the developers could prove an 
opportunity from which the Near West Side could benefit. 
Gates noted to me: 
One of the important issues was for us to understand 
their tactics. They said to us during the negotiations 
for the United Center: Well, you know this area is 
devastated, the land is worth nothing, so you should 
let it go. You cannot tell me that the land is 
worthless, that there is no value to the land, when you 
are doing everything in your power to acquire it. You 
see what I mean, a piece of land which you want is not 
valueless, it is worth something; that is why you want 
it ... We also knew that they were going to get their 
stadium, because they got the resources. That 
eventually they were going to succeed. And let me tell 
you, we were not against the stadium. We wanted to 
make sure that the community would benefit from it and 
that the people displaced would not get screwed in the 
process. That's all. 
How did they (the Stadium Joint Venture) respond? 
They were surprised. They did not expect such a 
response. They thought: here is an area which is 
devastated, we should have no problem getting what we 
want through. 
The community presented its concerns to stadium owners in 
specific terms. Gates, who played a key role in the 
negotiations, told me about the strategy: 
You do not want to make it a social issue. Frame it in 
the context of a business deal, keep the social out of 
it. These people do not care about the community. 
They want to get something from us. Well let's deal, 
we'll give you what you want, if you give us A., B., 
C., etc ... 
This approach afforded the community an opportunity to carry 
forward their plan as they negotiated with the stadium 
developers. 
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The Actual Product: The United Center 
In the end, 12 national and international lending 
institutions came together to provide the funding for the 
United Center. Those included Fuji Bank Ltd., which lead 
seven Japanese institutions, Westpac Banking Corp., of 
Australia, Banque Paribas of France and three local-black 
owned banks: Seaway National Bank, Drexel National Bank and 
Independence Bank of Chicago made up the syndicate (Reardon, 
1992). The City also agreed to cooperate on land 
acquisition, provide $3.2 million for infrastructure 
improvements, offer a 40 percent break on amusements taxes 
and apply a 4 percent tax to 60 percent of the 216 skybox 
income (Kass, 1991). 
This $175 million facility would assist the ownership 
and management of these two Chicago professional teams 
(Bulls and Blackhawks) in achieving their goals. To place 
the size of this new structure into perspective, the United 
Center surrounds 1 million square feet of space compared to 
the 275,000 square feet which were available in the Chicago 
Stadium. Its large structure provided ample flexibility in 
building facilities (i.e. luxury skyboxes, restaurants, 
etc) . There are 216 luxury boxes in three levels which are 
priced from $55,000 to $175,000 a year. All of these luxury 
boxes were rented well before the opening of the facility. 
They contribute over $25 million to the Bulls and Blackhawks 
annually. 
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The Community Agreement with the Stadium Developers 
The Stadium Joint Venture and the community of the Near 
West Side eventually came to an agreement about the 
construction of a new sports arena in the area. The IOP 
served as the negotiating arm of the community and the 
various terms of this agreement are outlined below (IOP, 
1992 :33-34): 
(1) The Stadium Joint Venture will build replacement 
housing for all resident homeowners. All the houses must be 
built before the homeowners will vacate their present homes. 
Construction of the new stadium will begin after the 
replacement housing is built and residents are resettled. 
(2) The replacement homes will be constructed in the 
community-designated "Better Alternative Area"- this area 
extends from Darnen to Western Avenue, and from Washington 
Boulevard to the Eisenhower Expressway. 
(3) Substantial cash values were set for the residents' 
homes. Those wishing to receive cash will secure fair 
market value of their property, plus $30,000; or $75,000 for 
a single-family home; 100,000 for a duplex; or $130,000 for 
a triplex. 
(4) Rental tenants will be compensated according to the 
national standard as outlined by HUD. This is $6,000 per 
unit. 
(5) The Stadium Joint Venture will provide a $600,000, no 
interest loan to IOP to develop 75 "for sale" homes. 
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(6) The !OP could, if necessary, enjoin construction of the 
stadium if the Stadium Joint Venture fails to live up to its 
agreement. The Stadium Joint Venture also agreed to 
compensate !OP for attorney's fees and associated costs if 
litigation is pursued. 
(7) The Stadium Joint Venture will provide a subsidy to 
each resettled resident homeowner for real estate taxes that 
were attributed to increased property tax assessments. 
(8) Near the site of the new housing, a park will be built 
linking Touhy, Herbert Park and land adjoining Creiger High 
School. 
(9) The Stadium Joint Venture agrees not to acquire any 
land west of Darnen, in the Better Alternative Area. 
However, the Stadium Joint Venture could exercise an option 
to acquire one block in this area, only if the end result 
was a mutually-agreeable, commercial development. 
(10) A new public library will be built on Madison Street in 
the Better Alternative Area. 
(11) On stadium-owned land, free parking will be provided 
for affected churches. 
(12) The city will be lobbied by both sides to fund a 
construction trade program at Malcolm X College. 
(13) The Stadium Joint Venture agrees that there will be no 
simultaneous events in the new and old stadiums. 
(14) !OP recognizes the Stadium Joint Venture's help in re-
opening Mile Square Health Center [in 1991, the Stadium 
Joint Venture gave the clinic a $75,000 grant to meet its 
payroll] . 
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It becomes clear from the above terms that the 
community of the Near West Side was successful in receiving 
various community benefits. Yet, these contributions by the 
stadium developers will prove limited, since in the long-
term, this community will experience additional private and 
public investment with the potential of transforming the 
racial and economic composition of the area. 
The Impact on the Community 
As previously agreed between the !OP and the Stadium 
Joint Venture, the construction of replacement homes was 
completed prior to the development of the United Center. 
Assistance was also provided by the Reinsdorf-Wirtz group to 
finance 75 two-flats and single family homes for other low 
and moderate income community residents. In addition, a 
contribution of $80,000 was made to Malcolm X College as 
part of a four year scholarship fund. The Bulls' charity, 
Charitabulls, donated $50,000 to the computer center of the 
nearby Mabel Manning Library. The library was named after 
Mabel Manning, who lived in the community for many years and 
was involved with the "stadium wars." Through these and 
other programs, the ownership of the United Center responded 
to many of its financial commitments toward the local 
community. 
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In recent months the ownership of the facility has 
looked beyond the walls of the United Center, interested in 
expanding local economic growth. In September of 1994, the 
Bulls donated $4 million to build a recreation and 
educational facility. More recently, the Bulls announced 
that a $375,000 contribution would be utilized to support 
the Chicago Park District's Midnight Basketball League. 
Finally, in February of 1995, officials of the United Center 
announced an economic development program aimed at providing 
$1 million for new business and job growth initiatives to 
the local area. The program would be available to 
entrepreneurs to start or expand services in the area, 
within the perimeters of Ashland Avenue, the Eisenhower 
Expressway, Western Avenue and Lake Street (Barron, 1995) 
Overall, it is estimated that approximately $10 million has 
been invested in the Near West Side by the stadium 
developers. 
Recent plans in the area have also included the 
rehabilitation of 403 middle income units at the Henry 
Horner Homes, the public housing projects in the area. 
Under the five phase plan (to be completed by the year 
2001) , a number of new units would replace the 50 percent 
current vacancy. According to this project, the height of 
these structures will decrease and the potential for the 
complete demolition of eight of those buildings is currently 
under review (Ihejirika, 1995) . 
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These developments have been welcomed by the IOP and 
local community leaders. Ernest Gates told me that in the 
case of the United Center, because of the overwhelming 
response and mobilization of the residents, the local 
community got the most out of the final arrangements. 
According to Gates: "The community was so successful in 
getting much of what it wanted that inquiries are coming in 
from people in cities in the U.S. and abroad who want to 
know the West Siders' technique" (Frank, 1992) . And, 
according The Interfaith Organizing Project (1992:26): "The 
agreement reached between the Near West Side community and 
the Stadium Joint Venture was historic. A largely black and 
low-income community was able to turn the tide of "urban 
renewal" into a useful catalyst for neighborhood based, 
redevelopment" (pp. 26). 
At the same time some important questions persist when 
considering the future of those residing on the Near West 
Side. Are these recent developments signs of the local 
community's success? Will the benefits of these economic 
investments belong to its current residents? Is this the 
beginning of a massive displacement and gentrification 
process which will attract residents of different 
racial/ethnic and socioeconomic status to the area? Or, 
will the Near West Side in Chicago become an expansion of 
the downtown area, providing numerous support services to 
those who work and live there? In this regard, poverty 
becomes functional within the urban environment since it 
provides the population needed to be displaced for new 
development (Gans, 1971). 
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The efforts of the local community were aimed at 
enhancing economic development through community organizing. 
Specifically, the focus was to solve the immediate community 
concerns in exchange for providing support to the prof it 
oriented agenda of the stadium developers. Organizers were 
successful in mobilizing the residents by directing their 
energies to the adversarial relationship between the 
developers and the community. Yet, the nature of the 
economic development as advocated by the local leadership 
has been short term and incapable of becoming 
institutionalized. 
The area east of the United Center has been the one to 
experienced considerable redevelopment. The government has 
invested over $13 million in streets improvements for the 
new stadium (Reardon, 1991b) and additional spending in 
beautification programs have recently occurred. These 
public investments will ensure that the upcoming 1996 
national Democratic convention becomes an opportunity for 
the city to showcase itself to the rest of the nation. 
Under this scenario, the United Center development serves as 
a "buffer", a physical boundary, intended to keep the 
"unwanted" to the west. If that is the case, the 
construction of this stadium becomes more than a business 
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venture and a place for fans to cheer and jeer. The stadium 
becomes a tool for urban redevelopment, capable of fueling 
the expansion of downtown Chicago westwards, reshaping in 
its way the existing urban terrain. 
This "redevelopment" supports the notion that as 
central cities, partly due to the suburbanization movement 
after WWII, lost jobs to the emerging structures of the 
periphery, and must refocus and develop a new economic 
function for themselves. Judd (1995) notes that the efforts 
on the part of cities across America to redefine themselves 
and invest in the creation of the central city center as a 
place of tourism, conventions and sports are a part of this 
reorganization. Connecting the revitalization of the Near 
West Side to large-scale capital investment projects such as 
the stadium projects discussed in this chapter can have 
broader implications. These forms of investment, due to 
their proximity to the downtown area, could not only alter 
the local community but also shape the cultural character of 
the city itself. 
Conclusion 
The case of the Near West Side in Chicago is a case of 
an urban, economically devastated community which has become 
exposed to various urban renewal programs orchestrated 
during the last few decades. In addition, the community has 
been exposed to the corporatization and capitalism of 
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professional sports. An investigation of the recent 
political economy of sports shows that place has 
increasingly become an integral part in the operations of a 
professional franchise. For the owners of professional 
teams such as the Chicago Bears, Bulls and the Blackhawks, 
place has become a critical means of production. It is 
space (the stadium), which provides the capitalist with an 
opportunity to expand capital and enlarge profit. Thus, 
selling entertainment through the use of space becomes 
vital. The construction of luxury boxes provides privacy, 
good viewing of the game and an array of personal benefits 
(i.e., cocktails, dinner, etc.,), all aimed at a better 
entertainment experience. These are the forces which make 
the construction of the United Center a "necessity." 
We can also see that the existing socioeconomic and 
political conditions are supportive of this endeavor. 
Specifically, (1) the local and state governments support 
the idea of stadium development by providing infrastructural 
development funds and various tax-benefits and, (2) the 
economically depressed area makes the construct of the 
facility easier, since such community is perceived to be 
weak and more willing to embrace economic development 
opportunities (Rubin and Rubin, 1987) . 
The response of the community to this project is 
critical. Many of the members of the IOP proudly discussed 
their success in their battle with "Goliath." The ongoing 
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services which the United Center provides to the community 
are very different when compared to other past urban 
development projects in that area. This sports facility, 
provides very little to the community after its 
construction. According to an informant: "· .. it is [United 
Center] a free standing, money making structure which will 
be there for many years and after its construction, has 
nothing to offer to this community." 
The stadium development plans lasted for over six 
years. The exchanges between the developers and the local 
organizers, during those years, can be divided into two 
distinct historical eras: (1) the Chicago Bears' stadium 
proposal and its eventual defeat (mid to late 1980's), and 
(2) the United Center proposal and the eventual construction 
of this facility (late 1980's and early 1990's). Who won 
and who lost? It is clear that during the Mccaskey era, the 
community succeeded, partly because of its actions and 
partly because of the inability of the developers to 
generate adequate funding. The outcomes of the "second 
battle" with Wirtz and Reinsdorf have yet to be determined 
but could include the expansion of the city core. 
The corporate drive of sports for profits resulted in 
the construction of the United Center on the Near West Side 
of Chicago. A poor, African-American community was capable 
of responding to these urban projects with courage and 
strength. Yet, the stadium developers' investments are the 
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beginning of additional investment which will reorganize 
this part of the city. In the end, stadium development 
becomes not only a vehicle for the physical reorganization 
of urban space but also a means of reshaping the social, 
economic and cultural fabric of this community. 
CHAPTER 10 
THREE STADIUM DEVELOPMENT PLANS, THREE URBAN COMMUNITIES: 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the three 
case studies presented above at two different levels. 
First, the chapter examines the communities' responses to 
the proposed stadium plans. How did each community attempt 
to resist the proposed plans? What were the similarities 
and/or differences? What factors were critical as these 
communities attempted to negotiate with the stadium 
developers? In this regard, the chapter concludes that race 
and class, local political influence, internal divisions, 
occupancy status, the media, political circumstances, and 
the imposition of state government, proved to have an 
influence on these community responses. 
Second, this chapter investigates the community effects 
of these stadium development plans. What are the 
similarities and/or differences in the outcomes following 
the completion of the new Comiskey Park, the installation of 
lights at Wrigley Field and the construction of the United 
Center? What might be the short and/or long term effect of 
the urban development projects on these three areas? 
The chapter concludes with a comparison of the role 
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which the government played in these developments. 
Conclusions then are drawn regarding the relationship 
between government and private enterprise within the urban 
environment, as exemplified through stadiums. Finally, the 
role of these urban social movements is addressed. 
Community Response to the Stadium Development Plans 
The responses of South Armour Square, Lake View and 
Near West Side communities to the proposed stadium 
development plans differed. For example, the Lake View 
residents sought to altogether halt the installation of 
lights at Wrigley Field, whereas the Near West Side 
residents viewed the construction of an indoor sports arena 
as an opportunity for urban redevelopment. 
In order to compare the community effects of these 
stadium development plans on the urban environment, a 
consideration of the social, political and economic 
organization of these communities is essential. 
composition of these communities will determine: 
The 
(1) the way 
the government and the stadium developers perceived the 
community concerns, (2) the extent of community inclusion in 
the negotiations, and (3) the duration and effectiveness of 
the community opposition to the proposed plans. 
Since community response and effects are interrelated, 
an understanding of these variations proves fundamental. 
For example, race played an important role in the 
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communities responses and consequently in the community 
effect. The success of the Lake View community in 
developing a viable and comprehensive program to address the 
effects of night games at Wrigley Field, and the inability 
of the South Armour Square residents to enlist on-going 
government support for their community, is partly due to the 
racial composition of these communities. Yet, what proves 
consistent when examining the resident reaction to these 
stadium plans, is that all three of these communities viewed 
these projects as cases where the corporate interests of the 
wealthy came in conflict with the well-being of the 
powerless residents. Power proves central to these 
community-based, urban resistance movements. 
Following, I identify some of the critical factors 
which were integral as these communities responded to the 
stadium development plans. However, it is important to note 
that all these factors operate together, they are 
interconnected, influencing the community organization, and 
thus, the community response. 
Race and Class 
Race and class proved critically important when 
comparing these community-based, urban, stadium resistance 
movements. Both the South Armour Square and Near West Side 
community residents involved in the "stadium battles" were 
African-American, whereas the residents in Lake View were 
ethnic European. Similarly, the incomes of these groups 
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varied. The south and west side residents were less 
affluent than their north side counterparts. 
The government and the stadium developers perceived 
these communities differently in the negotiation processes. 
Because of their race and class position, the community 
residents from South Armour Square and the Near West Side 
were viewed as groups standing in the way of urban 
development and progress. On the other hand, the concerns 
of the Lake View residents were identified to be very 
legitimate, and worthy of serious consideration. As a 
result of these perceptions, the ability of the African-
American community in South Armour Square to effectively 
oppose the construction of the new Comiskey Park and more 
importantly, ensure that the relocation plans were 
responsive to all of its residents failed. 
O'Connell, involved in the new Comiskey Park 
development communicated to me how the local residents 
perceived the developments on the south side, and how race 
played an important role. She noted: 
I was very mad when I talked to people about stadium 
issues in Chicago. Automatically, everyone assumed 
that I was talking about the Cubs. People in Chicago 
were mostly aware of the lights situation at Wrigley 
Field. Here we have a community on the verge of 
displacement, and people in Chicago were not talking 
about it. Yet, the lights issue at Wrigley Field 
received all the media coverage. Everybody knew about 
the Cubs. I am sure that race played an important role 
here. We were more aware of the events affecting a 
white community than we were about the events affecting 
a black community. People also viewed the new Comiskey 
development as something good for South Armour Square. 
I don't think that this is a fair assessment. 
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Because of these differences, the concerns of the 
predominantly African American residents of the South Armour 
Square, following the construction of the new Comiskey Park, 
did not receive the extensive attention which the Lake View 
residents generated. Specifically, the Neighborhood 
Protection Plan in Lake View has proven effective, however, 
such plan has been instituted in neither the South Armour, 
nor the Near West Side case. 
Race continued to play a role when the residents of the 
South Armour Square community were unable to enlist the 
support of their neighboring white communities. The sharp 
racial divisions did not provide these residents with an 
opportunity to build a coalition which would have proven 
extremely helpful in the negotiations with the government 
and the developers. 
Finally, it was also proven in this case that it was 
much easier for the government to directly remove, poor 
minority residents, than it would have been to remove 
middle-class or wealthy individuals who are white. The 
various social, political and economic power which these 
groups exemplify contributes to these variations. 
Local political influence 
Though these communities employed many similar tactics 
to influence the stadium development plans, in the end, 
involvement in the political process proved critical. A 
comparison of the three communities' organizing efforts, 
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shows that the advocacy of their aldermen to City Hall 
varied. Specifically, the Lake View alderman was actively 
involved as the community attempted to stop the installation 
of lights at Wrigley Field. According to Mccarron (1987e) 
Meetings about lights at Wrigley Field are typically 
heralded by printed agendas and press releases; emceed 
by a professional mediator hired by the city; attended 
by Ald. Bernard Hansen (44th), two state 
representatives, two state senators, the city's 
commissioner of planning; covered by reporters from The 
Tribune, the Sun-Times, the Lake View Booster and 
Channels 2, 5, 7 and 9. 
Although the Near West Side's local alderman engaged in 
the stadium issues, she did not take a convincing stance in 
favor of the opposition leaders. Instead, the newly elected 
alderman attempted to determine the community "feelings" on 
the issue. As a result, community residents emerged as the 
leaders who would direct and organize the community response 
to the stadium development plans. 
Finally, in South Armour Square the local aldermans' 
role in the negotiations was less than minimal. He proved 
incapable of advocating for the interests of the residents 
in City Hall. According to Mccarron (1987e): 
They [some residents in the South Armour Square] 
learned about the bill-signing ceremony only because 
somebody heard about it on radio. So they gathered 
over the weekend in the kitchen of neighbor Lillian 
Brown, tore up a bunch of cardboard soda-pop cartons 
and hand-lettered some protest signs with Magic 
Markers .... They have been told nothing [about the new 
stadium], not by the mayor, not by his department 
heads, not by their alderman, Patrick Huels (11th), not 
even by the precinct captain even though the precinct 
with all the endangered homes delivered 345 of its 359 
votes to Harold Washington in April's election. 
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After considering these variations in local political 
representation, it is obvious to see why the Lake View 
residents proved to be the most successful of the three 
communities. They attempted to organize and influence 
decisions through the existing political structure. Forming 
a partnership with the local alderman, city government and 
community representatives, resulted in effective 
negotiations with stadium developers. This type of 
conventional participation, which uses the institutional 
channels of representative government (Conway, 1990; Janda, 
Berry and Goldman, 1996), was clearly a central aspect of 
the strategy employed by the north side community. 
Internal Divisions 
A comparison of the three communities' responses to the 
stadium development plans shows the Lake View community to 
be the most unified. Although the Near West Side did 
experience some internal divisions, as various community 
organizations viewed the proposed plans differently, it was 
the South Armour Square response which proved to be the most 
divided. 
Contributing to this internal division were the 
residents' feeling of powerlessness. Because of the 
influence of the state, they believed that the construction 
of a stadium in their community was inevitable. As a 
result, they began to act individually. Their goal became 
to arrange the best deal possible for themselves, since they 
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feared the that the state would take over their homes 
without even providing replacement housing. Likewise, 
community leaders on the Near West Side also realized that 
in the end the United Center would be built. Yet, they 
remained more focused to extract the best possible benefits 
for the local community. The extent of displacement in 
South Armour Square and the power of the state, proved much 
more overwhelming in dividing the community response than in 
the more limited displacement and state imposition 
experienced by the Near West Side. 
On the other hand, the Lake View residents did not 
experience the threat of direct reorganization of physical 
space due to displacement. Thus, their personal interests 
did not become an issue, and, as a result, the Lake View 
residents viewed the introduction of lights to be a 
community problem rather than an individual concern. They 
remained united. 
Imposition of Local and State Government 
The magnitude of power exercised by the state and local 
governments also played an important role in influencing the 
communities' responses to the stadium development plans. In 
the case of the South Armour Square, the influence of the 
state government in realizing the construction of a publicly 
funded stadium for the White Sox proved overwhelming. The 
state and the city, through the ISFA, had access to many 
resources - political, legal, financial - in their efforts 
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to remove the residents. In the face of all this, the 
community's attempts to challenge these plans proved 
ineffective. 
The role of the state and local government on the Near 
West Side was not imposed in the same manner that it was in 
the South Armour Square case. Though the government in this 
community supported the private interests of the developers, 
the community leaders did not directly conflict with 
government representatives. Part of the strategy of the 
Near West Side community leaders was to exclude the 
government from the negotiations. As Gates told me: 
I knew that if we could keep the government out of the 
negotiations we would have a chance to get something 
out of the agreement. You see, that was our goal. You 
can never beat the government. That's why we were 
successful. 
Finally, in the Lake View case, the government did not 
directly impose its will on the community. This greatly 
contributed to the resident's effectiveness. Though, in the 
end, the ordinance passed by the city allowed for the 
installation of lights at Wrigley Field, through the active 
involvement of the local alderman, and a strong voter 
turnout in a non-binding referendum, the residents had the 
opportunity to effectively communicate their concerns. 
Political circumstances 
It was during the Washington administration that the 
South Armour Square, Lake View and Near West Side stadium 
development plans first emerged. With the death of Mayor 
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Washington, these stadium issues in Chicago became even more 
politicized. The Mayor employed an approach which had 
attempted to balance the community requests with the 
interests of the developers. Because of this strategy, 
Washington proved capable of advancing his agenda by 
building appropriate political coalitions in City Hall. 
Following his death, political direction on the stadium 
issues diminished, subsequently having a different effect on 
the three communities. 
In the case of South Armour Square, this politicization 
contributed to further dividing the community and weakening 
its response. On the Near West Side, the effect was 
neutral. Even though plans to develop a stadium on the Near 
West Side had the support of Washington, the Mayor was also 
sensitive to the community's needs. The shift in 
administrations provided community leaders with an 
opportunity to assert their agenda. Yet, the lack of local 
political support, did not provide the residents leverage to 
halt the stadium development plans. 
On the other hand, the death of Mayor Washington 
provided an already politically engaged Lake View community 
with an opportunity to further oppose the lights proposal. 
This community attempted to enlist wider City Hall support 
since the political agenda on this stadium issue now lacked 
direction. 
The community which had the greatest political means to 
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resist the stadium development plans (Lake View), proved to 
potentially benefit the most from these circumstances. On 
the other hand, the community with the least effective local 
representation (South Armour Square) proved unable to take 
advantage of these circumstances and resist the stadium 
development plans. 
Occupancy Status 
The type of occupancy also proved to play an important 
role in these community responses, especially in the case of 
South Armour Square. The presence of both renters and 
owners divided this community when the relocation package 
was proposed. For the renters, the ISFA offer recognized 
the needs of the owners to a much greater extent than it 
recognized those of their own. Because of the relocation 
proposal, the community became further divided due to their 
occupancy status. The owners, without regard for the 
renters, concentrated on extracting the best replacement 
housing possible. 
The role of the media 
Another factor which proved influential in the way 
these communities responded to the stadium development plans 
was the media. The media in all of these cases sided with 
the developers, often isolating the community leaders 
describing them as radical, self-serving and insensitive to 
the well-being of their communities. The media also 
consistently promoted the proposed social and economic 
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benefits of these professional sports franchises. Acting in 
support of urban redevelopment, they urged the construction 
of a stadium on the Near West Side since it would save this 
socially and economically devastated community. Though 
Lake View was more successful in utilizing the media to 
advance its discontent with the lights proposal at Wrigley 
Field, none of these communities found the media as an ally 
in their efforts. 
Role of these factors in community response 
Because of the above mentioned factors (the types of 
organizational strategies), the effectiveness of the tactics 
utilized by the residents proved different. The community 
of Lake View was most capable in its response to the 
installation of lights, as exemplified by the neighborhood 
protection plan. This plan shows that the community ensured 
continued attention to the effects of this stadium 
development plan. The community of the Near West Side 
proved capable of sustaining numerous short term benefits. 
Yet, this community has been unable to guarantee continued 
partnerships with the government and the developers on 
issues facing the Near West Side. Finally, the community of 
the South Armour Square proved incapable of resisting these 
stadium development plans, resulting in considerable 
displacement. 
In considering the communities' responses, it becomes 
clear that structural forces played a very critical role. 
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The inability of the South Armour Square to effectively 
address the community concerns can be attributed to factors 
such as race, class, and the role of the state. These 
factors proved to impact each community differently, 
producing social inequalities, while also communicating 
their effect on urban change within a larger context. 
The communities of South Armour Square and the Near 
West Side did not rely on the political system to advance 
their goals. The community leaders instead attempted to 
take it upon themselves to best respond to the stadium 
development plans. On the other hand, in Lake View, the 
community proved most capable of employing the political 
system to represent its goals. This variation can be 
attributed to the different ways blacks and whites perceive 
the effectiveness and inner-workings of the government. 
Research shows that for blacks, the political system is 
viewed to be ineffective, untrustworthy and incapable of 
responding without bias to their needs (Shingles, 1981; Bobo 
and Gilliam, 1990) . 
In addition to these structural factors, the residents 
of the South Armour Square and the Near West Side accepted 
the fact that eventually these stadiums would be built in 
their communities. As a result, their goal became to search 
for the best possible arrangement, thus, contributing to the 
success of the stadium developers. The community responses 
then are part of a dynamic experience of both structure and 
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agency. 
The Effects of the Stadium Plans on the Three Communities 
The stadium development plans discussed in this study 
contributed to the physical and cultural reorganization of 
these communities. The effectiveness of the community 
response and the degree of impact proved interconnected. 
Following, I summarize these effects: 
South Armour Square and the New Comiskey Park 
The new Comiskey Park in South Armour Square was 
completed in 1991. This stadium was meant to provide the 
White Sox with increased prof its since they threatened to 
leave the city and the state. As a result, the construction 
of this sports facility required the displacement of an 
African-American community including numerous businesses. 
This development has had a direct physical effect on this 
area, since, over 15 acres of land were taken from the 
community to develop the new structure. 
In addition to this physical reorganization, the 
culture of this community has also been transformed with the 
removal of this neighborhood and the demolition of 
McCuddy's, a local baseball bar which had become a south 
side landmark. In addition, the lease agreement between the 
state and the franchise prohibited locals from selling their 
products outside the new sports facility, since the 
franchise was given complete control over all game related 
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sales. 
Efforts by the community to address these effects have 
been slow. The public housing residents left behind, 
without the support of the local government, have recently 
attempted to redevelop their community. Their goal has been 
to reintroduce the community businesses destroyed during the 
stadium development process. 
Lake View and Wrigley Field 
In 1988, the community of Lake View experienced the 
addition of lights at Wrigley Field, a stadium development 
plan. Though, there was no displacement or direct physical 
reorganization of space resulting from the lights 
installation, this stadium development plan has contributed 
to transforming this part of Lake View into an entertainment 
area. Night games assisted the various entertainment 
businesses by supplying the "after the game" crowds. A 
parking program intended to assist the community, affected 
businesses which did not rely on night games for business. 
Thus, a different type of co-existence between Wrigley Field 
and the community of Lake View, driven by this stadium 
development plan, emerged. 
At the same time, the long term implications of the 
lights at Wrigley Field on the community of Lake View are 
yet to be determined. Driven by economic rationales and 
transportation demands, the community could be transformed 
as efforts to accommodate a larger number of night games are 
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undertaken. Specifically, under this scenario, surface or 
multi-level parking structures would yield more profits than 
the current operation of these structures as rental units. 
If that becomes the case, Wrigley Field will not be a 
ballpark integrated with the local community, but rather 
another suburban-style facility. The future stability of 
this north side community largely depends on the stability 
of Wrigley Field. 
Near West Side and the United Center 
In the 80's and the early 90's the community of the 
Near West Side was presented with proposals for the 
construction of two sports facilities. These proposed 
stadium development plans resulted in the construction of 
the United Center in 1994. 
Though the magnitude of this project is not comparable 
to the new Comiskey Park, displacement of residents proved 
inescapable. Beyond this direct, physical effect, the 
construction of the United Center on the Near West Side has 
sparked additional physical reorganization, and has served 
as a catalyst of culture change. 
Specifically, driven by the 1996 National Democratic 
Convention to be held at the United Center, the city has 
invested considerably into area beautification and other 
related projects, including the demolition of the nearby 
Henry Horner Public Housing. This form of public investment 
occurred along side additional private spending on the area 
329 
surrounding the United Center. To that extent, the actions 
of the private and public sector work to alter the cultural 
and physical environment of this community. 
Though some form of urban redevelopment on the Near 
West Side was clearly needed, the community advocated 
different types of spatial reorganization than those 
advanced by the stadium developers, the local government and 
the media. The most recent developments on the Near West 
Side, precipitated by the construction and presence of the 
United Center, point toward the creation of a space and a 
culture not inclusive of its current residents. 
Gentrification, increased cost of redevelopment and higher 
taxes will likely force many of the current residents to 
move elsewhere, thus reshaping this part of the city. 
Government and Corporate Partnership in Stadium Development 
This study also outlines the role of the government in 
these stadium projects. Though the degree of involvement 
and financial contribution to the plans varied, a clear 
partnership between government and private interests can be 
observed. 
The government played a critical role in each of these 
three situations. The most intense government support of 
private interests can be observed in the case of South 
Armour Square and of the new Comiskey Park. The local and 
state governments not only financed the construction of a 
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new facility for the White Sox, but also agreed to be 
responsible for its management and operation. In addition 
to this extraordinary, direct, financial assistance, the 
government, at public cost, assumed the responsibility for 
the removal and relocation of community residents. 
In the case of the installation of lights at Wrigley 
Field in Lake View, the local government again played a key 
role. It was the mayoral support of these stadium 
development plans which resulted in the approval of a City 
Council resolution, making night games at Wrigley Field 
possible. 
Finally, the government proved to be in support of the 
stadium development proposals on the Near West Side. The 
city government promoted these proposals as a means of 
redevelopment, while playing a key role in the production of 
a publicly financed package which would make the 
construction of a stadium for the Bears in that community 
possible. Though this plan eventually failed, the 
government later assisted with the infrastructural 
development of the United Center, while providing sales and 
luxury skybox tax incentives. 
The professional franchises utilized four methods to 
ensure that the government would support their goals. 
Specifically, they (1) threatened to leave Chicago, coercing 
the city and the state into distributing 'necessary' public 
funds to support their goals, (2) employed economic impact 
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studies to show their economic contribution to the city, 
county and state, (3) argued that the franchises' presence 
assisted in the advancement of civic pride while noting the 
special relationship between the public and the teams, and 
(4) argued that their proposed plans would result into 
positive urban redevelopment. 
The utilization of these methods can be seen in all 
three of these cases. For example, both the White Sox and 
the Cubs threatened to leave Chicago unless their demands 
were met. The same two franchises also published economic 
impact studies to showcase their contribution to Chicago's 
and Illinois' economies. The Tribune Co., through various 
surveys also attempted to bring to the attention of the 
public and the politicians that Wrigley Field was a special 
ballpark and that the Cubs were an integral part of 
Chicago's history. The Tribune Co., advocated that 
Chicagoans strongly identified with the Cubs and Wrigley 
Field, thus a move of the Cubs out of Chicago would mean the 
possible demolition of the historic ballpark. 
The Bears, the Bulls and the Blackhawks promoted the 
concept of urban redevelopment on the Near West Side, 
claiming a new sports stadium or arena would provide 
economic opportunities and help revitalize the area. 
Though the community responses and community effects of the 
stadium development plans were different in each of the 
three case studies presented earlier, the driving force 
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behind these stadium proposals by these professional 
franchises remained the same; a search toward profits and 
increased capital. Thus, government support of free 
enterprise, expressed through stadium development becomes a 
central finding of this analysis. 
The Role of these Urban Social Movements 
But what role do these urban community movements play 
in society and more specifically, can the community 
responses discussed in this study inform us of the dynamics 
of social change in the urban environment? What is the 
social significance of these localized urban movements? 
Answering these questions will allow both a connection and 
an interpretation of the events which occurred in South 
Armour Square, Lake View and Near West Side in Chicago 
during the 1980's and 1990's into a larger social and urban 
context. 
Castells (1977; 1980; 1983) examines urban social 
movements within capitalism. Since the city is a social 
product, class conflict and production relations contribute 
to the emergence of social movements. The capitalist class 
reorganizes social forms, and according to Castells results 
in "changes [in] the existing meaning .... A social movement 
develops its own meaning over a given space in contradiction 
to the structurally dominant meaning" (Castells, 1983: 304-
305) . 
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In this regard, the stadium development plans, an 
expression of the dominant political and economic interests, 
perpetuate urban change as indicated by the effect that 
these stadium development plans have on these communities 
and the city in general. The conflict between the stadium 
developers and the communities provides the contested 
meaning of space within these communities. 
This notion of contested meaning of urban development 
is best exemplified in the cases of the Near West Side and 
the South Armour Square. Specifically, the city, the 
developers and the media viewed a new stadium differently 
than did the residents of these communities. The plans of a 
new, open-air sports stadium on the Near West Side, for 
example, would develop into an urban redevelopment project, 
capable of rescuing that community from its current 
condition. On the other hand, the community leadership 
attributed a different meaning to redevelopment, or at least 
how redevelopment ought to take place. As Gates noted to 
me: 
They [stadium developers] were undermining our 
intelligence. Like we do not know what is best for our 
community .... Others want to tell you what is best for 
you. Our approach was that we wanted, the community 
that is, to define our own destiny. We want to make 
the decisions as to what is best for us. Why? Because 
we live here, we are the ones to be affected by the new 
construction, the traffic and all that. That's why. 
Similarly, in the case of the new Comiskey Park development 
in South Armour Square, Radford-Hill noted: 
The case of a sports stadium is not a public benefit. 
It advances the interests of a few and gives nothing 
back to the community affected. 
As a result of these conflicting perceptions of urban 
meaning, and through the struggles that ensue, an 
understanding of the process of urban change emerges. 
At the same time, these urban movements proved quite 
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limited. Although a variation in the level of success can 
be observed, in the end, the interests of the developers 
proved overwhelming. In all three cases the communities 
proved incapable of suspending the construction of new 
stadiums in South Armour Square and Near West Side, and the 
installation of lights at Wrigley Field. What then becomes 
the significance of these community movements? Is there a 
long term social significance? 
Castells (1983:319) views these movements within the 
larger context of social change by noting that these 
movements alone are incapable of producing social change. 
While reflecting on the role of the urban movements of this 
study, one can conclude that all three of these movements 
lost the possibility of a radical focus. A focus which 
would have attempted to challenge the institutionalization 
of the dominant interests at the structural level. Rather, 
all three of the urban movements evolved into interests 
groups, concentrating on advancing single objectives (i.e, 
resident relocation, neighborhood protection, etc) . 
Yet, on the macro level of analysis, these urban social 
movements can be viewed as assisting in the production of 
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social change since they" ... are the organizational forms, 
the live schools, where the new social movements of our 
emerging society are taking place, growing up, learning to 
breath, out of reach of the state apparatuses ... " (Castells, 
1983: 331). In this regard, the urban social movements of 
discussed here, while disjointed, sporadic, and powerless, 
have the ability to contribute to the creation of a culture 
structure capable of producing social change. Specifically, 
the language employed by the community organizers, the 
community tactics, the exposure of the dominant interests, 
etc., can have an influence on other urban social movements. 
Conclusion 
The responses of these three communities to the plans 
of the stadium developers varied. Structural factors such 
as race, class and the political support of private 
interests played a critical role in the outcomes. In 
addition, South Armour Square and the Near West Side, 
accepted the fact that the developers would eventually 
succeed, thus, contributing to the construction of the two 
sports facilities. 
It also becomes clear that stadiums and stadium 
development plans, can have both direct and indirect effects 
on the urban environment. In this regard, both the physical 
and the cultural organization of community living is 
transformed. Finally, the role of the government in this 
process becomes crucial. In all three case studies 
presented, the government worked in accord with the 
developers to realize their capitalist interests. 
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In the end, a combination of government, economic and 
social factors are transcended through the stadium 
developments of this study. In the process, an opportunity 
to better understand urban change and urban life is 
revealed. 
CHAPTER 11 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has investigated the relationship between 
urban communities and stadium development within the larger 
scope of capitalist relations. Urban centers across America 
have departed from being identified as centers of 
manufacturing and industry and have increasingly become 
involved in promoting themselves as cities of culture. This 
shift in direction is consistent with the emergence of a 
post-industrial society, elements of which have included 
decentralization and globalization. The economies which 
have emerged from these structural changes can be identified 
as culture industries. Such industries have included the 
arts, urban tourism and sports. 
Professional sports teams have come to be viewed by 
local governments, civic boosters, the media and the teams 
themselves as significant economic and social/cultural 
contributors. In this regard, these sports franchises 
differ from other local businesses since they can draw from 
their symbolic and cultural value to become intensely 
connected with the cities themselves. The investigation of 
the urban environment, including urban change, requires a 
theoretical framework which integrates cultural factors into 
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an analysis of political and economic aspects. 
The stadium becomes the link between the professional 
team and the city. A new or refurbished stadium provides 
the sports franchise with an opportunity to substantially 
increase its profit through advertizing and luxury seating. 
The city on the other hand, since its cultural image and 
perceived progress relies on the presence of the team, will 
have to invest in the construction of sports facilities. 
Spending on these projects by local and/or state 
government proves to be another example of how public 
support of private interests within the urban environment 
occurs. Rationalizing these governmental expenditures 
becomes of primary concern to public officials, the media 
and the franchise owners. In order for the public to accept 
this spending, an environment supporting its approval must 
be produced. 
Within this context sports and the stadium become first 
represented in economic terms. Through the use of 
multiplier effects and economic impact studies, spending 
advocates argue that the presence of the team and of the 
stadium will result in regional economic growth and urban 
redevelopment. Secondly, this line of thinking is followed 
by social and cultural arguments which outline community 
building and social cohesion as the outcome of the 
activities of the professional team. These arguments are 
advanced by the media which is often positioned to play a 
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public policy role. 
Yet, research shows that the multiplier effects as a 
well as the publicized economic impact studies are seriously 
exaggerated. Problems with definitions, estimations, 
assumptions, and vested interests produce findings which 
prove unfounded. Though one can accept the proposed social 
functions of professional sports, the extremes to which 
these arguments extend seriously undermine the reported 
benefits. Thus, construction of a stadium and the presence 
of a professional sports franchise for the city, in the 
majority of the cases, does not provide a return equivalent 
to the reported benefits. 
At the same time, the drive amongst urban centers 
toward urban redevelopment through the use of culture 
industries also becomes apparent. Sports, like the arts, 
museums, conventions, theme parks and other related 
entertainment industries stimulate public investment and 
generate government support for stadium construction and 
development. Cities compete to attract professional 
franchises by offering huge subsidies and state-of-the-art 
facilities. In the process, the city develops an identity 
which often becomes connected to the team and its players. 
For example, a recent NIKE ad on a Chicago expressway 
highlights a Bears football jersey with pads and the slogan: 
"City of Big Shoulders." Similarly, Michael Jordan has 
become a role model serving as an ambassador for the 
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Chicago. The success of the Bulls of the NBA has produced a 
world-wide following and the name of the city which the team 
represents, becomes depicted in sportswear worn by fans all 
around the world. These sports-based, culturally driven 
representations, do not powerfully communicate a city as a 
place of industry and a hub of economic activity. Rather, 
Chicago now becomes portrayed as a sporting city, a city of 
entertainment and culture. The use and role of these images 
then become part of a strategy toward urban growth. As a 
result, sports is a culture industry which takes center 
stage, able to communicate and construct a new urban 
identity. 
This study further analyzes three stadium development 
plans in Chicago; the New Comiskey Park in South Armour 
Square, the installation of lights at Wrigley Field in Lake 
View, and the construction of the United Center on the Near 
West Side. These investigations cover the political economy 
of these projects, the community responses, and the 
potential effects of these plans on the communities. These 
case studies allow for the following conclusions to emerge: 
(1) Stadium development substantially increases the profits 
of professional franchises. 
(2) There is strong relationship between the interests of 
the stadium developers and the actions of the public 
officials (local and/or state governments), who work to 
support private enterprise. 
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(3) Multiplier figures and social/cultural rationales are 
employed to advance the interests of the professional sports 
teams. 
(4) The community response to these stadium development 
plans varies since the social and economic organization of 
these communities differs. 
(5) Race matters since minority communities prove to be more 
directly affected by these projects. At the same time, 
because of the racial make-up of these communities, the 
developers and the government find it easier to assert their 
agenda. 
(6) Social inequality proves to be the outcome of these 
projects within the urban environment. 
(7) Effective community organizing proves critical in 
maintaining continuous government support. 
(8) The media plays an important role as it works to support 
the interests of the developers. 
(9) The stadium as an urban development tool is capable of 
not only reorganizing the physical space but also of 
transforming local culture. Thus, the stadium can effect 
urban change. 
(10) A coalition of government, the media, and capitalists 
works to advance private interests. 
(11) Culture becomes a driving force behind urban 
development and urban change. 
This study also communicates the need for additional 
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research regarding the relationship between urban 
communities and stadium development. Specifically, the 
following areas are identified where further analysis can be 
conducted: 
(1) Investigation of the political and economic processes 
through which the agenda of the stadium developers is 
advanced. 
(2) Examination of the ways through which cultural factors 
are employed to conceal the implications of these projects. 
(3) Assessment of the proposed benefits resulting from these 
projects. 
(4) Analysis of community effects and urban change. 
(5) Exploration of the changing nature of urban centers as 
culture cities and the role which sports play within this 
framework. 
The use of an analytic framework which combines cultural 
factors to political and economic forces expands our 
understanding of the urban environment and informs us that 
even sports contribute to shaping the nature of urban 
centers across America as we move toward the 21st century. 
APPENDIX A 
CHANGES OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN CENSUS DATA TRACKS 
WITHIN ONE MILE SURROUNDING WRIGLEY FIELD, CHICAGO BETWEEN 
1980 AND 1990 IN PERCENTAGE POINTS 
20-24 
25-34 
35-44 
over 60 
Living alone 
Living with 
non-relatives 
Never Married (men) 
Never Married (worn) 
Bachelor's or higher 
Lived in same house 
five years ago 
Use public trans 
for work 
Managerial and 
Professional 
Technical, Sales 
and administrative 
support 
Median Income in 
thousand dollars 
Rounded Mean value of 
housing units 
in thousands 
1980 - 1990 
+ 1. 2 
+ 11. 3 
+ 4.3 
3.1 
+ 6.6 
+ 8.0 
+ 13.7 
+ 17.7 
49.7 (1990)* 
8.3 
+ 3.3 
+ 15.6 
+ 1. 5 
+ 17.2 
+ 144 
* Due to changes in categories regarding educational 
attainment between the 1980 and 1990 census, the figure 
reflects the percentage of those with Bachelor's degree or 
higher within the tracks surrounding Wrigley Field (U.S. 
Census 1980, 1990). 
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APPENDIX B 
CHANGES OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN CENSUS DATA TRACKS 
WITHIN HALF A MILE SURROUNDING WRIGLEY FIELD, CHICAGO 
BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990 IN PERCENTAGE POINTS 
(U.S. CENSUS 1980, 1990) 
20-24 
25-34 
35-44 
over 60 
Living alone 
Living with 
non relatives 
Never Married (men) 
Never Married (worn) 
B.A. or higher 
Lived in same house 
five years ago 
Use public trans 
for work 
Managerial and 
Professional 
Technical, Sales 
and administrative 
I 80 I 90 
#604 
10.7 
23.7 
12.3 
14.7 
16.0 
5.7 
40.0 
30.6 
N/A 
11. 2 
33.6 
16.5 
10.3 
19.6 
13.0 
53.3 
47.3 
49.6 
45.4 39.3 
35.3 37.7 
23.2 44.3 
support 29.8 25.2 
Median Income in 
thousand dollars 16.1 31.9 
Rounded Mean value of 
housing units 
in thousands 42 172 
344 
YEAR 
'80 '90 
#605 
9.0 
19.1 
7.0 
34.0 
31. 0 
4.3 
37.6 
21. 9 
N/A 
5.8 
22.8 
12.7 
37.5 
36.1 
8.5 
38.9 
31. 0 
21. 3 
60.2 47.8 
49.9 41.4 
20.6 31.5 
25.1 29.6 
5.2 17.0 
42 148 
I 80 I 90 
#606 
10.2 
36.6 
11. 9 
13.7 
29.7 
12.8 
56.4 
41. 9 
N/A 
9.7 
33.3 
19.8 
10.4 
32.5 
13.9 
56.3 
51.2 
48.5 
47.3 33.8 
47.2 56.5 
47.4 44.0 
38.3 36.6 
16.3 31.9 
119 275 
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CHANGES OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN CENSUS DATA TRACKS 
WITHIN HALF A MILE SURROUNDING WRIGLEY FIELD, CHICAGO 
BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990 IN PERCENTAGE POINTS 
(U.S. CENSUS 1980, 1990) 
YEAR 
'80 '90 '80 '90 '80 '90 
#607 #610 #611 
20-24 10.4 14.7 12.8 17.4 10.7 15.3 
25-34 25.9 32.4 28.6 46.3 28.7 46.2 
35-44 11.4 13.5 11. 5 15.8 11.4 13.0 
Over 60 13.6 6.6 9.6 5.6 10.2 7.1 
Living alone 21. 5 19.3 18.1 25.1 15.6 23.0 
Living with 
non relatives 6.0 14.1 9.8 23.5 8.5 20.8 
Never Married (men) 43.3 60.9 52.5 69.9 47.7 65.2 
Never Married (worn) 29.2 45.7 39.7 64.9 35.0 58.7 
B.A. or higher N/A 37.8 N/A 61. 2 N/A 57.0 
Lived in same house 
five years ago 46.0 37.0 29.4 18.9 39.5 26.6 
Use public trans 
for work 63.0 51. 0 65.0 54.2 34.4 57.4 
Managerial and 
Professional 29.7 32.1 27.6 49.0 35.9 42.4 
Technical, Sales 
and administrative 
support 26.7 27.2 26.4 29.7 28.2 38.9 
Median Income in 
thousand dollars 13.7 23.4 14.7 34.7 13.6 32.0 
Rounded Mean value of 
housing units 
in thousands 40 200 72 212 41 190 
346 
CHANGES OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN CENSUS DATA TRACKS 
WITHIN HALF A MILE SURROUNDING WRIGLEY FIELD, CHICAGO 
BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990 IN PERCENTAGE POINTS 
(U.S. CENSUS 1980, 1990) 
YEAR 
'80 '90 '80 '90 '80 '90 
#612 #614 #615 
20-24 11. 8 11. 8 12.2 7.5 10.4 13.9 
25-34 27.9 41.4 26.1 36.0 25.4 39.0 
35-44 10.8 17.2 12.2 19.4 11. 9 17.8 
over 60 13.0 10.2 15.9 12.1 16.7 10.4 
Living alone 12.3 23.2 18.5 25.9 15.2 21. 2 
Living with 
non relatives 8.5 16.6 6.9 10.9 5.9 17.9 
Never married (men) 44.4 59.5 39.7 53.4 38.4 58.0 
Never married (worn) 37.1 52.8 36.5 47.5 31. 9 51. 7 
B.A. or higher N/A 60.2 N/A 48.7 N/A 58.4 
Lived in same house 
five years ago 37.3 41. 7 32.3 40.6 47.5 38.5 
Use public trans 
for work 44.0 47.6 37.9 42.8 41. 8 45.9 
Managerial and 
Professional 26.2 51.4 36.7 44.1 26.6 48.9 
Technical, Sales 
and administrative 
support 26.0 29.1 31. 2 33.1 29.6 32.9 
Median Income in 
thousand dollars 17.2 38.3 15.8 34.4 18.8 36.9 
Rounded Mean value of 
housing units 
in thousands 53 95 62 250 51 262 
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CHANGES OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN CENSUS DATA TRACKS 
WITHIN HALF A MILE SURROUNDING WRIGLEY FIELD, CHICAGO 
BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990 IN PERCENTAGE POINTS 
(U.S. CENSUS 1980, 1990) 
YEAR 
'80 '90 '80 '90 '80 '90 
#616 #617 #621 
20-24 13.4 10.8 13.2 21. 9 13.6 20.2 
25-34 28.3 45.5 29.4 38.1 29.5 39.6 
35-44 14.5 16.9 10.5 13.5 10.8 13.1 
over 60 11. 5 7.5 10.3 8.5 10.9 11.8 
Living alone 20.3 41. 5 19.0 16.5 20.7 27.0 
Living with 
non relatives 10.2 14.0 11. 6 24.8 10.0 22.1 
Never married (men) 50.0 71. 6 55.3 72.2 57.4 72.7 
Never married (worn) 40 .3 59.1 36.0 67.7 38.7 60.9 
B.A. or higher N/A 59.6 N/A 55.0 N/A 52.6 
Lived in same house 
five years ago 23.6 20.8 51. 5 26.1 31. 7 23.3 
Use public trans 
for work 34.8 50.8 49.9 50.5 49.3 56.4 
Managerial and 
Professional 52.7 53.8 22.3 44.0 31.4 44.7 
Technical, Sales 
and administrative 
support 40.2 32.8 30.0 31. 0 31. 6 36.1 
Median Income in 
thousand dollars 16.6 31.4 17.7 38.2 11.4 27.8 
Rounded Mean value of 
housing units 
in thousands 46 167 62 262 57 206 
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CHANGES OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN CENSUS DATA TRACKS 
WITHIN HALF A MILE SURROUNDING WRIGLEY FIELD, CHICAGO 
BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990 IN PERCENTAGE POINTS 
(U.S. CENSUS 1980, 1990) 
YEAR 
'80 '90 '80 '90 '80 '90 
#622 #623 #624 
20-24 13.5 13.3 11. 0 9.1 11. 2 10.2 
25-34 24.7 39.9 21. 7 37.2 17.8 32.1 
35-44 10.4 17.5 12.1 16.2 12.0 12.8 
over 60 10.3 6.9 15.2 10.8 16.4 13.7 
Living alone 12.8 22.3 14.7 22.4 11. 6 16.7 
Living with 
non relatives 7.9 16.4 6.4 11. 8 5.7 11. 7 
Never Married (men) 47.7 58.0 40.7 54.9 39.3 50.7 
Never Married (worn) 34.9 53.0 29.1 45.3 27.7 38.7 
B.A. or higher N/A 52.4 N/A 44.2 N/A 38.9 
Lived in same house 
five years ago 25.3 32.3 60.8 41. 6 53.2 46.5 
Use public trans 
for work 39.8 43.6 34.2 47.4 38.3 30.9 
Managerial and 
Professional 23.4 47.6 14.4 47.3 20.0 47.5 
Technical, Sales 
and administrative 
support 28.1 29.5 24.0 31. 8 32.8 28.1 
Median Income in 
thousand dollars 14.4 34.5 11. 5 32.2 16.2 33.2 
Rounded Mean value of 
housing units 
in thousands 47 197 32 158 37 177 
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